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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
Aaron T. McDonald 
Doctor of Philosophy 
Department of Management 
June 2020 
Title: Restoring Undermined Institutions: How Firms Combine Nonmarket Strategies to 
Respond to Digital Piracy 
How do firms strengthen their institutional environment after the unplanned and 
radical weakening of a strong regulatory institution? For some industries, regulative 
institutions play a dominant role in defining the institutional environment by providing 
stability and certainty for firms. Yet, environmental jolts can radically weaken regulative 
institutions causing increased uncertainty and instability in the institutional environment. 
Driven by this uncertainty, firms may attempt to strengthen their weakened institutional 
environment. 
By exploring this question in the context of weakened copyright protection after the 
rise of digital piracy, I can make important contributions to the institutional change 
literature. Specifically, I build new theory on how firms coordinate actions targeting 
multiple institutional pillars (e.g. regulative and normative) to change their institutional 
environment and the institutional environment of different industries. I test these theories 
using a longitudinal dataset of the corporate political activity of copyright-reliant firms, 
and the copyright infringement takedown notices sent to Google. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 Institutions are broadly defined as “cognitive, normative, and regulative structures 
and activities that provide stability and meaning to social activities” (Scott, 1995, p. 33). 
This broad definition captures the three types of institutions, called institutional pillars, 
which affect firm behavior. Regulative institutions include laws and public policies 
(North, 1990; Williamson, 2000), normative institutions are values and norms (March & 
Olsen, 1989), and cognitive institutions are the cultural and cognitive schema (DiMaggio, 
1997). Much of the early institutional research in management has focused on how 
institutions shape firm behavior (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983).  
Yet, since DiMaggio (1988) introduced the concept of institutional entrepreneurs, 
defined as firms intentionally creating divergent change in institutions, much 
organizational research has shifted the other direction to how firms change institutions 
(Battilana, Leca, & Boxenbaum, 2009; Micelotta, Lounsbury, & Greenwood, 2017). The 
institutional entrepreneurship research stream has demonstrated that while firms do face 
isomorphic pressures from institutions, they also can act with agency and change 
institutions (Battilana et al., 2009; Oliver, 1992). As such, scholars have spent much 
effort to improve our understanding of why and how firms change institutions.  
Despite over 30 years of research on institutional change, new theoretical 
understanding and empirical evidence are consistently being added (Battilana et al., 2009; 
Micelotta et al., 2017). An apparent takeaway from this literature is that institutional 
change is a complex phenomenon that appears in many parts of society. Given how 
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complex institutional change is, it is not surprising that we still have much to learn about 
how firms change institutions.  
 Two areas particularly stand out as limiting our conceptualization of institutional 
change. First, institutional researchers readily recognize that all three institutional pillars 
(e.g., regulative, normative, and cognitive) are present and interconnected in an 
institutional environment, even if one pillar is dominant (Hirsch, 1997; Hoffman, 1999).  
Despite this recognition, most prior research on institutional change shows that firms 
only target a singular institutional pillar. Therefore, we know little about how firms target 
multiple institutional pillars to enact institutional change.  
 Despite the lack of research on firms targeting multiple institutional pillars, we 
have learned that other institutional actors, such as social movement organizations, target 
multiple institutional pillars (Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert, 2009; B. G. King & Pearce, 2010). 
For example, the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union social movement organization, 
founded in 1874, targeted cognitive, normative, and regulative institutional pillars in their 
push for Prohibition in the U.S (Hiatt et al., 2009; Wade, Swaminathan, & Saxon, 1998). 
As such, the social movement literature provides evidence that organizations can 
successfully enact institutional change by targeting multiple institutional pillars.  
However, as institutional change actors, social movement organizations greatly differ 
from firms in their motivation, resources, and position in the market environment (Ahuja 
& Yayavaram, 2011; Davis, McAdam, Scott, & Zald, 2005; B. G. King & Pearce, 2010; 
North, 1990). Therefore, it is likely that firms may differ in how they target multiple 
institutional pillars to enact institutional change.  
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 As such, there is reason to believe that firms do target multiple institutional pillars 
and that doing so may increase their ability to enact institutional change. Therefore, new 
research is needed to better understand how and why firms target multiple institutional 
pillars to enact institutional change. Specifically, understanding the relationship between 
the mechanisms that target different institutional pillars is important, as it is possible that 
combining institutional pillars could result in a more effective approach to institutional 
change than targeting a single institutional pillar.  
 Additionally, studying how firms target multiple institutional pillars allows for 
exploring an adjacent area of institutional change that focuses on the tension between 
institutional actors during the change process. Institutional change is often a tense process 
involving multiple actors either for or against the change at hand (Seo & Creed, 2002). 
Prior research has identified organizations can be at odds with each other over 
institutional change, such as firms enacting change in a single industry, as in the case 
when accounting firms introduced a new organizational form (Greenwood & Suddaby, 
2006). Another example of this tension is when social movement organizations are at 
odds with firms in an industry as the social movement organizations push for institutional 
change for issue improvement (Sine & David, 2003). 
 Yet, despite recognizing tensions around institutional change, we have little 
research that examines how firms in one industry can enact institutional change on firms 
in another industry.  This is somewhat surprising, given firms may increase their 
performance by enacting institutional change on firms in another industry by engaging in 
rent-seeking (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011) or lowering transaction costs (North, 1990).  
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Therefore, new research is needed that explores how firms enact institutional change on 
firms in different industries. Specifically, researching the relationship between the 
mechanisms that target different institutional pillars may provide insights into how these 
mechanisms can be used for offensive actions to enact institutional change, or as 
defensive actions to prevent the institutional change from occurring.  
My dissertation aims to provide new theoretical and empirical knowledge to fill 
these critical gaps in the institutional change literature.  I achieve this by focusing on a 
novel institutional problem that allows for exploring these two areas. The institutional 
problem asks how firms strengthen their institutional environment after the unplanned 
and radical weakening of strong regulative institutions? When strong regulative 
institutional environments radically weaken, the economic incentives and sanctions that 
constrained firm behavior are greatly reduced (North, 1990; Oliver, 1992; Peng & Heath, 
1996). The weakening of these constraints means a firm’s past strategies may no longer 
be viable (Oliver, 1992). Additionally, firms face increased uncertainty on how to behave 
in this weakened environment (North, 1990). These challenges mean that firms will likely 
attempt to strengthen the radically weakened institution.  
Firms attempting to strengthen their institutional environment after the unplanned 
and radical weakening of a strong regulatory institution face unique challenges. First, 
even though some regulative institutions are made ineffective, the overall government 
and legal structure that comprises regulative institutions are still present. Additionally, the 
specific regulations and policies affected are weakened but not removed. This means 
firms may be able to restore the regulative institutions to their former strength. However, 
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firms also can implement normative institutional change to strengthen their institutional 
environment. Yet, organizational scholars have little understanding of how firms 
strengthen the institutional environment in this scenario.  
Prior research has explored some aspects of regulative institutional weakening. 
For example, research on deregulation investigates how the intentional and planned 
removal of regulations affects firm behavior (Haveman, 1993b; Kim, 2013; Sine & 
David, 2003). However, how firms are able to respond to regulative institutional 
weakening from deregulation differs significantly from unplanned regulative institutional 
weakening. With unplanned regulative institutional weakening, the regulative institution 
is still present but is ineffective, whereas with deregulation the regulative institution is 
fully removed. Therefore, firms in the deregulation scenario face such an altered 
regulatory environment that further regulative change action is unlikely (Dacin, 
Goodstein, & Scott, 2002). However, firms in the unplanned scenario can still pursue 
regulative change action. Thus, a gap remains in organizational scholars' understanding of 
how firms strengthen their institutional environment after the unplanned and radical 
weakening of strong regulatory institutions. 
Additionally, even though the unplanned radical weakening of regulative 
institutions has been under-researched by organizational scholars,  this scenario 
isbecoming more prominent in industry.  As economies become more dependent on 
innovation for growth (Fagerberg & Verspagen, 2002) and technology-driven industries 
continue to grow (Bartels, 2017), it is likely that technology-based disruptions will 
increase (Khanagha, Ramezan Zadeh, Mihalache, & Volberda, 2018). Recent 
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technological disruption examples include autonomous car development challenging 
regulations on personal and commercial driving (Araya, 2019), and social media 
weakening regulations on political advertisement disclosures (M. Lee, 2018). As public 
policy often struggles to keep up with technological developments (Moses, 2007, 2013), 
firms will likely continue to face weakened regulative institutional environments in the 
future.  
This dissertation will explore the remaining theoretical questions and growing 
practical relevance around how firms strengthen their institutional environment after the 
unplanned and radical weakening of strong regulative institutions. From this exploration, 
I build and test theory on how firms manage the relationship between regulative and 
normative institutional change action to strengthen their institutional environment. 
Additional theory is created on how firms combine these institutional change pillars 
through two nonmarket strategies, corporate political activity and industry self-
regulation, to enact institutional change in a different industry.  
Digital IP Institutional Environment 
To explore how firms strengthen their institutional environment after the 
unplanned and radical weakening of strong regulative institutions, I focus on digital 
copyright intellectual property (IP) institutional environment, which is especially well 
suited for exploring the research question. Before digitization, the copyright institutional 
environment was comprised of strong, stable regulative institutions. However, the digital 
copyright IP institutional environment received a major exogenous environmental jolt in 
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the form of media digitization and the internet’s proliferation, the result of which 
radically weakened the regulative institutions for copyright protection.  
Since the digitization jolt, firms in the music, movies, and television industries 
have experienced major shifts in their ability to effectively protect and enforce their 
copyrights. Attempts to update regulative institutions, such as the Digital Millennium 
Copyright Act (1998), have been largely ineffective at strengthening digital copyright 
protection (N. R. Council, 2000; Guo & Meng, 2014). As such, digital copyright firms are 
operating in an environment without strong regulative institutions. Therefore, digital 
copyright firms face the challenge of needing to strengthen their institutional 
environment without reliance on the once-strong regulative institutions.  
I use this context to test hypotheses about how firms use nonmarket strategies to 
instigate normative and regulative institutional change. Specifically, I explore how digital 
copyright firms use internet takedown requests made to online service providers such as 
web search engines.  Internet takedown requests are requests made by copyright holders 
to online service providers to remove copyright-infringing material. By reviewing the 
legislative and market context of internet takedown requests, I show how internet 
takedown requests are used to apply pressure to online service providers to self-regulate. 
Additionally, I collected lobbying activity from digital copyright firms as a measure of 
corporate political activity for regulative institutional change. With these two primary 
datasets and the addition of multiple control data, I constructed a panel dataset from 2012 
to 2018. Fixed effect models were used to test hypotheses about how firms engage in 
normative and regulative institutional change actions. 
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Findings and Contributions 
The findings from this study inform the two targeted theoretical gaps in the 
institutional change literature discussed previously. First, this study theoretically and 
empirically demonstrates a positive relationship between regulative and normative 
change actions exists in some institutional environments. Specifically, as firms increase 
their engagement in regulative change action, their engagement in normative change 
action increases. This was demonstrated through findings that show increased corporate 
political activity from digital copyright firms is related to these firms placing increased 
normative change pressure on enabling firms to self-regulate. Further, this study shows 
that under the increased normative pressure, the enabling firms enact self-regulation that 
culminates in institutional change in the digital copyright institutional environment. 
Second, this study theoretically and empirically illustrates how firms in one 
industry enact institutional change on firms in a different industry. Specifically, this study 
finds that digital copyright firms engage in a combination of corporate political activity 
for regulative institutional change and pressuring enabling firms to self-regulate for 
normative institutional change to enact institutional change in the web search industry. 
Further, this study theoretically and empirically shows that firms in industries reliant on 
digital copyrights engage in offensive institutional change actions, while firms in the web 
search industry respond with defensive institutional change actions.  
While additional results provide more nuance to these two main contributions, 
which are discussed in Chapter 7, these two main findings make significant contributions 
to the institutional change literature. First, by illustrating how firms strategically 
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coordinate change action targeting multiple institutional pillars (e.g. regulative and 
normative), this study challenges the convention to keep regulative and normative 
institutional change separate (Scott, 2010). By realizing firms coordinate action to target 
multiple institutional pillars, our understanding of institutional change action and 
outcomes is increased.  
Second, by illustrating how firms in one industry improve their business 
environment by intentionally changing the institutional environment, this study informs 
the established literature on how institutional change can be used for offensive strategic 
purposes (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011; Peng, Sun, Pinkham, & Chen, 2009). The view of 
institutional change as a competitive strategy has not received much attention in 
organizational research, though calls for more research in this area regularly occur (Ahuja 
& Yayavaram, 2011; Dorobantu, Kaul, & Zelner, 2017; Peng et al., 2009). However, 
given the impact on performance for both the offensive industry and the defensive 
industry, strategy scholars should be interested in this perspective.  
These main findings and contributions are discussed more in detail in Chapter 7. 
Findings on nonmarket strategy coordination, foreign firms engaging in institutional 
change, changing IP institutional environment responses, and how firms respond to 
regulative institutional change are also discussed in Chapter 7. 
The remainder of this dissertation begins with a literature review in Chapter 2.  
The literature review is structured in two main parts. The first part focuses on general 
institutional change and highlights how firms targeting multiple institutional pillars is 
under-researched. This includes a review of firm motivation for engaging in institutional 
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change and a discussion on Suchman’s (1995a) institutional change model. Reviewing 
Suchman’s model highlights a greater need for research into combining change actions to 
target multiple institutional pillars. Additionally, the deregulation and social movement 
literature are discussed, as these provide insights on firms targeting multiple institutional 
pillars.  The second part focuses on institutional change research that is pertinent to the 
specific institutional problem for this study. This includes a brief review of institutional 
environments and a detailed review of IP institutional environments. Additionally, this 
section reviews nonmarket strategies as mechanisms for institutional change.   
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the digital copyright institutional context 
which is the empirical setting for the dissertation. This includes a summary of the 
digitization jolt that weakened regulative institutions. Then I discuss the responses from 
regulators and digital copyright reliant firms to address the regulatory weakening. 
In Chapter 4, I explore the institutional change sequence firms undertake to 
strengthen their institutional environment after the unplanned and radical weakening of a 
strong regulatory institution. I then focus on a specific aspect of this sequence, namely 
when firms engage in regulative and normative change actions simultaneously. To aid 
theory development in this aspect, I frame this theory in the context of the digital 
copyright institutional environment. By doing so, I create hypotheses about various 
aspects of how firms engage in regulative and normative institutional change actions in 
this environment.  
In Chapter 5, I review the data and methods used to analyze the theory from 
Chapter 4. This includes a discussion on the construct validity and operationalization for 
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takedown notices as the primary dependent variable. Additionally, construct validity and 
operationalization for corporate political activity measures and various control variables 
are discussed. Finally, this chapter specifies the models used for testing the study’s 
hypotheses.  
Further, Chapter 6 discusses the results of the empirical tests for each hypothesis. 
Chapter 7 elaborates on how the empirical findings in Chapter 6 contribute to various 
areas of management theory. Chapter 7 is structured such that the first part discusses the 
broadest contributions to institutional change literature and the second part discusses 
more focused contributions to institutional change and nonmarket strategies literature. 
Finally, Chapter 8 provides reflections and closing remarks for the dissertation.  
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II. Literature Review 
 This dissertation aims to explore and contribute to the institutional change 
literature in two areas. The first area focuses on how firms simultaneously target multiple 
institutional pillars to enact change in their institutional environment. Therefore, I begin 
the literature review by providing an overview of why firms change institutions. Next, I 
review Suchman’s (1995a) Multistage Model of Institutionalization as a basis for 
discussing how firms are faced with multiple options on how to enact institutional 
change. Additionally, Suchman’s model is used to highlight that firms targeting multiple 
institutional pillars with their change actions is not well understood. 
Next, I review the literature that relates to how firms target multiple institutional 
pillars to enact institutional change. This includes a review of the deregulation literature 
and how firms respond to regulative institutional weakening with normative institutional 
change action. Additionally, a review of the social movement literature shows how social 
movement organizations target multiple institutional pillars and, importantly, how social 
movement organizations differ from firms in their capacity as institutional change actors.  
Finally, this section concludes with a claim that the need exists to study how firms target 
multiple institutional pillars despite what we know from the existing literature.  
The second area focuses on literature related to a novel institutional problem that 
allows for the study of how firms target multiple institutional pillars. The novel 
institutional problem asks how firms strengthen their institutional environment after the 
unplanned and radically weakening of a strong regulative institution. Next, a literature 
review related to this problem begins with a general review of institutional environments 
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before moving on to a focused exploration of IP institutional environments.  Finally, a 
review of the nonmarket strategies literature is conducted to better understand the 
relationship between mechanisms for firms targeting multiple institutional pillars.  
Institutional Change 
Focusing on Firms 
 As mentioned in the introduction, institutional change research has been a popular 
area of study over the last three decades. Accordingly, it is necessary to focus the first 
area of the literature review on elements of institutional change that aid in understanding 
how firms target multiple institutional pillars. Additionally, I restrict the literature review 
to focus on macro institutional change, which focuses on organizations, as opposed to 
micro institutional change, which focuses on individual micro-level processes (see Reay, 
Golden-Biddle, & Germann, 2006). This is because firms are the focal institutional 
change actor for this study. Hence, most of the literature review is focused on firms as the 
institutional actor, except for the review of social movement organizations. As such, 
following is a review as to why firms engage in institutional change.  
Why Firms Engage in Institutional Change 
Prior research has identified several reasons firms engage in institutional change. 
The most dominant in the institutional change literature is that firms engage in 
institutional change to increase their legitimacy (Pacheco, York, Dean, & Sarasvathy, 
2010).  Legitimacy is defined as “a generalized perception or assumption that the actions 
of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system 
of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions (Suchman, 1995b, p. 574).”  Increased 
!  xiii
legitimacy aids firms by helping them achieve organizational goals (DiMaggio, 1988; 
Pacheco et al., 2010). Institutional change action then increases a firm’s legitimacy in a 
few ways.  
 The first occurs when an existing institution becomes misaligned with a firm’s 
practices, which then threatens a firm’s legitimacy (Oliver, 1992). When this occurs, 
firms will engage in institutional change action in an attempt to alter the institution to 
better align with their preferred behavior, which in turn increases the firm’s legitimacy 
(Hiatt et al., 2009; Oliver, 1992). For example, Hiatt, Sine, & Tolbert’s (2009) research 
on deinstitualization demonstrates how entrepreneurial soft drink companies increased 
their legitimacy by helping to instill new institutions around soft drinks as an acceptable 
alternative to alcohol after social movements led to delegitimizing alcohol consumption 
around Prohibition. 
Alternatively, prior literature in institutional economics has focused on how firms 
use institutional change to increase their performance. One way firms increase their 
performance through institutional change is through rent-seeking. Firms engage in rent-
seeking by using institutional change to gain unfair cost reductions or increase the cost 
for competitors (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011; Brownlow, 2007; Majumdar & 
Bhattacharjee, 2014). For example, Majumdar and Bhattacharjee’s research (2014) on 
institutional change effects on manufacturing profitability in India, found that during 
times of strong government regimes, manufacturing firms engaged in rent-seeking by 
influencing politicians for more favorable contracts.  
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Further, increased performance can occur if a firm can change an institution in a 
way that lowers their transaction costs (North, 1990). As lower transaction costs may lead 
to improved economic performance, firms may engage in institutional change action to 
achieve a competitive advantage (North, 1991; Williamson, 1989).  Additionally, firms 
can engage in institutional change action as a means to alter their field in a way in which 
they can utilize new internally developed competencies to create a competitive advantage 
(Garud, Jain, & Kumaraswamy, 2002; Rao, 1994). For example, Garud, Jain, and 
Kumaraswamy’s (2002) research on institutional entrepreneurship in the promotion and 
adoption of technical standards shows how Sun Microsystems promoted Java adoption in 
an attempt to achieve a competitive advantage.  
In summary, at a basic level, firms engage in institutional change to gain 
legitimacy or to gain an economic advantage through rent-seeking or lowering 
transaction costs. Hence, while institutional change is an infrequent occurrence, firms 
have meaningful motivation to engage in institutional change action when it is a suitable 
course of action. A look into why and how firms engage in institutional change via 
Suchman’s Multistage Model of Institutionalization (1995a) follows.  
Institutional Change Model 
 A major contributor as to why the institutional change literature is so vast is due 
to the multiple ways institutional change can manifest. To highlight some variance in 
institutional change actions, I  first give a general overview of Mark Suchman’s 
Multistage Model of Institutionalization (1995a) in Figure 1. Then I dive deeper into the 
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problem and response parts of the model to frame the theoretical motivation for this 
study. 
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Figure 1 
Suchman’s Multistage Model of Institutionalization 
!  
SOURCE: Suchman, M. C. (1995). Localism and globalism in institutional analysis: The 
emergence of contractual norms in venture finance. The institutional construction of 
organizations: International and longitudinal studies, 39-63.  
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 The first step in Suchman’s model is that a novel problem arises that is 
incongruent with the current institutional models. If a novel problem arises that can be 
solved with the current institutional framework, then there is no impetus for firms to 
enact institutional change. The second step is problem cognition in which actors regularly 
accept they are facing a problem which is more likely if the problem is large or recurrent. 
Next is problem naming where the problem is exemplified and associated with similar 
problems and available ad hoc solutions.  
 Assuming there is not an ad hoc solution to the problem and that multiple possible 
solutions are apparent, the model moves to response categorization. Response 
categorization allows actors to create a collection of alternative, workable strategies to 
the problem so the proposed solutions can be evaluated in the response comparison 
phase. After the solution evaluation process, actors then engage in theorization, which is a 
general account of how the institutional system works and which solutions will change 
the system to achieve the desired outcome. Finally, once the strategy and solution are 
chosen and acted upon, the solution can be spread within the social system in this 
institutional context. The diffusion of the new solution leads to institutionalization.   
 In summary, Suchman’s model describes a general demand-side perspective on 
institutional change where institutional change is initiated by actors in response to a 
recurrent problem where no standard solution exists (Scott, 2013). While this model is 
heavily generalized, as empirical studies of institutional change reveal a more intricate 
process, it does highlight that the nature of the problem can lead to a large variance in 
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institutional change actions and outcomes. As such, the problem is the upstream 
beginning that affects the downstream response and eventual institutional change. 
 The large variance in institutional change actions and outcomes is highlighted by 
institutional researchers' multiple attempts to create comprehensive reviews of the 
institutional change literature (see Battilana et al., 2009; Hardy & Maguire, 2008; 
Micelotta et al., 2017; Pacheco et al., 2010).  As such, perhaps it is not surprising that 
despite all the research on institutional change, there are still areas of institutional change 
that are less understood. One such area relates to the part of Suchman’s model dealing 
with multiple visible responses and specifically to firms targeting multiple institutional 
pillars with their change actions.  
 Much institutional change research has focused on firms changing a specific 
institutional pillar (e.g. regulative, normative, or cognitive). However, institutional 
theorists accept that while the institutional environment may be dominated by one pillar 
at a given time, all three pillars are always present and interconnected (Hirsch, 1997; 
Hoffman, 1999). Yet, despite this recognition of the coexistence of institutional pillars, 
relatively little research has investigated how firms engage in multiple institutional 
change actions that target different institutional pillars. Therefore, the next section 
reviews existing literature related to firms targeting different institutional pillars.   
Targeting Multiple Institutional Pillars 
Prior studies that incorporate multiple institutional pillars into institutional change 
research generally fall into one of two areas. The first area centers on firms responding to 
changes in one institutional pillar by taking change action on a different institutional 
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pillar. This institutional phenomenon is exemplified by the deregulation literature. The 
second area is the social movement literature which focuses on social movement 
organizations as the focal actor. 
Deregulation 
 Deregulation is the intentional and planned removal of regulations through 
government action (Haveman, 1993b; Haveman, Russo, & Meyer, 2001). One example is 
when the U.S. energy sector underwent deregulation in the late 1990s. The energy 
industry was transformed when restrictions that prevented private companies from 
producing and selling energy were removed (Delmas, Russo, & Montes-Sancho, 2007; 
Russo, 2001). Another example is the removal, in the 1980s, of federal and state 
regulations that set clear boundaries between different financial services (i.e. residential 
mortgages, credit cards, trust services) in the U.S. financial services industry. This 
allowed savings and loans financial-service firms to expand their offerings and compete 
in new markets (Haveman, 1993b; Haveman et al., 2001). 
 The deregulation literature has found deregulation can lead to a myriad of 
different firm-level outcomes, such as an increase of new entrants, firm survival, and 
organizational change (Haveman, 1993b; Haveman et al., 2001; Sine & David, 2003). 
However, from an institutional change perspective, studies have mainly focused on the 
initial regulative institutional change and a singular normative institutional change 
response.  
For example, Haveman (1993a)  finds that after the financial-service deregulation, 
new normative institutions on financial-service diversification were established by large 
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successful firms that influenced smaller firms in the financial services industry. Similar 
outcomes occurred in Nickerson and Silverman’s study (2007) of the price and entry 
deregulation of the U.S. trucking industry in 1980. They found after deregulation new 
normative institutions were established that influenced trucking companies to hire more 
company drivers, as opposed to owner-operators, when similar trucking companies were 
located in the same region.  
These examples show that deregulation does investigate multiple institutional 
pillars during the institutional change process. However, the different institutional pillars 
occur sequentially, with the removal of the regulative institution occurring first and the 
normative institutional change response from firms occurring after.  Therefore, while the 
deregulation literature does provide increased understanding of how firms respond to 
regulative institutional change, it does little to further understanding of how firms target 
multiple institutional change pillars simultaneously.  
Social Movements 
Additionally, the recent focus of the social movement and organizational theory 
literature has begun to uncover how multiple institutional pillars can be combined. The 
recent social movement stream has focused on how social movement actors (i.e. 
environmental groups & temperance organizations) bring contention to markets in the 
midst of controversial issues (Davis et al., 2005; B. G. King & Pearce, 2010).  As such, 
much of the social movement literature has focused on how social movement 
organizations enact institutional change in market environments.  
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The social movement literature is unique as it does evaluate how social movement 
actors use multiple institutional pillar change actions to change their institutional 
environment. Studies show how social movement actors use lobbying to enact regulative 
institutional change, while simultaneously attempting to sway public opinion by engaging 
in cognitive and normative institutional change actions (Hiatt et al., 2009; B. G. King & 
Pearce, 2010; Sine & Lee, 2009). 
For example, Sine and Lee (2009) explained how environmental social movement 
actors, such as the Audubon Society and the Sierra Club, created cognitive and normative 
institutional change that promoted wind energy production by framing nonrenewable 
energy production as an environmental problem. Simultaneously, these same social 
movement organizations were lobbying state legislatures and regulators to change 
regulative institutions that allowed for easier entry into the wind energy market. In this 
way, the environmental social movement actors were able to engage all three institutional 
pillars simultaneously, which effectively changed the institutional environment around 
energy production.  
Additionally, research about the temperance social movement that led to 
Prohibition U.S. in 1920 has shown a similar combination of institutional change pillars 
(Hiatt et al., 2009; Wade et al., 1998). The temperance social movement was headed by 
the Woman’s Christian Temperance Union (WCTU) social movement organization. The 
WCTU led the temperance social movement and was able to change cognitive institutions 
by influencing public attitudes against drinking alcohol.  Additionally, the WCTU lobbied 
for regulative institutional change to make alcohol consumption illegal, and created 
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normative institutional change by convincing public figures to speak out against alcohol 
consumption.  
These examples show how social movement research does include multiple 
institutional pillars during the institutional change process. One reason social movement 
organizations target multiple institutional pillars is because they are on the fringe of the 
market environment, while the targets of their change actions (e.g. firms)  are at the 
center (B. G. King & Pearce, 2010). This fringe positioning results in social movement 
organizations needing to create multiple points of leverage in order to have firms change 
their actions. Therefore, leveraging change action that targets different institutional pillars 
increases the likelihood of successful institutional change.  
 Additionally, social movement organizations are categorically different from the 
firms they are trying to change. First, social movement organizations generally have 
fewer resources and status than firms do. This makes it challenging for social movement 
organizations to influence policymakers to change the regulative institutional 
environment (Baron, 2001; O'Rourke, 2003). As such, social movement organizations 
target other institutional pillars as well as regulative institutional change. 
 Hence, the reasons social movement organizations target multiple institutional 
pillars may not be the same for firms. As firms are at the center of the market 
environment, they have higher status and power that allows for direct engagement with 
regulative institutions (Hillman & Hitt, 1999; Hillman, Keim, & Schuler, 2004). 
Therefore, in a similar case, firms may be able to engage regulative institutions directly 
and may not need to engage in change action that targets the other institutional pillars.  
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Second, social movement organizations differ from firms in key ways that affect 
how they can change institutions. First, social movement organizations engage in 
institutional change primarily for issue improvement (Davis et al., 2005; B. G. King & 
Pearce, 2010). On the other hand, firms may be motivated by increased performance 
through rent-seeking or lowering transaction costs to engage in institutional change.  
Since social movement organizations do not engage in institutional change for 
performance increases, firms engaging in institutional change for performance reasons 
may target multiple institutional pillars differently than social movement organizations.  
These boundary conditions of the social movement research impose limits on the 
theoretical understanding of how firms target multiple institutional pillars. Therefore, 
more research is needed to understand how firms target multiple institutional pillars and 
the relationship between institutional change mechanisms.  
Part One Summary 
 This literature review highlights that we know organizational institutional actors 
can and do target multiple institutional pillars to enact institutional change. Suchman’s 
model, shown in Figure 1, recognizes that actors will have multiple options on how to 
enact institutional change. The deregulation literature has shown that changes to 
regulative institutions result in firms engaging in normative institutional change to 
optimize their institutional environment. Finally, the social movement literature has 
shown that social movement organizations target all three institutional pillars to enact 
institutional change.  
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 However, there is still little understanding of how firms target multiple 
institutional pillars to enact institutional change. Specifically, the relationships between 
the mechanisms that target multiple institutional pillars are still not well understood.  
Similarly, we have limited understanding of how firms targeting multiple institutional 
pillars enact institutional change for other firms in their shared institutional environment. 
Therefore, further research is needed that explores these facets of firms targeting multiple 
institutional pillars.  
 In order to best explore these aforementioned facets, I am focusing on a novel 
institutional problem that provides a unique opportunity to study how firms target 
multiple institutional pillars. After describing the novel institutional problem, I will spend 
the rest of the chapter reviewing literature specific to the problem.  
Defining and Exploring the Problem 
 The problem begins with the unplanned and radically weakening of a strong 
regulatory institutional environment. Without the mandates on appropriate behaviors of 
the former strong regulatory institution, firms will face new risks from other actors 
deviating from the prior agreed-upon appropriate behavior. The problem then becomes: 
how do firms strengthen their institutional environment after the unplanned and radical 
weakening of a strong regulatory institution? 
 Importantly, this problem is novel for institutional researchers. The closest area 
studied is deregulation, which has been studied in multiple contexts including the airline 
industry (Walker, Madsen, & Carini, 2002), telecommunications (Spiller, 1996), and 
those mentioned earlier in Chapter 2. While deregulation does provide examples of firms 
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responding to weakened regulative institutions, it is different from the focus of this study. 
Deregulation consists of a planned and intentional removal of regulation by 
policymakers. After policymakers remove a regulation, they are highly unlikely to create 
a new regulation that restores the regulative institution to its former strength. As such, 
firms affected by deregulation are unlikely to pursue regulative institutional change 
action to strengthen their institutional environment (Dacin et al., 2002). In contrast, this 
study is concerned with debilitating regulative institutions but not actually removing the 
institution. Hence, the regulations are still in place but can no longer be effectively 
enforced. This means that firms still have the option to pursue regulative institutional 
change.  This difference is critical and motivates investigating the unplanned and radical 
weakening of a strong regulative institution as a separate institutional context.  
 By exploring this novel problem, I aim to theoretically contribute to two areas of 
institutional change that have remained under-researched. The first is how firms combine 
change actions that target multiple institutional pillars to change the overall institutional 
environment. The majority of institutional change literature has focused on institutional 
change efforts that target a single institutional pillar (e.g. regulative, normative, or 
cultural) (Battilana et al., 2009; Pacheco et al., 2010; Scott, 2010). Yet, firms may pursue 
multiple institutional change actions simultaneously that target different institutional 
pillars. Further, coordinating actions that target multiple institutional pillars may prove 
more beneficial in changing the overall institutional environment than targeting a single 
institutional pillar.  
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 The second area is how firms create improvements to their business environment 
by enacting institutional change for firms in a different industry. Prior institutional change 
research has identified actors can be either an opponent or proponent of institutional 
change (Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005). However, opponent actors are usually either 
firms within the same industry or non-firm actors who are outside the industry (Battilana 
et al., 2009). Yet, when different industries have overlap in their institutional 
environments, it is possible for firms in one industry to benefit from institutional change 
enacted in firms in the other industry. However, there is little theoretical understanding of 
the offensive and defensive actions taken by firms in this scenario.    
 To expand the theoretical understanding of these two areas of institutional change, 
I explore the problem previously outlined.  Therefore, the remainder of the literature 
review focuses on literature specific to this problem. This begins with a review of 
institutional environments and is followed by a focused review of IP institutional 
environments.  
Institutional Environment 
The combination of all three institutional pillars comprises a firm’s institutional 
environment (Scott, 1995). Institutional environment affects firms by guiding their 
behavior toward acceptable practices (North, 1990; Ruef & Scott, 1998; Scott, 1995). 
How institutional environments affect firm behavior depends on several characteristics of 
the institutional environment. Characteristics pertinent for this study include institutional 
dominance in the environment, institutional environment strength, and institutional 
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stability. In the following sections, I review each of these institutional environment 
characteristics and how they affect firm behavior.  
Institutional Dominance in the Environment 
How institutional environments affect firm behavior depends greatly on which 
institution is dominant in the environment at a given time (Hirsch, 1975; Hoffman, 1999; 
Marquis & Raynard, 2015; Peng, 2003). Both regulative and normative institutions can 
dominate the environment.  Regulative dominant institutional environments use laws, 
public policies, and property rights to create formal rules that provide economic 
incentives or sanctions to constrain firm behavior (North, 1990; Williamson, 2000). 
Regulative dominant institutional environments occur when regulations are well defined, 
readily apparent, and highly enforced.   
An example of a regulative dominant institutional environment is shown in Sine 
and David’s (2003) research on institutions in the U.S. electric power generation industry. 
In the early 1900s, the electric power generation industry, operating under little 
regulation, evolved into a monopoly where a few utility companies controlled most of the 
power generation market (Carley, 2011; Sine & David, 2003). Firms in the monopolized 
industry were accused of underserving rural areas, poor safety performance, and not 
cooperating with state regulators. In response to these issues, the federal government in 
1935 created the Rural Electrification Administration regulatory agency and passed the 
Public Utility Holding Company Act to regulate the power generation industry.  The new 
regulations resulted in breaking apart monopolistic firms into multiple smaller 
geographically bound electric utility companies.  This new policy radically changed the 
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structure, operations, and ownership in the industry for several decades (Sine & David, 
2003). This example demonstrates how regulative dominant institutional environments 
strongly affect firm behavior. 
On the other side, normative dominant institutional environments use values, 
norms, and standards that utilize informal social pressure to constrain and enable firm 
behavior (Scott, 1995).  Normative dominant institutional environments occur when 
pressures to conform to social norms are readily apparent and highly enforced.   
An example of a normative dominant institutional environment is shown in Djelic 
and Ainamo’s (1999) research on the luxury fashion industry. From the 1860s to the 
1960s, the luxury fashion industry was comprised of a few Parisian fashion houses. These 
few fashion houses created and defined norms about the luxury fashion industry that 
manifested in strict rules fashion houses had to comply with to get the coveted haute 
couture designation. These rules included the number of employees working on the 
collections, number of spring and fall collections presented, and the use of live models 
(Crane, 1997; Djelic & Ainamo, 1999). The creation and adoption of these voluntary 
rules made it difficult for non-Parisian fashion houses to obtain the haute couture 
designation and compete in the luxury fashion industry. The presence of a dominant 
normative institution affected production levels, employment numbers, and blocked new 
firms entering the market (Djelic & Ainamo, 1999).  
These two examples demonstrate a few important components of how dominant 
institutions affect firm behavior. First, as is well established in institutional literature, an 
institutional environment can be dominated by any single institutional pillar. Second, 
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when a single institutional pillar is dominant, that institution overwhelms the effects of 
other institutions. However, institutional composition in an environment is often more of 
a spectrum than a binary category. Even when an institutional environment is dominated 
by one institutional pillar, other institutions are still present and affect firm behavior, 
though to a lesser degree. Therefore, even in single pillar dominant institutional 
environments, there is a possibility to target non-dominant institutional pillars to enact 
some degree of institutional change. Thus, it is important to understand how non-
dominant institutional pillars influence firm behavior, as these may become important 
targets for institutional change if the dominant institutional pillar weakens.  
Institutional Environment Strength 
Another institutional environment characteristic that affects firm behavior is the 
overall strength of the institutional environment. Institutional environmental strength 
refers to the robustness and intensity of the present institutions in the environment 
(Henisz, 2000; North, 1990; Scott, 1987). Strong institutional environments greater 
constrains firm behavior, as the institutions are more controlling, robust, and salient 
compared to weaker institutional environments (Marquis & Raynard, 2015; Peng, 2003). 
Additionally, strong institutional environments are more predictable which provides 
increased certainty for firms. In comparison, firms in weak institutional environments 
have less guidance on what behavior is allowable. Therefore, firms face an inherently 
higher level of uncertainty in weak institutional environments (North, 1986, 1990).  
The literature on institutional environment strength is generally divided by 
institutional type. One set of literature investigates the effects of the regulative 
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institutional environment's strength on firm behavior. A major area of this literature 
focuses on IP rights and how well IP rights are defined and enforced. This literature often 
compares strong and weak IP institutional environments' effects on firm behavior and 
finds that stronger IP institutional environments are more conducive to firms engaging in 
activities with higher uncertainty.  As such, stronger regulative institutional environments 
have been linked to higher levels of new product development (McCann & Bahl, 2017), 
R&D (Brown, Martinsson, & Petersen, 2017),  innovation (Barbosa & Faria, 2011), 
patenting (Lerner, 2002; Park, 2008), technology transfer (Gans, Hsu, & Stern, 2008) and 
foreign direct investment (Cheung & Ping, 2004; Zhang & Song, 2001).  
The other focus on institutional environment strength is on normative institutional 
strength. This research area compares how variance in social pressure and norms strength 
in an institutional environment affects firm behavior. Research in this area shows how 
strong normative institutions result in higher levels of firms adopting environmental and 
social programs. For example, Baughn, Chua, and Nuepert (2006) studied how normative 
institutions affect women’s participation in entrepreneurship. Through a comparison 
across 38 countries, they found that countries with strong norms on general equality and 
support for female entrepreneurs had higher rates of female entrepreneurs even after 
controlling for general rates of entrepreneurship and economic development.   
Institutional Environment Stability 
A final characteristic is institutional stability, which is defined by the levels of 
institutional change occurring in the institutional environment (Peng, 2003; Williamson, 
2000). Stable institutional environments are characterized by institutions that are steady 
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and change slowly. Stable institutional environments provide a predictable environment 
that allows firms to optimize their institutional engagement strategies to improve their 
competitive advantage (North, 1990). Transitioning institutional environments are 
characterized by institutions that are volatile and changing quickly (Peng, 2003). 
Transitioning institutional environments provide an unpredictable environment that 
increases uncertainty for firms as they navigate the changing institutional environment 
(Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; K. E. Meyer, Estrin, Bhaumik, & Peng, 2009; 
Peng, 2003). 
Stability in institutional environments is often implicit in research and is usually 
associated with strong institutional environments (Peng et al., 2009). As such, stability is 
usually only mentioned when comparing stable to transitioning institutional environments 
(Chakrabarti, Singh, & Mahmood, 2007; Lin, Peng, Yang, & Sun, 2009). Since the 
institutional environment is not significantly changing, researchers treat the institutional 
environment as fixed and focus on other aspects of firm behavior. As such, research in 
stable institutional environments often is concerned with how firms optimize their 
behavior to improve their competitive advantage (Shinkle, Kriauciunas, & Hundley, 
2013; Somaya, 2012). For example, research shows that pursuing a pure strategy of either 
cost leadership or differentiation leads to better performance in stable institutional 
environments than it does in transitioning institutional environments (Shinkle et al., 
2013).  
As is the case with the emerging economies literature (Marquis & Raynard, 2015; 
Peng, 2003), transitioning institutional environments research mainly includes 
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institutional environment strengthening.  Emerging economies are “low-income, rapid-
growth countries using economic liberalization as their primary engine 
growth” (Hoskisson et al., 2000, p. 249). The institutional environment in emerging 
economies is inherently weak and characterized by less developed regulative institutions 
and governments, which cause firms to rely on normative institutions (K. G.-L. Huang, 
Geng, & Wang, 2017; Marquis & Raynard, 2015). However, the institutional 
environment is transitioning by becoming more developed and stronger. Firms operating 
in these institutional environments must balance utilizing the developing regulative 
institutions with the normative institutions present before the transition (K. G.-L. Huang 
et al., 2017).  
Additionally, transitioning institutional environments include strong institutional 
environments weakening, as is the case with deregulation. As discussed previously in the 
literature review, deregulation is the intentional and planned removal of regulations 
through government action (Haveman, 1993a). The result of deregulation is a weakened 
institutional environment where the prior constraints pre-deregulation are no longer 
present. These lack of constraints allow firms to greatly alter their behavior from pre-
deregulation, which range from higher firm entrant levels (Sine & David, 2003), to 
increase in differentiation strategy use (Delmas et al., 2007), and to increased CEO 
succession (Haveman et al., 2001).  
Institutional Environments: General to Specific 
This review utilized studies across many contexts to demonstrate the multiple 
ways institutional environment affect firm behavior. Highlighted in this review is the 
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relative lack of literature on the unplanned and radical weakening of a strong regulatory 
institution. Therefore, focusing on a specific institutional environment where this occurs 
will aid in exploring the main research question. With this in mind, the next part of the 
review focuses on IP institutional environments.  
I choose the IP institutional environment context for several reasons. First, IP 
institutional environments are likely to contain strong regulative institutions. The 
literature on the laws and policies of formal IP rights is well developed and provides a 
clear understanding of the regulative institutional environment. Second, recent research 
has explored how firms engage with normative institutions in response to a weak IP 
institutional environment. Therefore, a base level of understanding exists on how firms 
engage with both regulative and normative institutions in this context. Finally, due to an 
exogenous environmental jolt, some regulative IP institutions have undergone an 
unplanned radical weakening. Thus, IP institutional environment context is well suited 
for increasing the theoretical understanding of how firms strengthen their institutional 
environment, after the unplanned and radical weakening of a strong regulatory institution, 
by potentially targeting multiple institutional pillars.  
IP Institutional Environments 
 Many firms rely on IP creation or acquisition as a core strength for their 
competitive advantage (Ahuja, Lampert, & Tandon, 2008). These firms appropriate value 
from their IP by making and selling products or services based on the IP or by selling, 
licensing, or distributing the IP (James, Leiblein, & Lu, 2013; Pisano & Teece, 2007).  As 
such, the ability of firms to appropriate value from their IP is paramount to their success 
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(Reitzig & Puranam, 2009; Teece, 1986). Yet, threats to IP appropriation exists from other 
entities using the IP without permission and suitable payment (Cohen, Nelson, & Walsh, 
2000; Teece, 1986). If a firm cannot appropriate value from its IP, the firm’s competitive 
advantage is threatened and the firm may fail.  
 To ensure firms engage in innovative activity, governments support appropriation 
by creating policies and laws that provide legal IP protection (Arrow, 1962; Besen & 
Raskind, 1991). The overall intent of these laws is twofold. First, IP laws provide a way 
for firms to legally define and declare their IP. These legal declarations are often in the 
forms of patents, copyrights, or trademarks dependent on the IP’s nature. Second, if an 
entity uses another firm’s IP without permission, the offending entity will be punished 
and held legally responsible. These punitive actions could include monetary fines, 
product recalls, or criminal charges (Besen & Raskind, 1991). Therefore, in addition to IP 
protection laws, an effective legal system is needed to uphold IP rights and enforce action 
against entities that offend on IP rights.   
 Additionally, firms engage in informal IP protection, which involves either 
avoiding the formal IP protection set up by regulative institutions or engaging in 
normative social pressure to protect IP. These informal IP protection tactics include 
secrecy and trust-based networks (Contigiani, Hsu, & Barankay, 2018; K. G.-L. Huang et 
al., 2017; Nelson, 2016). Secrecy for IP appropriation includes intentionally not sharing 
IP developments with others to prevent imitation (Contigiani et al., 2018). Yet 
organizations engaging in secrecy may choose to selectively share IP developments and 
trust the secret will not be disseminated widely (Nelson, 2016). Similarly, firms may form 
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trust-based networks with firms that may imitate their IP (K. G.-L. Huang et al., 2017). 
The hope is that the social pressures from the trust-based relationship will prevent these 
firms from imitating the IP.    
 Therefore, the full IP institutional environment includes both formal and informal 
IP protection strategies. To aid in our understanding of how the institutional environment 
affects how firms use formal and informal IP strategies, I conduct a literature review of 
different IP institutional environments. For this literature review, I categorized IP 
institutional environments based on the institutional environment’s strength and stability. 
Table 1 shows this IP institutional environment categorization. For each category, I 
review the institutional environment characteristics along with how firms engage with 
formal and informal IP strategies. Table 2 summarizes the findings of the literature 
review.  
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Table 1 
IP Institutional Environment Classification 
  Institutional Stability
TransitioningStable
Weak-StrengtheningWeak-Stable
Institutional 
Strength
IP Institutional Environment Classification
Strong    
Weak    
Strong-Stable Strong-Weakening
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Table 2 
IP Institutional Environment Category Characteristics 
IP 
Institution
al 
Environm
ent 
Category
Strong-Stable Weak-Stable Weak-Strengthening
IP 
Institution
al 
Environm
ent 
Characteri
stics 
Established 
IP defining 
& 
protection 
policies 
Legal 
system 
enforces IP 
Policies 
High levels 
of R&D and 
innovative 
activity 
Example 
Countries: 
U.S. 
Germany, 
Japan, 
France
Lerner, 
2002 
Park, 
2008 
Lanjou
w & 
Lerner 
2001 
Rudy & 
Black 
2018 
Ginarte 
& Park, 
1997 
Ginarte 
& Park, 
1997 
Lerner, 
2002 
Park, 
2008 
Barbosa 
& Faria, 
2011
Non-existent 
or 
inadequate 
IP defining 
and 
protection 
policies  
Incapable or 
ineffective 
legal system 
enforces IP 
policies 
    
Low levels 
of R&D, 
innovation, 
and foreign 
direct 
investment 
    
Example 
Countries: 
pre-mid 
1990s China, 
less 
industrialize
d countries 
in Central 
America and 
Eastern 
Europe
Lerner, 
2002 
Park, 
2008 
Zhao, 
2006 
Ginarte 
& Park, 
1997 
Park, 
2008 
Javorcik, 
2002 
K.G. 
Huang, 
2010 
Li, 2012  
Rapp & 
Rozek, 
1990
IP 
defining 
and 
protection 
policies 
are newly 
in place 
Legal 
system is 
beginning 
to actively 
enforce IP 
policies 
    
  
Increasing 
levels of 
R&D, 
innovation
, and 
foreign 
direct 
investment 
  
   
Example 
Country: 
China post 
mid-1990s
K. G. L. 
Huang,  
Geng & 
Wang, 
2017 
K. G. 
Huang, 
2010 
Cheung & 
Ping, 
2004 
Zhang & 
Song, 
2001 
  
Park, 
2008 
K. G. L. 
Huang et 
al. 2017
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Table 2 
IP Institutional Environment Category Characteristics (Continued) 
IP 
Institutio
nal 
Environm
ent 
Category
Strong-Stable Weak-Stable Weak-Strengthening
Formal IP 
Strategy 
General 
Heavy 
engagemen
t in formal 
IP 
strategies 
Specific 
Multiple 
strategies 
around 
patenting 
and legal 
system 
enforceme
nt  
Lerner, 
2002 
Park, 
2008 
Somaya 
2003, 
2012  
James et 
al. 2013
General  
Avoid 
formal IP 
strategies 
when 
possible 
Specific  
Shorten 
lead time 
from patent 
to product 
release 
Self-cite for 
patents/rely 
on internal 
knowledge
Zhao, 
2006 
de Faria & 
Sofka 
2010 
Zhao 2006
General 
Increased 
engagem
ent in 
formal IP 
strategies 
Specific 
Patent 
filings 
increase
K. G. 
Huang, 
2010 
K. G. 
Huang, 
2010 
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Informal 
IP Strategy
General  
Informal IP 
strategies 
present but 
industry-
dependent  
Specific  
Secrecy & 
Sharing
Png, 
2017 
Png, 
2017 
Nelson, 
2016
General  
Heavy 
engagemen
t in 
informal IP 
strategies 
Specific 
Secrecy & 
Sharing 
Trust-based 
networks
Zhao 2006 
de Faria & 
Sofka 
2010 
de Faria & 
Sofka 
2010 
Xin & 
Pearce 
1996
General 
Informal 
IP 
strategy 
use 
Specific 
Alliance 
with 
governm
ent-
owned 
entities 
Trust-
based 
networks
Huang et 
al. 2017 
Rong et 
al., 2017 
Huang et 
al. 2017
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Strong-Stable Institutional Environment 
 The first IP institutional environment identified in the literature is strong-stable. 
These environments are strong due to their developed IP defining and protection policies 
(Lerner, 2002; Park, 2008). Additionally, strength is provided by the legal system actively 
and predictably enforcing IP policies (Lanjouw & Lerner, 2001; Rudy & Black, 2018). 
These environments are stable, as the existing IP policies are established and unlikely to 
undergo radical change (Paik & Zhu, 2016).  While IP policy changes still occur in these 
environments, new IP policies generally offer incremental changes to existing strong IP 
policies (Park, 2008).  
Strong-stable IP institutions are found in countries such as the U.S., Germany, 
Japan, and France (Ginarte & Park, 1997; Lerner, 2002; Park, 2008). These countries 
share similar characteristics of highly industrialized and developed economies (Park, 
2008). Additionally, these countries have high levels of R&D and innovative activity 
(Barbosa & Faria, 2011; Ginarte & Park, 1997). Countries in this environment rarely 
change their IP institutions, but still participate in international IP rights standards. 
However, their role in these standards is to provide a model for IP institutions which they 
plan to disseminate to countries in weaker IP institutional environments (Gervais, 1998; 
Park, 2008).  
Strong-Stable Firm IP Institution Engagement Strategy  
Strong-stable IP institutional environments help lower uncertainty and transaction 
costs for firms, as they can reasonably rely on the institutions to prevent IP appropriation 
threats (North, 1986, 1990; Teece, 1986). Due to the reliability of the regulative 
!  xlii
institutions, firms are more concerned with strategies on how to engage with IP policies 
and laws to achieve a competitive advantage instead of being concerned with the 
enforceability of IP laws (James et al., 2013; Somaya, 2012). To demonstrate how firms 
engage with IP institutions in strong-stable environments, I review firm IP strategies. IP 
strategies, especially patent strategies, in strong-stable institutional environments are 
prevalent enough to have developed into a category of strategic management research. A 
patent strategy review article by Somaya (2012) lays out three generic patent strategies 
firms use in strong-stable IP institutional environments. These three strategies - (1) 
proprietary, (2) defensive, and (3) leveraging - demonstrate how firms utilize formal IP 
policies and court systems to maximize their IP appropriation and achieve a competitive 
advantage.  
 The first category, proprietary strategies, pertains to firms using patents to 
prevent other firms from imitating their IP and hence protect their competitive advantage 
(Lippman & Rumelt, 2003; Somaya, 2012). A popular proprietary strategy is fencing in 
which firms patent the original IP as well as adjacent and downstream IP to block 
competitors from accessing the technological space (Granstrand, 1999; Ziedonis, 2004).  
For example, pharmaceutical firms often file multiple patents that are related to a new 
drug to prevent rival firms from developing similar drugs (Sternitzke, 2013).  
Additionally, firms using proprietary strategies are likely to commercialize the IP 
themselves and will not license the IP to other firms (Teece, 1986). With a proprietary 
strategy, firms are likely to use the court system to aggressively pursue any patent 
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infringers (Polidoro Jr & Toh, 2011) and are unlikely to settle out of court (Somaya, 
2003).  
The second category, defensive strategy, pertains to firms using patents to protect 
themselves from patent infringement claims by other firms. This strategy affords the firm 
space to commercialize its IP without interference from patent claims by other firms  
(Somaya, 2012). A popular defensive strategy is for firms to build large patent portfolios 
from either their patents or purchased patents (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001). For example, 
firms in the U.S. semiconductor industry made large capital investments to create new IP 
in order to build large defensive patent portfolios (Hall & Ziedonis, 2001). Additionally, 
firms pursuing a defensive strategy are more likely to settle IP infringement lawsuits 
(Somaya, 2003).  
The third category, leveraging strategy, pertains to firms using patents for their 
bargaining power to generate rents even though the patent is not useful for the firm to 
develop additional IP (Somaya, 2012). This strategy may be employed, for example, 
when firms use patents for the sole purpose of licensing (Arora & Ceccagnoli, 2006; 
Arora & Fosfuri, 2003). A newer leveraging strategy is called patent trolls, and it occurs 
when firms acquire patents for the sole purpose of suing R&D intensive firms for patent 
infringement (Reitzig, Henkel, & Heath, 2007; Steensma, Chari, & Heidl, 2015).  
 In strong-stable IP institutional environments, informal IP strategies are present as 
alternatives to formal IP strategies. Firms engage in trade secrecy, intentionally not 
disclosing IP developments, to protect their IP from being imitated. Secrecy is used to 
protect IP before commercialization and as a substitute for patenting when firms believe 
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information disclosure in the patenting process may accelerate competitor imitation 
(Cohen et al., 2000; James et al., 2013).  The hidden nature of secrecy makes it difficult 
to measure its overall use in IP protection. However, several studies have found that 
secrecy is a common IP protection strategy used by firms in strong-stable IP institutional 
environments (Cohen et al., 2000; Levin et al., 1987; Png, 2017). 
While secrecy is based on the premise of not sharing, sometimes knowledge 
sharing is required for further IP development. In these cases, secrecy strategies include 
normative social pressure. For example, research on university R&D shows that some 
universities engaged in secrecy will still share secrets with select trust-based partners 
(Nelson, 2016). Interestingly, strong-stable IP institutional environments have taken 
action to create regulative institutions around informal IP strategies. For example, the 
Uniform Trade Secrets Act was created in the U.S. to provide legal protections for trade 
secrets and punishes firms that obtain trade secrets through improper means (Png, 2017).   
However, even trade secrets are formally protected by laws such as the Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act (Png, 2017).   
Weak-Stable Institutional Environment 
 The next IP institutional environment category to be reviewed is weak-stable. 
These environments are considered weak because either adequate IP rights do not exist 
(Lerner, 2002; Park, 2008), or they do exist but the legal system to enforce IP rights is 
inadequate (Zhao, 2006). These environments are stable in that no or little new IP policies 
or legal system changes are being introduced. The stable designation does not imply that 
weak IP institutions cannot change and develop into stronger institutions (Peng & Heath, 
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1996). Instead, stable in this context means that under the current circumstances the IP 
institutions are not developing further. 
 Weak-stable environments are generally found in countries with developing 
economies (Ginarte & Park, 1997; Lerner, 2002). Examples include pre-1995 China and 
less industrialized countries in Central America and Eastern Europe (K. G. Huang, 2010; 
Li, 2012; Rapp & Rozek, 1990). These countries are less economically developed and 
have low levels of R&D activity (Ginarte & Park, 1997; Park, 2008). Further, countries in 
weak-stable environments receive less direct investment from foreign firms due to 
concerns over IP protection (Javorcik, 2002). 
Weak-Stable Firm IP Institution Engagement Strategy  
In contrast to the strong IP rights contexts, firms in weak institutional IP rights 
contexts assume their IP is not adequately protected and it will be infringed upon 
(Marquis & Raynard, 2015; K. E. Meyer et al., 2009).  To combat this concern firms take 
on a variety of IP protection strategies while engaging in innovative activities (Rong, Wu, 
& Boeing, 2017; Zhao, 2006).  One action is to rely more heavily on the firm’s internal 
knowledge as opposed to external firm knowledge (Zhao, 2006). Zhao (2006) found that 
when multinational companies (MNC) operate in countries with weak IP rights, the 
MNCs file patents with more self-citations than in countries with strong IP rights. The 
idea behind this activity is that limiting exposure to other firms in a weak IP context will 
help protect their IP from infringement.  
Similarly, de Faria and Sofka (2010) found that MNCs operating in countries with 
weak IP rights will implement additional IP protection strategies. For example, MNCs 
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will wait to file patents until the IP is ready for commercialization in order to extend the 
time their product has on the market before competitors imitate their IP. Additionally, 
MNCs may forego patents all together and just engage in secrecy or complex product 
design to make imitation more difficult. However, when these same MNCs operate in a 
strong-stable IP institutional environment they rely heavily on the patent system. These 
examples show the variety of concerns firms have about protecting their IP rights in weak 
institutions. 
The lack of regulative IP institutions in weak-stable IP institutional environments 
does not prevent domestic firms from creating IP. As such, domestic firms often rely on 
informal IP strategies such as social networks with other firms to build trust and provide 
IP protection (Holmes Jr, Miller, Hitt, & Salmador, 2013; Xin & Pearce, 1996).  For 
example, Xin and Pearce (1996) leveraged regional institutional strength variances in 
China to examine network reliance differences for IP protection. They found that the less 
developed the region’s institutions were, the more firms relied on strong trust-based 
network ties for IP protection.  
Weak-Strengthening Transition IP Institutional Environments 
The third IP institutional environment identified in the literature is weak-
strengthening. These environments are in the process of transitioning from weak IP 
institutions to stronger IP institutions (K. G. Huang, 2010; Park, 2008). As such, IP 
defining and protection policies are newly in place and the legal system is beginning to 
actively enforce the IP policies (K. G.-L. Huang et al., 2017).  However, IP institutions 
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are not as strong, predictable, or reliable as in strong-stable environments. Additionally, 
IP imitation is still present even though regulative IP institutions are strengthening.  
Weak-strengthening IP institutional environments are generally found in countries 
that are transitioning to a developing economy (Park, 2008). A prime example is China 
after the mid-1990s. In the mid-1990s China implemented new IP rights and since then 
patenting activity in China has steadily climbed (K. G. Huang, 2010). This has coincided 
with a large increase in R&D activities within the country along with a greater volume of 
foreign direct investment (Cheung & Ping, 2004; Zhang & Song, 2001).  However, 
despite the growth in R&D activity and patents, IP imitation and theft is still a major 
concern in China. For example, in 2019 the U.S. stated that China’s weak IP protections 
are a major reason for unsuccessful trade negotiations between the countries 
(Rosenbaum, 2019).  
Weak-Strengthening Firm IP Institution Engagement Strategy  
Firms in weak-strengthening IP institutional environments experience aspects of 
weak-stable and strong-stable IP institutional environments. On one side, research has 
found that firms engage more with formal IP strategies as the institutional environment 
strengthens (Holmes Jr et al., 2013; Xin & Pearce, 1996). For example, studies on 
China’s IP institutions show firms have steadily increased domestic patent filings since 
the mid-1990s (K. G. Huang, 2010).  Additionally, Xin and Pearce (1996) found that 
firms in more institutionally developed areas of China rely more on formal IP strategies 
to protect their IP than firms in less institutionally developed areas in China. These 
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studies suggest that as weak regulative IP institutions become stronger, firms adapt their 
strategies away from informal IP strategies and toward formal IP strategies.  
However, in weak-strengthening IP intuitional environments, the informal IP 
strategies before the institutional transition are still present. The presence of these 
informal IP strategies results in a combination of formal and informal IP strategy 
engagement (K. G.-L. Huang et al., 2017; Xin & Pearce, 1996). For example, Huang et 
al. (2017) found that after a major strengthening of regulative IP institutions in China in 
2001, domestic firms still relied on informal IP strategies, whereas foreign firms relied on 
formal IP strategies. This variance in institutional engagement is due to domestic firms 
being embedded in the informal IP strategies that were prevalent in the weaker 
institutional environment before the transition.  Another strategy firms use in weak IP 
institutional environments is to align themselves with government-owned organizations 
so they can receive increased regulative IP institutional protection due to the government 
interest in their firm (Rong et al., 2017). Rong et al. (2017) found that firms in China that 
obtain Chinese institutional investors innovate more than firms that do not obtain 
institutional investments.   
IP Institutional Engagement Strategies: The Missing Category 
 The literature review on IP institutional environment found three main categories 
based on the IP institutional strength and state: (1) strong-stable, (2) weak-stable, and (3) 
weak-strengthening. However, based on the two-by-two categorization by institutional 
environment strength and state, a category is missing.  
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Strong-weakening IP institutional environments are absent from the IP 
institutional environment literature. This absence is largely due to the rarity of such 
scenarios. In general, institutions are difficult to change, let alone radically weaken 
(North, 1990, 1991). Yet, while IP institutional environments radically weakening have 
been under-researched, other institutional environment research demonstrates that 
institutions can be radically weakened by exogenous environmental jolts (A. D. Meyer, 
1982).  
Therefore, to better understand strong-weakening IP institutional environments, I 
first review the literature on environmental jolts. I then focus on the specific IP 
institutional environment of copyrights in the digital age. I review how digitization acted 
as an environmental jolt that weakened regulative copyright protecting institutions. I then 
review the weakened regulative institutions around digital copyright protection and 
discuss how this affects firms operating in this institutional environment.  
Environmental Jolts: How Strong Institutions Become Weak 
Environmental jolts are exogenous extraordinary events that disrupt 
organizational fields (A. D. Meyer, 1982). Researchers have documented a variety of 
environmental jolts including technological disruption (Tushman & Anderson, 1986), 
political and social upheavals (Newman, 2000), and major regulative changes (Sine & 
David, 2003). For example, Newman (2000) uses the demise of communism in countries 
located in Central and Eastern Europe as an example of an environmental jolt that 
impacted politics, society, the legal system, and markets. 
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Environmental jolts have a variety of effects on firms and industries. One set of 
findings shows that environmental jolts cause organizational change, ranging from 
relatively minor changes in processes and systems, to relatively major changes such as 
reconfiguring strategic orientation (A. D. Meyer, 1982; A. D. Meyer, Brooks, & Goes, 
1990).  In addition, if an environmental jolt is big enough it can restructure the industry. 
For example, Sine and David (2003) show how, after decades of stability in the U.S. 
electric utility industry, an oil crisis led to immense growth and expansion in the industry 
and resulted in thousands of new venture independent electrical producers entering the 
field.   
Environmental jolts also have the ability to radically change regulative institutions 
(Battilana et al., 2009; Newman, 2000). Regulative institutions can be affected by 
environmental jolts if governments and policymakers are greatly influenced by the jolt. 
For example, when nations in Central and Eastern Europe changed from a communist 
societal structure to a more democratic and market-based society and economy, the laws 
and legal systems associated with the old regime radically changed (Newman, 2000). 
Additionally, environmental jolts can change market conditions to the point that 
governments introduce new policies to adapt to these new conditions. For example, risky 
banking practices around subprime mortgages led to the 2008 financial crisis, which 
severely weakened economies around the world. In response to the financial crisis, U.S. 
policymakers introduced the Dodd-Frank Act, which introduced new regulations on 
banks to promote financial stability and increase consumer protection (Kroszner & 
Strahan, 2011). 
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Environmental jolts have the ability to radically change an institutional 
environment and as such are often studied as precursors of institutional change (Sine & 
David, 2003). Therefore, it is reasonable that firms experiencing the unplanned and 
radically weakening of a strong regulatory institutional environment will take 
institutional change actions. As such, the next section reviews nonmarket strategies as 
likely mechanisms firms will use to enact institutional change.   
Nonmarket Strategies as Mechanisms of Institutional Change 
 As previously stated, firms experiencing the unplanned and radically weakening 
of a strong regulatory institutional environment will likely take institutional change 
action. As such, this study is interested in how firms will target multiple institutional 
pillars to strengthen this institutional environment. Therefore, change actions that target 
different institutional pillars need to be reviewed in order to create theory that explains 
the relationship between the institutional change mechanisms. As such, I have chosen to 
focus on nonmarket strategies as institutional change mechanisms as they allow for the 
clear identification of how the mechanism targets a particular institutional pillar.   
Nonmarket strategies are actions firms take outside the traditional market 
environment to manage their institutional environment in order to improve firm 
performance (Baron, 1995; Mellahi, Frynas, Sun, & Siegel, 2016). There are multiple 
actions firms take that are categorized as nonmarket strategies, which include corporate 
political activity (Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005; Bonardi, Holburn, & Vanden Bergh, 
2006), corporate social responsibility (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007), 
industry self-regulation (A. A. King & Lenox, 2000), and alliances with firms (B. H. Lee, 
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Struben, & Bingham, 2018) and nonmarket stakeholders (Hillman & Keim, 2001)  
(Dorobantu et al., 2017). While each nonmarket strategy is often studied by itself, an 
underlying theme in the nonmarket strategy literature is that firms use nonmarket 
strategies to change institutions in response to weak institutional environments or 
decreased firm performance (Dorobantu et al., 2017; Rudy & Johnson, 2016).   
Important for this study, nonmarket strategies provide a method for changing both 
regulative institutions and normative institutions. Corporate political activity (CPA) is 
commonly used by firms to directly target regulative institutional change. Industry self-
regulation is used to implement normative institutional change. Therefore, what follows 
is a review of the CPA and industry self-regulation literature. I do so in order to later 
explore theories on how firms may use these mechanisms to target multiple institutional 
pillars in response to the unplanned and radical weakening of strong regulative 
institutions. 
Corporate Political Activity 
  Public policy is responsible for establishing the legal and regulatory conditions 
and ramifications that influence firm market behavior (Baron, 1995; Hillman et al., 
2004). Therefore, firms engage in CPA in efforts to influence regulative institutions, such 
as policy and political institutions, in order to improve their competitive advantage 
(Bonardi et al., 2005; Bonardi et al., 2006; Hillman et al., 2004).  Firms engage in CPA 
through lobbying efforts, donating to political action committees (PAC), and contributing 
to election campaigns (Hillman et al., 2004; Meznar & Nigh, 1995). 
!  liii
CPA activity has steadily increased in the U.S. (Lux, Crook, & Woehr, 2011). 
Since the passing of Citizens United vs Federal Election Commission (2010) ruling, 
which removed limits on corporate donations to political organizations and campaigns, 
corporate spending on CPA activity has greatly increased. For example, from 2008, the 
year the last U.S. presidential election took place before the formation of Citizens United, 
to the latest U.S. presidential election in 2016, top corporation U.S. election donations 
increased from approximately $130 million to $712 million (Center for Responsive 
Politics, 2019b). Even though PAC donations have increased, lobbying activity remains 
the highest CPA expenditure in the U.S., reaching $3.4 billion in 2018 (Center for 
Responsive Politics, 2019b).   Similarly, research in CPA has expanded since the new 
millennia and now includes findings on firm, institutional, industry, country-level 
differences, outcomes, and various strategic approaches in an assortment of empirical 
settings (Hillman et al., 2004; Macher & Mayo, 2015; Mellahi et al., 2016). 
CPA Strategies & Approaches 
 The most expansive CPA types are classified as proactive or reactive (Hillman et 
al., 2004). Proactive CPA involves influencing the actual policy being created whereas 
reactive CPA involves responding to a previously implemented policy to ensure 
compliance (Meznar & Nigh, 1995). Generally, reactive CPA has less to do with 
institutional change as it occurs after the institutional changing policy takes place. 
Therefore, proactive CPA is the focus of institutional change research.  
 Proactive CPA can involve a variety of firm activities. Some activities are more 
docile, such as providing feedback to policymakers on proposed legislation impacts. 
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Other actions are more oppositional, such as intentionally weakening firm regulations, 
and other activities are more incentivized, such as lobbying and campaign contributions 
and PAC (Hillman et al., 2004; Meznar & Nigh, 1995). Much of these efforts are driven 
by firm financial donations, either directly to political entities, or through the use of 
political action committees (PAC) or lobbying activity (Lux et al., 2011; Magee, 2002).  
A meta-analysis by Lux, Crook, and Woehr (2011) shows that firms do experience 
increases in economic performance after participating in CPA.  The variety of activities 
highlights that agency firms have to influence public policymakers and actively shape 
institutions.  Yet, not all firms engage equally in CPA, as researchers have identified 
several firm characteristics that influence the likelihood of firms pursuing a CPA non-
market strategy.  
 Firm size has been one of the most researched antecedents for firms engaging in 
CPA activity (Hillman et al., 2004; Macher & Mayo, 2015).  In general, extant research 
shows larger firms are more likely to engage in CPA (Hansen & Mitchell, 2000; Hillman 
et al., 2004; Schuler, Rehbein, & Cramer, 2002) and more likely to believe that engaging 
in CPA will affect policy (Macher & Mayo, 2015).  The theory behind these findings is 
that larger firms have more resources to engage in CPA, have more economic power, and 
represent more potential sway with voters (Hillman et al., 2004).  Smaller firms may still 
engage in CPA yet are more likely to do so with collective action in order to pool their 
resources (Hillman & Hitt, 1999). Collective action in CPA often results in participation 
in PACs (Hansen & Mitchell, 2000; Masters & Keim, 1985). Though large firms do 
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participate in PACs, they may also act alone due to their greater resource pool (Boies, 
1989). 
 Another characteristic that affects a firm’s CPA activity is if the firm has domestic 
or foreign headquarters outside of the nation where the public policy takes place.  While 
nations vary on their political finance laws, many nations do allow foreign firm 
investment.  In the U.S., foreign firms are not allowed to donate directly to election 
campaigns but are allowed to donate through wholly-owned subsidiaries based in the 
U.S. or through PACs (Commission, 2015). Therefore, foreign firms ultimately do have 
the ability to make financial contributions to U.S. based elections. However, research 
shows that foreign firms are less likely to engage in lobbying and PAC activity than 
domestic firms (Hansen & Mitchell, 2000, 2001). This is attributed to firms following 
behavioral norms of entities not influencing foreign elections (Hansen & Mitchell, 2000).  
Further, foreign firms may curb CPA to avoid being seen as interfering or meddling in 
foreign politics (Hansen & Mitchell, 2001) 
Issue Saliency and CPA 
 In addition to firm characteristics, issue saliency is an important antecedent to 
CPA (Caldeira, Hojnacki, & Wright, 2000; Henisz & Zelner, 2005; Hillman et al., 2004; 
Keim & Zeithaml, 1986).  Issue saliency is how much the issue at hand is expected to 
impact the firm’s performance and strategic action (Hillman et al., 2004; Schuler & 
Rehbein, 1997). The more an issue impacts a firm, the more likely the firm will take 
action (Caldeira et al., 2000; Vogel, 1996). Additionally, the more salient an issue, the 
more intense the CPA action will be (Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Getz, 1997). For example, 
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when health issues from smoking became widely known and accepted as true, tobacco 
firms became more aggressive in their CPA efforts in the European Union (Bonardi & 
Keim, 2005). 
 In summary, CPA provides a way for firms to influence regulative institutions.  By 
engaging in CPA, firms can influence the policy that directly affects their firm, their 
industry, or possibly firms in other industries. 
 Industry Self-Regulation 
 Industry self-regulation is comprised of the voluntary actions firms take to govern 
their industries (A. A. King & Lenox, 2000). Industry self-regulation provides a 
mechanism for implementing normative institutional change and often includes the 
voluntary adoption of industry standards, such as the ISO 4001 environmental 
management standard (A. A. King, Lenox, & Terlaak, 2005).  Other examples of industry 
self-regulation include the chemical industry Responsible Care program, enacted to 
reduce harmful externalities in the chemical industry (A. A. King & Lenox, 2000), and 
Canada’s Oil Sands Innovation Alliance efforts to improve Canada’s oil sands industry 
environmental impact (Bowen, Bansal, & Slawinski, 2018).  
Industry self-regulation research has largely focused on environmental issues 
relating to firms and managing common-pool resources (Bowen et al., 2018; A. A. King 
& Lenox, 2000; A. A. King et al., 2005; Ostrom, 1990; Russo & Harrison, 2005). 
However, not all industry self-regulation revolves around the environment or resources. 
For example, when compared to bureaucratic and legal action taken against firms, 
industry self-regulation has been shown to be more effective in getting firms to admit to 
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wrongdoing by issuing corrected corporate earnings (Pfarrer, Smith, Bartol, Khanin, & 
Zhang, 2008). Additionally, recent research has looked at industry self-regulation from 
Dutch financial firms looking to increase their board of directors' gender diversity (Shi, 
Swinkels, & Van der Lecq, 2017). 
 A commonality in the industry self-regulation research is that self-regulation 
stems from firms reacting to an issue or problem facing the industry.  Not surprisingly, a 
main goal of industry self-regulation is for the issue to be mitigated, improved, or 
avoided (Barnett & King, 2008; A. A. King & Lenox, 2000). Yet, issue improvement is 
not always an outcome for industry self-regulation.   For example, the chemical industry 
formed the Responsible Care program in part to reduce the harmful environmental impact 
of chemical production. Yet, King and Lenox (2000) found that firms that voluntarily 
participated in the Responsible Care program did not increase their environmental 
improvement rate over nonparticipant firms. This was due in part to opportunistic firms 
who joined the Responsible Care program for reputational gain and did not actually 
improve their environmental performance. Similarly, empirical studies have shown that 
the adoption of  ISO 4001 environmental standard does not lead to an improvement in 
environmental performance (Darnall & Sides, 2008; Russo & Harrison, 2005).  Although 
industry self-regulation does not always directly improve the issue at hand, firms still 
benefit in other ways.  
 Industry self-regulation can also enact problem prevention that averts negative 
events from one firm’s problems affecting other firms in that industry (Barnett & King, 
2008). For example, Barnett and King’s (2008) study on the U.S. chemical industry found 
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firms faced increased public and government criticism after major industrial accidents in 
the chemical industry, which negatively affected stock prices. However, after the forming 
of the Responsible Care program, firms that participated in the program experienced less 
severe drops in stock prices after industrial accidents compared to firms that did not 
participate.  This implies that industry self-regulation does insulate participating firms 
from other negative events experienced by other firms.  
Trade Associations & Industry Self-Regulation 
While industry self-regulation is often started around an issue facing an industry, 
an underlying sub-theme in the industry self-regulation literature is the role of trade 
associations in organizing the response to the problem. The purpose of trade associations 
is to advance their member firms shared interests (Barnett, 2013). As such, trade 
associations often play an active and key role in implementing industry self-regulation 
(Barnett, 2013; A. A. King & Lenox, 2000; Lenox & Nash, 2003). For example, the 
Responsible Care Program, a prominent example in industry self-regulation literature, 
was started by the Chemistry Industry Association of Canada in 1984 before being 
adopted by the American Chemistry Council in 1988 (A. C. Council, 2019). Research on 
trade associations shows they are uniquely positioned to implement industry self-
regulation (Barnett, 2013; Lenox & Nash, 2003). 
First, trade associations are designed to respond to shared problems facing the 
industry (Barnett, 2013). Therefore, when a major negative event occurs, such as the 
large chemical spills that led to the Responsible Care Program, trade associations can 
collectively respond for their member firms (A. A. King & Lenox, 2000; Lenox & Nash, 
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2003). Second, trade associations have established relationships with member firms and 
are seen to act in their best interests. This puts trade associations in a unique position to 
oversee and verify self-regulation action, as well as to apply normative pressure on 
member firms to comply (Lenox & Nash, 2003). For example, the American Textile 
Manufacturers Institute (ATMI) created the Encouraging Environmental Excellence 
initiative in 1992 to promote pro-environmental practices in the textile industry (Conover, 
1993). After the creation of the initiative, the ATMI recruited member firms to join the 
initiative and then oversaw their compliance with the standards (Lenox & Nash, 2003).  
Additionally, trade associations provide a means for firms to join in collective 
action to address industry issues (Barnett, 2013; Lenox & Nash, 2003). This is especially 
beneficial for small firms that likely do not have the resources or status to influence the 
industry on their own (Barnett, 2013; Sherer & Lee, 2002). However, while trade 
associations due give small firms a means to join collective action, the agenda of trade 
associations are influenced more by larger firms (Barnett, 2013). 
Industry Self-Regulation & Governmental Regulation 
 Another area of industry self-regulation that stems from problems facing the 
industry, is how industry self-regulation is related to government regulation. Even though 
industry self-regulation is voluntary and not mandated by governments, there are direct 
ties between industry self-regulation and government regulations. The first connection 
relates to the threat of government regulation to following through on commitments to 
self-regulate. Short and Toffel (2010) found that firms were more likely to comply with 
the self-imposed reduction of air pollutants when government monitoring was high, even 
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though there were no direct sanctions. This suggests that the threat of new or increased 
government regulations motivates firms to engage and follow through with industry self-
regulation. Additionally, actual sanctions or actions by government regulation may not be 
needed to spur firm action, as merely the threat of action may cause firms to self-regulate.  
Further, firms use industry self-regulation as a means to avoid or postpone 
government regulation (Gupta & Lad, 1983; Lenox, 2006). When government regulators 
respond to negative industry events with threats of new regulation, firms face uncertainty 
about how restricting and extensive the regulations may be. Therefore, firms enact 
industry self-regulation to create a more favorable regulation as well as to avoid 
additional government regulation (Fremeth & Shaver, 2014; Lenox, 2006). Further, firms 
that may be opposed to the industry self-regulation may still adopt the self-regulation 
measures to prevent stricter government directives (Lenox, 2006). 
While much of the industry self-regulation literature focuses on government 
regulations impacting industry self-regulation, a subset of research studies the opposite - 
industry self-regulation’s impact on government regulation. While this area of research 
has received little attention, what has been published shows that industry self-regulation 
driven initiatives can be adopted and made into formal government regulations 
(Gulbrandsen, 2014; B. H. Lee, 2009).  Research in the organic food industry 
demonstrates how local industry efforts to define the organic food standard and 
certification have been adopted by local government officials in cities in several U.S. 
states (B. H. Lee, 2009). Similarly, a study of the European timber industry shows that 
procurement standards initiated by the timber industry, which ensure legality and 
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sustainability of timber procurement, have been adopted as official policy in certain 
regions (Brack, 2008; Gulbrandsen, 2014). These studies suggest that industry self-
regulation may influence governments to formalize industry set regulations.  
Connecting CPA and Industry Self-Regulation  
 This review separately discusses CPA and industry self-regulation as mechanisms 
for institutional change. However, these two mechanisms are related by industry self-
regulation’s ability to prevent government regulation. Therefore, if a firm engages in CPA 
to create regulative institutional change that will affect a different firm’s institutional 
environment, the other firm can potentially mitigate the effectiveness of the CPA by 
engaging in self-regulation. In this way, CPA represents an offensive institutional change 
action and industry self-regulation represents a defensive institutional change action. 
Therefore, firms can combine these two nonmarket strategies to simultaneously target 
regulative and normative institutional pillars. This relationship between mechanisms 
provides the basis for creating new theory on how firms target multiple institutional 
pillars and is discussed in Chapter 4.  
Literature Review Summary and Remaining Questions 
 This literature review began by highlighting the lack of understanding about how 
firms target multiple institutional pillars when enacting institutional change. This 
knowledge gap motivates researchers to take a focused look at a novel institutional 
problem, specifically how firms may strengthen their institutional environment after the 
unplanned and radical weakening of a strong regulative institution. Several aspects 
pertinent to expanding our theoretical understanding related to firms targeting multiple 
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institutional pillars were highlighted through the exploration of the literature surrounding 
the novel institutional problem.  
  First, institutional environments affect firm behavior. Specifically, strong stable 
regulative institutional environments use incentives and sanctions to define appropriate 
firm behavior. Second, firms adapt their strategies to changes in the institutional 
environment. Therefore, as the regulative institutions radically weaken, firms will change 
their behavior to suit their new institutional environment.  Third, firms engage in 
institutional change to strengthen an institutional environment and improve their 
performance.  These may include regulative and normative change actions. Specifically, 
the nonmarket strategies of CPA for regulative change and industry self-regulation for 
normative change were highlighted as likely change actions and as a means to better 
understand the mechanisms between regulative and normative institutional change.  
 The literature review highlights that firms are likely to engage in institutional 
change action to strengthen their institutional environment after the unplanned and 
radical weakening of a strong regulatory institution. However, we know little about the 
institutional change process firms use in this scenario. Additionally, the prior literature 
does not suggest how firms will manage the relationship between regulative and 
normative institutional change actions to strengthen their institutional environment.  For 
example, how does engagement in regulative change affect engagement in normative 
change? Additionally, how does normative change success affect further regulative and 
normative change action? Therefore, in Chapter 4, I develop theory on how firms use 
regulative and normative institutional change action to strengthen their institutional 
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environment after the unplanned and radical weakening of a strong regulatory institution.  
 To aid in framing the theory, Chapter 3 first describes the digital copyright 
institutional environment context that is used for the analysis of this dissertation.  
III. Digital Copyright Context 
 The purpose of Chapter 3 is to provide background on the digital copyright 
institutional environment. The digital copyright context exemplifies an institutional 
environment where a once strong regulative institution underwent an unplanned radical 
weakening. As such, understanding this specific institutional context will aid in framing 
the theoretical contributions in Chapter 4. Chapter 3 begins with an explanation of the 
unplanned radical weakening of the digital copyright environment. Then, responses from 
regulators and digital copyright reliant firms to the weakening are discussed. 
Digitization as an Environmental Jolt 
An important environmental jolt in recent history is the shift to the information 
age, which encompasses the digitization of information and the proliferation of the 
internet. While digitization and the internet have affected almost every part of society, the 
impact on IP and especially copyright enforcement has been profound. The National 
Research Council formed and commissioned the Committee on Intellectual Property 
Rights and Emerging Information Infrastructure to assess the impact of digitization and 
the internet on IP. The committee published its findings in 2000 and deemed the issues 
facing digital copyright enforcement as the digital dilemma  (N. R. Council, 2000). 
 The committee’s findings state two main events have fueled the digital dilemma. 
The first is that technological advancements have radically altered how information is 
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published, reproduced, distributed, and controlled. This is due to three main technological 
advancements. First, information switching from physical to digital format has 
fundamentally altered the ease and economics of reproduction. The costs to reproduce 
and nearly perfectly replicate information are incredibly low for both the lawful IP holder 
and those illegally copying the IP.  Second, the speeds of computer networks are fast 
enough to transmit digital information quickly and inexpensively. This has greatly 
lowered the costs of distributing information. Finally, the proliferation of the World Wide 
Web means most of the industrialized world can access information easily and relatively 
inexpensively. 
 The second main event is that the digital information infrastructure has integrated 
into everyday life for much of society. For example, many people stream music, 
television shows, and/or movies multiple times a day. This frequent access can and is 
being paired with casual illegal access to digital copyrighted material (N. R. Council, 
2000). 
These changes brought on by the digitization of information and the internet have 
greatly affected firms that rely heavily on copyright protection. Firms in industries such 
as movies, television, music, and software have experienced major threats as digital 
piracy has become prominent (Peitz & Waelbroeck, 2006; Siwek, 2006, 2007). While 
difficult to accurately calculate, industry studies have estimated the cost of digital piracy 
in the US movie industry to be $6 billion in 2006 and in the US music industry $12.5 
billion in 2007 (Siwek, 2006, 2007). Estimates for the software industry show the value 
of unlicensed PC software installations in 2011 was $63 billion worldwide, with the U.S. 
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comprising almost $10 billion (BSA, 2018).   Further, industry analysis predicts digital 
piracy will become an even bigger issue in the future as future technology changes, such 
as 3D printing, could bring a new host of digital piracy concerns (Depoorter, 2013).   
While digitization has created opportunities for widespread digital piracy to hurt 
firm performance, it has also created new growth opportunities for digital copyright 
firms. For example, both the movie and television industries have experienced 
tremendous growth due to digitization increasing user access to movies and shows 
(Waldfogel, 2017). However, even with the new opportunities brought by digitization, 
digital piracy remains a serious and continuing issue for digital copyright firms. As such, 
I now review how digitization weakened the regulative institutions around copyright 
protection.  
Digitization: Weakening Regulative IP Institutions 
The combination of digitization and the internet has created an incredible 
environmental jolt for firms reliant on copyrights. Pre-digitization firms operated in a 
strong-stable IP institutional environment. In this environment, firms could generally rely 
on copyright protection policies and legal systems to protect their copyrights from illegal 
use and distribution. However, the changes digitization brought to copyrighted media, 
made the existing U.S. copyright laws less effective. As such, the U.S. made several 
changes to copyright policy. The first two changes, the Audio Home Recording Act of 
1992 (AHRA) (1992) and the No Electronic Theft Act (NET Act) (1997), were small 
policy changes that did pave the way for a larger policy change in the future.  
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The AHRA provided the first updates regarding digital IP to copyright law in the 
U.S. and made two important contributions to future laws. First, the AHRA created the 
first anti-circumvention copyright for digital IP by stating that individuals could make 
first-generation copies (i.e. a single copy) of legally purchased music for non-commercial 
use. However, second-generation copies (i.e. copy of a copy) are illegal. Second, the 
AHRA made the first technological limit to digital IP rights by requiring digital audio 
recording devices sold or manufactured in the U.S. to include the Serial Copy 
Management System (SCMS). SCMS was designed to prevent individuals from making 
second-generation copies by using technology that allows only one copy to be made.  
The NET Act’s main contribution was extending the definition of criminal 
copyright infringement to include illegally copying copyright material for an individual’s 
own use, even if that use is not commercially or financially beneficial to the individual. 
Prior to the NET ACT, criminal copyright infringement only occurred if the individual 
used the copyrighted material for commercial purposes or gained financially from it as 
per the Copyright Act of 1976 (1976). This change essentially started treating digital 
copyrighted material in a similar fashion to physical space theft, like shoplifting 
(Goldman, 2003).  
Both the AHRA and NET Act were ultimately unsuccessful in preventing digital 
piracy as standalone policies. However, these laws did directly influence the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) (1998) which is the main U.S. policy change for 
digital copyright protection.  
DMCA 
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The DMCA attempted to update U.S. copyright laws by enabling firms to protect 
their copyrights from illegal use and distribution in the digital age through two main 
avenues. First, the DMCA expanded the scope of restrictions for technology that 
circumvents copyright protection technologies to include manufacturers and distributors 
of products or services that allow for circumvention. Further, it expanded penalties for 
those engaging in anti-circumvention of copyright protection technologies. Second, the 
DMCA created the notice and takedown system for removing copyright-infringing 
material from online sources. The notice and takedown system works by copyright 
holders sending notices to online service providers, such as web search engine and media 
hosting sites, informing these providers that copyright-infringing media is being hosted 
on their online service. The online service providers then remove the copyright-infringing 
material.  By removing the copyright-infringing material expeditiously, online service 
providers are provided with safe harbor which protects them from any legal liability from 
hosting the copyright-infringing material.  
Despite these updates to copyright law, the DMCA has largely been considered 
ineffective at preventing digital piracy (Boyden, 2013; Hargreaves, 2011). The major 
issue cited by critics is that the notice takedown system is ineffective at preventing digital 
piracy, as copyright infringing users can easily repost the copyright-infringing material 
once it is taken down.  Additionally, critics claim that the DMCA does not put enough 
pressure on online service providers to proactively remove and prevent copyright-
infringing media (Sag, 2017). As it stands, online service providers have to only respond 
to requests to remove copyright-infringing material and do not have to proactively 
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remove or prevent copyright-infringing material. Critics from the music and movie 
industries call for a more proactive role of online service providers to remove or restrict 
copyrighted material without requests from copyright holders (Boyden, 2013). 
 Additionally, firms have attempted to use the legal system to combat both firms 
that enable and individuals who engage in digital piracy.  The most notable legal action 
comes from the Record Industry Association (RIAA) against Napster. Napster was a 
pioneer peer-to-peer file-sharing service that allowed users to upload and then freely 
share digital media with other users. Napster, operating between 1999 and 2001, quickly 
became popular and at its peak had 80 million registered users (Gowan, 2012).  While 
Napster’s users could share a variety of digital files, Napster was mainly used for sharing 
digital music recordings. This is largely due to digital audio files having a smaller file 
size and were, therefore, faster to share compared to digital video files. The RIAA 
claimed that 90% of the music recordings shared on Napster infringed upon the 
copyrights held by RIAA member music labels. This led to a lawsuit by the RIAA against 
Napster seeking over $100 million in copyright infringement damages (Berschadsky, 
1999). The legal and financial peril caused Napster to cease operation in 2001. However, 
other peer-to-peer services quickly took its place and Napster’s closing did little to stop 
digital piracy.   
 The peer-to-peer services that replaced Napster made changes to how digital 
media was stored that protected them from legal action. Napster centrally stored digital 
files on their own servers, whereas new peer-to-peer services decentralized file storage by 
having users store the files on their own computers. This inability to legally pursue the 
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new peer-to-peer services lead the RIAA to alter their legal strategy. Instead of taking 
legal action against the peer-to-peer services, the RIAA decided to file lawsuits against 
individual users of peer-to-peer services. This resulted in 6,200 lawsuits filed by the 
RIAA against individuals for copyright violation (Groennings, 2005). These lawsuits 
charged approximately $10,000 of damages per copyrighted song, which resulted in 
charges of over $500,000 per individual. Most of these lawsuits were settled out of court 
for between $3,000 to $11,000. Some of these cases did end up in court, including a 
famous case awarding the RIAA over $200,000 for a single mother of two illegally 
sharing 24 songs (Foundation, 2008).  Similarly, the Motion Picture Association of 
America (MPAA) followed this individual lawsuit strategy in 2004 (Groennings, 2005). 
The RIAA and MPAA realized they could not bring lawsuits against every individual 
engaging in illegal file-sharing, however, they hoped these lawsuits would serve as a 
deterrent. 
 While these individual lawsuits did garner much media attention, their impact on 
digital piracy was minimal.  Studies showed a decline in user engagement of popular 
peer-to-peer services (i.e. KaZaa and Morpheous) whose users were targeted by lawsuits 
(Bhattacharjee, Gopal, Lertwachara, & Marsden, 2006; Groennings, 2005). However, the 
overall effect on peer-to-peer service use was negligible, as users switched to new peer-
to-peer services that were more secure and anonymous (Groennings, 2005). Further, 
public opinion was not in the favor of the individual lawsuits, which hurt the RIAA’s 
public image (Groennings, 2005). This is due in part to a few high profile lawsuits that 
were either mistaken identity - an astrophysics professor named Usher was falsely 
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accused of illegally sharing the music artist Usher’s songs - or against sympathetic cases, 
such as single mothers with little income (Foundation, 2008; Groennings, 2005). 
Additionally, public sentiment saw little harm in file-sharing. A popular news article at 
the time sums up well the sentiment about the individual lawsuits, “The battle against 
file-sharing has become the entertainment industry’s version of the War on Drugs, an 
expensive, protracted, apparently ineffective and seemingly misguided battle against 
contraband that many suggest does little harm” (Manjoo, 2002, p. 1). 
Changes to digital copyright policies and legal attempts to enforce digital 
copyrights have overall been ineffective at preventing digital piracy. These failed 
attempts highlight how the existing institutions involved with copyright protection are 
inadequate in the digital era. Providing further evidence for this claim are technical 
reports from researchers in the United States (N. R. Council, 2000) and the United 
Kingdom (Hargreaves, 2011), along with economic analysis (Varian, 2005), which have 
identified the existing regulative institutions that once protected intellectual property are 
failing in the wake of digitization. Additionally, legal case studies have shown that digital 
copyright firms may find better success using normative institutions to strengthen digital 
copyright protection, given the weak state of formal copyright protection (Priest, 2015).   
Therefore, firms are left with attempting to change the institutions related to 
digital IP rights. As such, I focus the next part of the literature review on nonmarket 
strategies' role in institutional change.  
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IV. THEORY 
The prior chapters provide a path forward for improving the theoretical 
understanding of how firms strengthen their institutional environment after the unplanned 
and radical weakening of a strong regulative institution. The literature review highlights 
three key aspects of the relationship between firms and their institutional environment 
that are useful for theory building. First, firms adapt their strategies to their institutional 
environment. Second, institutional environments can be radically weakened by 
exogenous events which may affect a firm’s strategic effectiveness. Third, in response to 
institutional weakening, firms may endogenously change the institutional environment 
through regulative and normative change action to improve firm performance. Together 
these aspects demonstrate that given unfavorable conditions delivered by their 
institutional environment firms may implement institutional change action.  
Yet, how firms manage the relationship between regulative and normative change 
action in this environment is not well understood. Therefore, in this chapter, I build 
theory regarding various aspects of how firms use regulative and normative change 
action. I begin by exploring the timing of regulative and normative change action in this 
environment. I then focus on a specific aspect of this process in which regulative and 
normative change actions occur simultaneously. For this aspect, I create testable 
hypotheses regarding various facets of how firms use regulative and normative change 
actions to strengthen their institutional environment.   
Sequence: Regulative to Normative Change Action  
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To begin understanding how firms strengthen their institutional environment after 
regulative institutions are radically weakened by environmental jolts, I first examine the 
sequence of institutional change. Figure 2 illustrates the sequence for strengthening the 
institutional environment after the unplanned and radical weakening of a strong 
regulatory institution. The sequence shows that, after regulative institutions radically 
weaken, firms will take regulative change action. However, assuming that the regulative 
change action is not successful, firms will engage in both normative and regulative 
change actions to attempt to strengthen the institutional environment. The following 
paragraphs describe the rationale for this institutional change sequence. 
Figure 2: Sequence Model for Institutional Change in Response to Unplanned and 
Radical Weakening of Strong Regulative Institution 
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Firms operating in institutional environments dominated by strong stable 
regulative institutions become reliant on the regulative institutions to define and enforce 
acceptable behavior. As such, firms design their strategies around the regulative defined 
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behaviors and work under the assumption that firms that violate the regulative institutions 
will be penalized. However, once the regulative institutions are radically weakened by the 
environmental jolt, the regulative institutions no longer effectively enforce the associated 
regulations. This results in regulative institution-dependent strategies no longer being 
viable for firms, which creates great uncertainty and lowers performance.  Therefore, 
firms will attempt to strengthen the weakened institutional environment as quickly as 
possible.  
The fastest way for firms to strengthen a weakened regulative institution 
environment is to engage in change action to restore the regulative institution. If the 
regulative change action is successful in restoring the regulative institutions, the 
institutional environment will return to a strong and stable state and firms can continue 
their prior strategies. Further, in an environment previously dominated by strong 
regulative institutions, restoring regulative institutions will provide more certainty than 
creating new strong normative institutions. This is because firms already understand how 
the prior regulative institutions defined and enforced acceptable firm behavior.  However, 
if a new normative institution is created, greater uncertainty exists for firms in how the 
new normative institutions will constrain firm behavior and how firms will respond to the 
new institution. Therefore, restoring the regulative institutions is a better option than 
creating a new normative institution. Thus, firms will first engage in regulative 
institutional change action to strengthen their institutional environment. 
 Yet, while regulative institutional change action is the likely first choice for firms 
to strengthen their institutional environment, it may not be effective. First, the effects of 
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the environmental jolt that caused the regulative institutional weakening are still present. 
This means regulative change action will need to effectively address the changes brought 
by the environmental jolt. However, regulative institutions often have difficulty in 
adapting to environmental jolts, especially when the jolt is related to technological 
development (Moses, 2007, 2013).  Research by Moses (2007, 2013) demonstrates that 
technological development often weakens existing laws and that policymakers generally 
struggle to make timely and effective changes in response to technological development. 
Therefore, regulative change action to restore the regulative institutions may very well be 
ineffective.   
Thus, if the regulative change attempts are not successful, firms are then likely to 
pursue other institutional change strategies. As such, firms are likely to engage in 
normative change action to attempt to strengthen the institutional environment after 
regulative change attempts have failed. Normative institutional change will attempt to use 
new values, norms, or standards that use social pressure to shape firm behavior in a way 
that strengthens the institutional environment. While normative change attempts may 
restore strength to the institutional environment, replacing regulative institutions with 
normative institutions is difficult. Unlike regulative institutions, normative institutions 
cannot rely on financial incentives and sanctions to define and enforce firm behavior. As 
such, creating enough social pressure to enforce specific behaviors at a similar level of 
the regulative institution is extremely difficult. Therefore, firms are unlikely to pursue 
normative change action as the sole institutional change strategy.  
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Instead, firms will use a combination of normative and regulative change actions 
to strengthen their institutional environment. By using institutional change actions that 
target both institutional pillars, firms may be able to increase their overall pressure to 
strengthen the institutional environment. Further, targeting one institutional pillar may 
bolster the effectiveness of the change action targeting the other institutional pillar.  For 
instance, firms can use the threat of regulative institutional change to encourage other 
firms to adopt the normative institutional change. Thus, the final aspect of the sequence 
model is firms engaging in regulative and normative change actions simultaneously.  
Yet, how firms manage this relationship between regulative and normative 
institutional change action is not well understood. Therefore, the following theoretical 
development aims to improve the understanding of this relationship.  I now use the 
theoretical context discussed in Chapter 3 to aid in developing this theory.  
Digital Copyright Institutional Environment 
To develop theory on how firms manage the relationship between regulative and 
normative change action to strengthen their institutional environment, I utilize the context 
of IP institutional environments in the digital age. Specifically, I focus on how firms 
attempt to strengthen the institutional environment for copyright protection in the U.S. 
after the rise of digital piracy. 
The combination of digitization and the internet has created an incredible 
environmental jolt for firms reliant on copyrights for IP appropriation. Pre-digitization 
firms operated in strong-stable IP institutional environments. These firms could generally 
rely on formal IP policies and legal systems to protect their copyrights from illegal use 
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and distribution. However, during post-digitization, these same regulative institutions 
were no longer effective at protecting copyrights. Therefore, firms will take action to 
strengthen their digital copyright institutional environment. 
The prior presence of a strong regulative institution that legally supported 
copyright protection suggests a sequence of institutional change that begins with 
regulative institution restoration attempts.  As such, digital copyright firms begin the 
institutional strengthening sequence by engaging in CPA action to strengthen digital 
copyright policy (Nimmer, 2001). The result of these CPA efforts was the DMCA, which 
was the major update to copyright policy in the U.S.  
As previously reviewed, the DMCA was ineffective at protecting copyrights. This 
policy failure meant that it was not only digital copyright firms that could not rely on the 
current regulative institutions, but also that subsequent regulative intuitional change 
action would likely be ineffective for some time. This is because subsequent regulative 
change is unlikely after a broad policy update like the DMCA (Patashnik, 2014). Further, 
despite strong CPA efforts from digital copyright firms, the DMCA was still ineffective at 
preventing digital piracy. As such, there is no guarantee that future CPA efforts will result 
in effective policy changes. Therefore, after the regulative change action results were 
found ineffective, digital copyright firms engaged in normative institutional change 
action.  
 Digital copyright firms face an interesting problem when trying to apply 
normative institutional change. The relationship between the digital copyright firm and 
individuals engaging in digital piracy is not direct. For individuals to engage in digital 
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piracy, they must have digital access to the copyrighted material. Digital access to the 
copyrighted material is provided by online services providers such as web search engines. 
Therefore, digital copyright firms will need to use normative pressure on online service 
providers to strengthen copyright protection. Additionally, online service providers that 
enable access to digital copyrighted material are now deemed enabling firms and their 
associated industries as enabling industries. Figure 3 illustrates the relationship of digital 
copyright firms in enabling firms and digital copyright infringers.  
Figure 3: Digital Copyright Firms Relationship Graph 
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Given this relationship, digital copyright firms are likely to use normative 
pressure on enabling firms to improve digital copyright protection. For example, if digital 
copyright firms can pressure enabling firms to restrict access to or pro-actively remove 
copyright-infringing material, digital copyright protection will be strengthened.  
Therefore, digital copyright firms are likely to use normative pressure to influence 
enabling firms to self-regulate in order to strengthen digital copyright protection. In this 
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context, self-regulation includes additional actions enabling firms take to proactively 
prevent online copyright infringement, remove copyright-infringing material, or punish 
copyright infringing entities that goes beyond what is required by the DMCA. 
 Further, many firms affected by weakening digital copyright protection will 
engage in applying pressure to enabling firms to self-regulate. However, not all digital 
copyright firms will participate equally in applying pressure. The following section 
develops hypotheses about how different aspects of CPA engagement affect the level of 
pressure digital copyright firms place on enabling firms to self-regulate. 
CPA Engagement 
As discussed in Chapter 2, firms in a radically weakened regulatory institutional 
environment are apt to engage in both regulative and normative institutional change to 
restore their institutional environment. Therefore, the first set of hypotheses examines the 
relationship between the nonmarket strategies related to regulative and normative 
institution change, CPA and industry self-regulation. Additionally, firms can choose to 
engage in CPA directly or indirectly through joining a trade association. Therefore, theory 
is created for each approach, as well as for comparing the two approaches.  
To begin, all firms located in the same jurisdiction as the regulative institutions 
have the potential to engage directly in CPA as an institutional change action. However, 
only a subset of these firms will engage in CPA, as significant resources and expertise are 
needed to engage in direct CPA. Firms must commit financial resources to pay lobbyists 
and make PAC donations, and have expertise on how to engage in CPA effectively.  This 
resource commitment and internal expertise signals a belief that regulative institutional 
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change is an effective mechanism to strengthen digital copyright protection. Therefore, 
firms engaging in direct CPA will look to increase the effectiveness of their CPA efforts 
to strengthen regulative institutions.  
Firms engaging in direct CPA will strengthen their regulative change actions by 
placing increased normative pressure on the enabling firms to self-regulate. Direct CPA 
firms will use this increased normative pressure as evidence of failed regulative 
institutions by applying the logic that if the regulative institutions were effective, then 
enabling firm self-regulation would not be needed. Therefore, by applying increased 
normative pressure, these firms are providing evidence to policymakers that additional 
formal policy is required to strengthen digital copyright protection. Thus, I predict that 
firms that directly engage in higher levels of CPA will apply higher levels of pressure for 
enabling industries to self-regulate.  
Hypothesis 1: The more firms directly engage in CPA, the more pressure they will place 
on enabling firms to self-regulate.  
Trade Associations and Indirect CPA Engagement 
 When choosing to engage in institutional change action, firms must choose to act 
individually or collectively. As trade associations are common means of collective action 
for institutional change (Barnett, 2013), I focus this section on trade associations’ role in 
strengthening the digital copyright institutional environment.  
Trade associations are designed to address collective issues facing their member 
firms. As such, when an issue becomes highly salient and shared among the trade 
association member firms, the trade association should take action. Given the severe 
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impact digital piracy has on digital copyright firms, associated trade associations will 
actively address digital piracy. Therefore, trade associations will pursue viable avenues 
for strengthening copyright protection for their member firms.  
One avenue for trade associations to strengthen copyright protection is to 
influence regulative institutions through CPA. Trade associations can engage in the same 
type of CPA actions as individual firms and some do so regularly. Therefore, it is likely 
some trade associations will engage in CPA to strengthen regulative institutions around 
digital copyright protection for their member firms.  
Trade associations that engage in CPA gain expertise and experience in engaging 
in institutional change action. This institutional change experience increases the trade 
associations’ legitimacy as an institutional change agent  (Maguire, Hardy, & Lawrence, 
2004). As higher legitimacy is an antecedent of institutional change action (Suchman, 
1995b), this greater legitimacy increases the likelihood trade associations will coordinate 
with their member firms to engage in higher levels of normative change action. 
Therefore, member firms will increase their pressure on enabling industries to self-
regulate in order to increase the effectiveness of the joint institutional change action 
between the firm and their trade association. 
Hypothesis 2: The more firms engage in CPA indirectly through their trade association, 
the more pressure they will place on enabling firms to self-regulate. 
As discussed previously, firms can engage in CPA either directly or through a 
trade association. Both avenues of CPA engagement are similar in that each is used as an 
attempt to change regulative institutions and engagement in both is predicted to lead to 
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placing increasing pressure on enabling industries to self-regulate. However, these two 
approaches differ in resource commitment, expertise needed to engage in CPA, and 
legitimacy as an institutional change actor. Therefore, the following hypothesis explores 
how a firm’s choice to engage in CPA, directly or indirectly through a trade association, 
affects the level of pressure they place on enabling firms to self-regulate.  
Contributing to a trade association to engage in CPA on your behalf, as well as 
engaging in CPA directly, takes a significant amount of resources. While trade 
associations do share the costs of CPA amongst its members, firms need to be a top 
contributor to the trade association to ensure their interests are prioritized over other 
members (Barnett, 2013). Thus, while firms hiring lobbyists to engage directly in CPA is 
likely more costly than contributing money to a trade association, the monetary resource 
allocation difference may not be significant enough to illicit different behavior, with how 
firms coordinate their nonmarket strategies.   
Yet, for a firm to engage in CPA directly requires specific knowledge of the CPA 
process and political capital (Bonardi et al., 2006; Bonardi & Keim, 2005), because firms 
engaging in indirect CPA do not have this knowledge and expertise, as the knowledge and 
expertise resides with the trade association.  Additionally, firms that engage in direct CPA 
have an increased reputation with the policymakers compared to firms that engage in 
CPA indirectly. Therefore, firms that engage in CPA directly increase their legitimacy as 
institutional change actors. This results in firms that engage in CPA directly, having 
higher legitimacy as institutional change actors than firms engaging in CPA indirectly 
through trade associations. This increased legitimacy, as well as increased knowledge, 
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expertise, and reputation will result in firms engaging directly in CPA placing more 
pressure on enabling industries to self-regulate than firms indirectly engaging in CPA 
through trade associations.  
Hypothesis 3: Firms that engage in CPA directly will place greater pressure on enabling 
industries to self-regulate than firms who indirectly engage in CPA through trade 
associations. 
Foreign Firms and CPA Access 
While the previous hypotheses examined the relationship between CPA 
engagement and pressuring enabling firms to self-regulate, not all firms have access to 
CPA. Even though digital copyright infringement affects firms globally, the major web 
search firms are based in the U.S. and are therefore operating under U.S. law. This, in 
turn, will have ramifications for foreign firms applying pressure on enabling firms to self-
regulate.  
Foreign firms do not have the same access to CPA as domestic firms. This is due 
to legal statutes that prevent firm interference in foreign governments.  Additionally, 
social norms exist that prevent firms from directly influencing foreign governments. 
Therefore, since foreign firms cannot engage in CPA, they must pursue other avenues if 
they wish to strengthen digital copyright institutions.  
As foreign firms do not have access to regulative institutional change, normative 
institutional change through pressuring enabling firms to self-regulate is their only 
recourse. As this is their sole available action, foreign firms will put additional effort into 
normative institutional change. Therefore, relative to domestic firms that have CPA 
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access but do not engage in CPA, I predict foreign firms without CPA access will place 
more pressure on enabling firms to self-regulate.  
However, the positive effect of engaging in regulative institutional change action, 
and on placing increased pressure on enabling firms to self-regulate described in H1 and 
H2, is greater than the positive effect of not having CPA access that foreign firms 
experience. This is due to the reinforcing relationship between regulative and normative 
institutional change that results in CPA engagement leading to increased pressure on 
enabling firms to self-regulate. This reinforcing relationship causes a stronger effect than 
the absence of a regulative institutional change option. Therefore, I predict relative to 
domestic firms that engage in CPA, foreign firms without CPA access will place less 
pressure on enabling firms to self-regulate.  
Hypothesis 4: Firms without CPA access will place greater pressure on enabling firms to 
self-regulate than firms with CPA access that do not engage in CPA but less than firms 
that do engage in CPA. 
Enabling Firms Self-Regulation  
 Firms in enabling industries are facing dual pressures that may significantly affect 
their strategic actions. First, as theorized previously, enabling firms are under pressure 
from digital copyright firms to implement self-regulating measures to strengthen digital 
copyright protections. While the pressure to self-regulate may be immense, self-
regulation is still a voluntary action. Therefore, enabling firms may choose not to self-
regulate.  
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 The second pressure affecting enabling industries is the threat of new or expanded 
government regulations. Digital copyright firms are engaging in CPA to influence 
policymakers to strengthen digital copyright policy. Changes to digital copyright policy 
may result in new and stronger government regulations on enabling firms. As these 
regulations are mandatory, enabling firms would have to comply.  
 These dual pressures result in two diverging regulatory paths. On one side is self-
regulation, where enabling firms choose what regulations are created and how they are 
implemented. On the other side are regulations created by new government policies, 
where enabling firms have less influence over the policies and must comply with the 
regulations.  Therefore, enabling firms will choose to self-regulate in order to keep more 
control over the regulations being implemented and to prevent or delay further 
regulations.  
 However, enabling firms are still acting in their own self-interest. Therefore, 
enabling firms will self-regulate the minimal amount they believe will satisfy 
policymakers and prevent further regulation. As such, digital copyright firms will likely 
not be satisfied with the extent of the self-regulating actions from enabling firms. 
However, digital copyright firms will still view these self-regulating actions as a victory 
and that the pressure they are applying is working. Therefore, after enabling firms 
implement self-regulating action, digital copyright firms will increase pressure in hopes 
of encouraging more self-regulating actions.  
Additionally, digital copyright firms will use self-regulation from enabling firms, 
as evidence that enabling firms are culpable in enabling digital copyright infringement. 
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They will use this evidence to attempt to influence policymakers to increase regulations 
on enabling industries. This will lead to an increase in CPA activity by digital copyright 
firms after enabling firms implement self-regulation. Finally, enabling firms also engage 
in their own CPA efforts to prevent further government regulations. Therefore, enabling 
firms will use their self-regulating action as evidence that they are capable of regulating 
themselves and no further government regulation is needed. Thus, I predict that enabling 
industries will increase their CPA activity after they implement self-regulation.  
 Thus, I propose the following three hypotheses regarding enabling implementing 
self-regulation and further institutional change action.  
Hypothesis 5: After enabling firms implement self-regulation, external pressure to self-
regulate from digital copyright firms will increase.  
Hypothesis 6: After enabling firms implement self-regulation, CPA from digital copyright 
firms will increase. 
Issue Saliency & Copyright Strategy 
 Issue saliency is a key antecedent for firms to engage in institutional change 
actions. Unless the issue directly hurts a firm’s competitive advantage, a firm is not likely 
to engage in institutional change actions. While digital piracy is a broad, salient issue that 
affects firms in multiple industries, not all firms are affected the same. First, issue 
saliency can be determined by how much copyright infringement occurs through enabling 
firms. This type of issue saliency can aggregate to industry differences. For example, 
estimates show that less than half of software piracy happens from online websites, 
whereas in the music and movie industry, almost all piracy happens online (Economics, 
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2017; Gantz et al., 2013). Therefore, firms in which the higher proportion of copyright 
infringement occurs online, experience higher issue saliency.  
Additionally, issue saliency varies depending on how much digital piracy affects 
firm copyright strategy.  The dominant copyright strategy is the traditional distribution 
strategy. In this approach, firms create copyrighted media and then sell distribution rights 
to distributor firms, who then sell or rent the copyrighted media to end customers. Firms 
using this strategy heavily rely on distribution fees for revenue. Therefore, digital piracy 
poses a great threat to these firms. If end customers can access copyright-infringing 
media, they will not pay the distributors for access to the copyrighted media. This, in 
turn, reduces the potential revenue for distributors and copyright producing firms. Thus, 
issue saliency is very high for firms engaging in a distribution strategy.  
 Another copyright strategy is based on distributors gathering copyrights from 
multiple firms and creating a subscription service to access the copyrighted media. For 
these firms, primary revenue comes from subscription fees to access the copyrighted 
media. However, these firms may also produce their own original copyrighted media to 
include in their subscription service. For these firms, digital piracy of their original 
copyrighted media does negatively affect their revenue. However, digital piracy may 
increase viewers of their original copyrighted media and ultimately attract more users to 
the subscription service. Additionally, only a portion of revenue comes from original 
content, as these firms still rely heavily on licensing other copyrighted media from other 
firms. Thus, issue saliency is low for these firms.  
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 An alternative strategy is to use copyrighted material to create demand for a suite 
of related products. In this approach, firms still use the traditional distribution strategy for 
the copyrighted media. However, they also generate great revenue by selling related 
products. Therefore, digital piracy negatively affects their copyright distribution revenue. 
However, related product revenue is not negatively affected and may benefit from 
increased viewership. Thus, issue saliency is moderate for these firms.  
 The variance in issue saliency based on the proportion of copyright infringement 
happening online, and differing copyright strategies, leads to the seventh hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 7: The stronger the issue salience for firms, the greater the pressure to self-
regulate they will place on enabling industries  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V. RESEARCH METHODS 
To empirically test the hypotheses about how firms strengthen the institutional 
environment to increase copyright protection, I build a longitudinal dataset comprised of 
copyright takedown notices from digital copyright firms. To justify the construct validity 
of this data, I first review the DMCA provision that creates the copyright takedown notice 
system and how firms use the system.  I then operationalize the copyright takedown 
notices as a primary data source. Further, I discuss the operationalization of CPA 
measure, issue saliency, and various firm characteristics that complete the longitudinal 
dataset. Finally, I conclude with the model specifications of how each hypothesis will be 
tested.  
Firm Sample & Timeline 
 The firm population for this study was comprised of the three industries - movies, 
television, and music - most impacted by digital piracy (Blackburn, Eisenach, & Harrison 
Jr, 2019; Economics, 2017; Poort, Quintais, van der Ende, Yagafarova, & Hageraats, 
2018). Firm activity related to digital copyright protection was observed and recorded 
quarterly from 2012 to 2018. Specifying quarterly activity provided the granularity 
needed to capture product release schedules that is related to digital piracy activity 
(Morris, 2019).   
The core sample from these industries was constructed by identifying the top 65 
firms in each industry based on annual sales size.  Selecting the 65 largest firms in each 
industry ensured that the firms included are likely to have high status and substantial 
resources, both of which are found to be indicators for firms engaging in institutional 
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change (Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006). The Mergent Intellect database was used to 
identify firms in each industry based on NAICS codes. 
However, this sampling strategy would miss smaller firms that create popular 
copyrighted media that may be affected by digital copyright infringement. Small firms 
experiencing digital copyright infringement are likely to have fewer financial resources 
and revenue diversity compared to larger firms and therefore may be at a greater risk of 
failure. Thus, small firms may have high issue salience, which is an indicator for 
institutional change action (Henisz & Zelner, 2005), while also having lower status, 
which has also been shown to be an indicator of institutional change action (Garud et al., 
2002; Haveman & Rao, 1997). Therefore, the core sample was supplemented by adding 
firms that have popular copyrighted media in each industry. Details on the process of 
identifying popular copyrighted media in each industry are found in the Popularity 
section in this chapter. Additionally, firms in China were not included in this sample due 
to the differences in copyright laws and acceptance of digital copyright infringement 
within the country (Brodbeck, 2013; Rapoza, 2012). 
Finally, firms that were listed independently in the sample, but operate under the 
direct control of their parent company, were removed from the sample. These procedures 
resulted in a sample of 196 firms (N) with 77 from the movie industry, 60 from the 
television industry, and 59 from the music industry. Additionally, quarterly observations 
from 2012 to 2018, for a total T = 28, are used to capture fluctuations in institutional 
change responses that may be tied to industry product seasonality (i.e. movie, TV, and 
music releases). The 2012 to 2018 timeframe was chosen as this was when digital 
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copyright firms have been most active in pressuring enabling firms to self-regulate. The 
resulting sample is N = 196 and T =28 for 5,448 firm quarter observations.  
Copyright Takedown Notice Construct Validity 
DMCA Takedown Notices and Safe Harbor 
 As previously mentioned, the DMCA is the main U.S. policy change regarding 
digital copyright protection. DMCA Title II included the Online Copyright Infringement 
Liability Limitation Act. Title II creates significant limitations on who can be held 
responsible for enabling copyright infringement. Specifically, Title II gives safe harbor to 
internet service providers which are defined broadly as “a provider of online services or 
network access” (17 U.S.C. § 512(c)(1)).  In practice, this means websites who either 
host digital material like YouTube, search engines that allow finding copyrighted material 
like Google, or internet service providers that physically provide consumers with internet 
service, such AT&T or Comcast Xfinity, are all classified as service providers.  Title II 
states that service providers are granted safe harbor, and therefore safe from legal action 
in the event they host copyrighting infringement files, if they comply with safe harbor 
guidelines.  
 The safe harbor protections that shield service providers from legal responsibility 
for hosting copyright-infringing materials are contingent on compliance with the notice 
and takedown system. The notice and takedown system established a quick method for 
copyright owners to notify a service provider about illegally shared copyright material so 
the infringing material can be removed. Prior to the DMCA takedown system, copyright 
holders had to go through the court system to legally have copyright infringing material 
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removed. Traditional court systems posed problems for digital copyright firms, as going 
through the court system takes considerable time and the court systems were not designed 
to handle the large number of copyright-infringing material removal requests post-
digitization. Therefore, for copyright holders, the DMCA takedown system provided a 
quicker method to remove copyright-infringing material from the internet.  
 The first step of the DMCA takedown system procedure is the copyright holder, 
or an agent working on behalf of the copyright holder, identifying copyright infringing 
material on the internet. A notice is then sent to the service provider who hosts the 
copyrighted material. The notice contains information of what the copyrighted material 
is, who owns the copyright, who is submitting the takedown notice, where the 
copyrighted infringing material is located on the internet (i.e. URL), and a signature 
certifying the notice is accurate and a good faith belief the material is violating the 
copyright. Once the notice is received by the online service provider, the online service 
provider sends a notice to the alleged offending party that they are sharing copyright-
infringing material and this material will be removed. The DMCA states that the online 
service provider is then to remove or disable the copyright-infringing material 
expeditiously. If the alleged offending party disputes the cited material copyright claim, 
they can file a counter-notice claim to which the service provider must then respond.  
Takedown Procedure Ineffectiveness 
 The DMCA designed the takedown system to work quickly and effectively.  
However, technology and user innovation made the takedown system ineffective at 
stopping digital piracy.  For example, a takedown notice includes a specific URL for the 
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copyright-infringing material. Once the takedown notice is processed, this URL is 
removed by the online service provider. However, this is often ineffective, as sharers of 
copyrighted material often use automatic processes to post the same content under a new 
URL. Further, URLs are specific and link to an exact web page. Websites that 
intentionally host copyright-infringing material contain many URLs that are extensions of 
its overall domain name. So even if several URLs are removed, the overall domain 
continues to operate.  
This example highlights a problem with the DMCA takedown procedure. It is 
easy for hosts of copyright-infringing material to circumnavigate the takedown 
procedure. As such, digital piracy has continued to increase (Boyden, 2013).  However, 
as long as service providers comply with the takedown procedure, even if it is not 
effective, they are granted safe harbor.  This ineffectiveness is why digital IP firms, 
especially in the music and movie industries, have repeatedly called to make changes to 
the DMCA safe harbor classification.  
Calls to Change the Safe Harbor Statute 
 Digital copyright-related trade associations foresaw the ineffectiveness of the 
DMCA takedown procedure. For example, during the creation of the DMCA ,the RIAA 
stated to policymakers that the takedown procedure would be ineffective and do little to 
stop copyright infringers (Imfeld & Ekstrand, 2005).  As such, trade associations have 
placed a large share of the blame for the DMCA’s ineffectiveness on the safe harbor 
protection for service providers (Bridy, 2016; Sag, 2017). They argue that the DMCA 
safe harbor clause does not put enough onus on service providers to prevent digital 
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piracy. Therefore, digital copyright firms and trade associations have lobbied Congress to 
alter the DCMA safe harbor statute. Proposed changes include making service providers 
responsible for actively screening copyrighted infringing material without having 
copyright owners send notices (Sag, 2017).  Additionally, some trade associations have 
lobbied for more radical changes to the DMCA that will remove safe harbor status for 
service providers if they do not take a more active and effective role in removing and 
preventing copyright infringing material (Doroshow & Wilkens, 2016). 
 Given the pressure online service providers are facing from digital copyright 
firms, some service providers are making voluntary improvements to prevent digital 
piracy beyond the scope of the DMCA. These additional efforts have been deemed 
DMCA-plus (Bridy, 2016). For example, Google has implemented a demotion signal 
policy that buries domains in Google Web Search results that receive many copyright 
infringement notices (Donaldson, 2017). While the demotion signal policy does not fully 
remove a domain from the internet, as that is outside of Google’s abilities, it does make 
the domain highly unlikely to be discovered by a web search.   
Additionally, YouTube has introduced its Content ID program which allows 
content owners, which may include copyright owners but is open to all original content, 
to create a unique identification for their original content material they upload to 
YouTube (Sag, 2017). The Content ID program works by having the content creator 
register the original content with YouTube. YouTube then checks the registered content 
against other media posted on YouTube.  If the found media is automatically determined 
to use the original content without permission, the media is flagged and the Content ID 
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owner is notified. The Content ID owner can then either have the media removed or 
choose to let the media stay.  
While DMCA-plus efforts are voluntary, they are viewed as being the result of 
threats of further government regulations brought on by lobbying efforts by digital IP 
firms (Bridy, 2015, 2016). In evidence of this, the RIAA, along with other music trade 
associations, submitted a letter to the Copyright Office in 2017 saying these new DMCA-
plus efforts show progress in service providers taking more responsibility for upholding 
copyrights. However, the trade associations argued that if these efforts are not enough, 
and if more concessions are not made, further government regulatory action will be 
required (Doroshow & Wilkens, 2016).   
Operationalization of Dependent Variables  
Internet Takedown Notices 
 At the surface level, internet takedown notices are about removing copyright-
infringing material. However, a deeper look shows that internet takedown notices are 
used for pressuring online service providers to self-regulate. To begin, internet takedown 
notices are ineffective at preventing digital piracy. As explained previously, after 
receiving a takedown notice, online service providers are only required to remove the 
offending URL, which is ineffective at preventing digital copyright infringement. Digital 
copyright firms have even admitted the takedown notice system is not useful for 
preventing digital piracy. In response for public comment about digital copyright 
protection from the U.S. Copyright Office, the RIAA said takedown notices are 
ineffective at preventing digital piracy and the takedown system “results in an endless 
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game of whack-a-mole, with infringing content that is removed from a site one moment 
reposted to the same site and other sites moments later, to be repeated ad 
infinitem”  (Doroshow & Wilkens, 2016, pp. 7-8). 
 Second, digital copyright firms are using takedown notices as evidence that online 
service providers need to self-regulate.  In a joint letter from various music trade 
associations, including the RIAA, to the U.S. copyright office, the music associations 
state that  online service providers cannot comply with such a high volume of takedown 
notices (Rosenthal & Metalitz, 2016). The music associations use this claim to motivate 
several suggestions for online service providers to self-regulate. These include complete 
removal of repeat infringers from the online service, automated systems to accept and 
takedown notices and remove copyright-infringing material, and screening media for 
copyright infringement before it is posted to the online service (Doroshow & Wilkens, 
2016; Rosenthal & Metalitz, 2016). Further, music associations have directly called for 
online service providers to self-regulate. However, they have also made it clear that if 
online service providers do not self-regulate, then formal regulations should be created by 
the government. For example, the closing paragraph of one letter from music associations 
to the U.S. Copyright Office states:  
“Service providers, including large technology companies, can help to restore 
much of the balance Congress intended to strike by agreeing to adopt standard 
technical measures and/or voluntary measures to address the DMCA safe harbors’ 
key failings. The Music Community stands ready to work with service providers 
and other copyright owners on the development and implementation of standard 
technical measures and voluntary measures. However, to the extent such measures 
are not forthcoming, legislative solutions will be necessary to restore the balance 
Congress intended (Doroshow & Wilkens, 2016, pp. 14-15).” 
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Finally, online service providers have stated they implemented self-regulation 
actions due to the pressure received from takedown requests. In an article written by 
Caleb Donaldson, copyright counsel at Google, and published in the American Bar 
Association’s publication Landslide, Donaldson lays out Google’s self-regulation action 
in response to takedown notices (Donaldson, 2017). The self-regulation actions include a 
demotion signal that buries repeat infringing domains in Google’s web search results and 
an ads policy enforcement campaign that does not allow large commercial piracy sites 
from receiving ad money on Google. Additionally, Google published a public document 
titled “How Google Fights Piracy” (Oyama, 2016) that discusses their self-regulation 
actions in response to pressure from digital copyright firms. Therefore, I conclude that 
takedown notices are an act of applying pressure to enabling industries to self-regulate.  
Each takedown notice includes the name of the copyright holder, the sender of the 
takedown notice (i.e. copyright holder or their agent), the copyrighted material being 
infringed upon, the copyright offending URL and domain, and the date and time the 
takedown notice was sent. From the takedown notice, a count of URLs requested to be 
removed can be created from each copyright holder for each year quarter. The URLs 
removed count is the main dependent variable for this study. 
Google Takedown Notices 
In an effort to show transparency, compliance to the DMCA, and efforts to curb 
digital piracy, Google has made all DMCA takedown notices they have received from 
2011 to present available to the public.  Takedown notices procedures have been in place 
since soon after the DMCA was introduced in 1998. However, takedown notices were not 
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often used until after 2010. For example, Google received takedown notices for 558 
million URLs in 2015, which is more than all takedown notices received from 1998 to 
2010 (Oyama, 2016). The large increase in takedown notice use comes from copyright 
firms implementing automated bots to find and send takedown notices. Therefore, the 
2012 to 2018 timeline captures the vast majority of takedown notices.  
Additionally, Google Web Search represents 92.86% of all web searches 
worldwide (Statcounter, 2019). As such, Google has a monopoly on the web search 
industry. Therefore, by analyzing takedown notices sent to Google, I was able to analyze 
the most important actor in the web search industry.  
CPA Variables  
For the CPA measure, I use lobbying activity made by firms on copyright issues. 
Lobbying activity was chosen as the CPA measure for a few reasons. First, lobbying 
activity can be tracked to specific issues, whereas other CPA types, like campaign and 
PAC donations, cannot. Therefore, using lobbying activity allows for direct measurement 
of CPA activity on digital copyright enforcement and not just general CPA engagement. 
Second, through the Lobbying Disclosure Act of 1995 and the House Leadership Open 
Government Act of 2007, all lobbying activity is recorded and made publicly available. 
These records take the form of a lobbying report. A separate lobbying report is required 
for each lobbying action a firm takes. Therefore, lobbying activity and intensity can be 
measured by counting the lobbying reports.  
For this study, lobbying activity was obtained from the OpenSecrets.org website 
hosted by the Center for Responsive Politics (Center for Responsive Politics, 2019a). 
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OpenSecrets.org allows users to select lobbying activity by issue; the website included a 
Copyright, Patent, & Trademark category. Lobbying reports for each firm in this category 
were read to determine if the lobbying effort was focused on digital copyright protection. 
The lobbying dollars were then recorded from the lobbying reports along with the year 
and quarter the lobbying activity occurred. Additionally, the number of separate lobbying 
reports was counted as an alternative measure of lobbying activity.  
The various lobbying activities were operationalized into two sets of variables. 
The first set relates to direct lobbying activity, which corresponds to firms in the sample 
that directly engaged in lobbying activity. The direct lobbying activity variables include 
direct lobbying dollars and direct lobbying report counts. The log of the direct lobbying 
dollars variable was taken to control for outliers.  Additionally, the variable direct CPA 
active is a categorical variable that denotes if a firm engaged in digital copyright related 
lobbying anytime during the study. 
The second set relates to indirect lobbying activity, which corresponds to firms 
that have trade associations engage in lobbying on their behalf. These variables were 
created by first identifying trade associations that engaged in digital copyright lobbying 
activity. Next, the member list for each trade association was found either through the 
trade association’s website or through news articles about the trade association. Then, the 
lobbying dollars spent and the number of lobbying reports filed by the trade association 
were divided equally among the member firms. The divided values are then assigned to 
each member firm that appears in the sample to create the variables’ indirect lobbying 
dollars and indirect lobbying report count. The log of the indirect lobbying dollars 
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variable was taken to control for outliers.  Finally, the variable indirect CPA active is a 
categorical variable that denotes if a firm’s trade association engaged in digital copyright 
related lobbying anytime during the study. 
Operationalization of Independent Variables 
CPA Access: Foreign or Domestic 
 In order to operationalize firm’s CPA access, each firm’s country location was 
recorded. Firms located in the US were coded as having CPA access and firms located 
outside the US were coded as not having CPA access.  
Self-Regulation Events 
 During the time span of this study, Google enacted two self-regulation events. The 
first self-regulation event took place in August 2012, at which time Google created a new 
procedure that down ranks a website that receives large numbers of DMCA takedown 
requests in Google’s search ranking. This tactic, deemed “demotion signal”, essentially 
buries the website in the search results, which means it is highly unlikely to be accessed 
through Google’s search engine. This procedure change goes beyond what is legally 
required by the DMCA. Again, the DMCA only requires the full offending URL to be 
removed, whereas this procedure punishes the whole domain. 
 The second self-regulation event took place in October 2014. This event consisted 
of Google removing the ability for websites that receive large numbers of DMCA 
takedown requests from receiving advertising revenue from Google. Additionally, Google 
revised its demotion signal strategy to encompass a larger number of digital piracy 
websites. 
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Both self-regulation events were identified from a report on Google’s search 
algorithm update history (Linkgraph, 2019). Each self-regulation event was coded for the 
year quarter the event took place, as well as the successive quarter after the event.   
Issue Saliency 
 The issue saliency measure was designed to better understand how different 
copyright strategies affect the level of normative pressure firms place on enabling 
industries to self-regulate as described in Chapter 4, hypotheses 7. To create the issue 
saliency measure, I recorded the annual sales dollars of licensed merchandise for firms. 
For entertainment-based companies, such as the firms in the study’s sample, licensed 
merchandise sales are a direct derivative of copyrighted media. By measuring the amount 
of licensed merchandise sales from firms, I can better understand how their copyright 
strategy may or may not be affected by digital copyright infringement. Therefore, firms 
with high amounts of licensed merchandise are less incentivized to prevent digital piracy.  
 To obtain licensed merchandise sales numbers for the firms in the sample, I used 
the Top 150 Global Licensors list published in License Global magazine, published by 
Informa (License Global, 2018). Since 2012, License Global has published an annual list 
of the top 150 firms based on licensed merchandise sales. Firms from the sample were 
matched to the list for 2012 through 2018. For years, when a firm did not appear in the 
list, the annual merchandise sales figures were found in other popular press articles or 
company statements. Finally, the licensed merchandise sales were divided by the firm’s 
annual sales to create the variable merchandise to sales ratio.  
Operationalization of Control Variables 
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Popularity 
 An obvious driver of digital copyright infringement that needs to be controlled is 
the popularity of the copyrighted media produced by each firm. If a firm produces highly 
popular media, the chances for digital copyright infringement increase, and therefore, the 
more likely the firm is to engage in actions to prevent digital piracy. Therefore, I recorded 
the global popularity data for the movie, music, and television industries for every year 
quarter from 2012 – 2018.  
 For movie popularity, I collected data on the global top 100 movie box office 
earnings from The Numbers (Numbers, 2018). The Numbers is a movie earnings website 
which includes an annual list of top global box-office earners. Including the top 100 
movies each year allows for a movie copyright popularity measure that captures not only 
blockbusters, but also movies from smaller movie production firms that were successful. 
Each movie appearing in the top 100 list was matched to the movie studio that owned the 
copyright to the movie. Each movie was given a count of 1 for the year quarter it was 
released, as well as for the next year quarter to account for movie popularity after the 
initial release. The movie count was then aggregated for each copyright-owning firm on a 
year quarter basis and matched to the study’s sample.  
 For music popularity, I collected data on the weekly global top 40 songs from 
Media Traffic (Media Traffic, 2018). Media Traffic is a music popularity chart website 
which includes a weekly top United World Chart that is an aggregate of global popular 
songs based on streaming, paid download, and airplay. The top 40 songs were included as 
this is a standard number of songs to include music popularity charts and allows for a 
!  cii
diverse sample of popular songs. Each song appearing in the United World Chart list was 
matched to the record company that owned the copyright to the song. Each song was 
given a count of 1 for the year quarter it appears on the chart. The song count was then 
aggregated for each copyright-owning firm on a year quarter basis and matched to the 
study’s sample.  
 For TV popularity, I collected data on the global top popularity TV series through 
Internet Movie database (IMDB, 2018).  Given the changing nature of TV viewing during 
this time, from traditional TV providers to streaming, the measure needed to account for 
overall TV series popularity and not just network ratings. Therefore, I used IMDB’s TV 
series popularity rankings based on a minimum average user rating of 7 out of 10, and a 
rating count of at least 10,000 individual ratings for TV series active in the 2012 to 2018 
timeframe.  The minimum of 7 rating and 10,000 individual ratings has been used in 
popular news articles on popular TV shows. Additionally, using these criteria helps 
ensure that the TV shows included in the variable are sufficiently popular to warrant 
individuals to engage in digital copyright infringement to watch them.  Each series 
appearing in the IMDB popularity list was matched to the TV studio that owned the 
copyright to the series. Each series was a count of 1 for the year quarter it was active. The 
series count was then aggregated for each copyright-owning firm on a year quarter basis 
and matched to the study’s sample. 
 The three industry-specific popularity measures were then combined to an overall 
popularity measure. 
Takedown Agent 
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 As many firms outsource the DMCA takedown procedure to specialized firms, it 
is important to control for differences in the takedown agents’ abilities to process the 
DMCA takedowns. Therefore, each takedown notice is coded for the takedown agent that 
the copyright holder used. This was then used to create a takedown agent ID variable that 
gives a unique ID to each takedown agent. Two-hundred and three different takedown 
agents appear in the sample.  
Sales 
 Annual sales for the whole company were included as a measure of firm size as 
larger firms have a greater chance to produce more copyrighted media. The sales data 
was obtained from the Mergent Intellect database (Mergent Intellect, 2019) 
Industry 
 As this is a multi-industry study, each firm’s industry was coded as a categorical 
variable to control for inherent industry differences.  
Variable Table 
 Table 3 shows the variable name, operationalization, and source for each variable 
in the study.  
Table 3 
Variable Name, Operationalization, and Source for Each Variable 
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Descriptive Statistics 
 Table 4 provides descriptive statistics and correlations for the variables used in the 
study. Of note in the table is that many correlation values are statistically significant at 
the p < 0.05 level, however, this is expected with the large number of observations in the 
study. Additionally, a few variables are highly correlated. The first sets of highly 
correlated variables are related to direct lobbying variables. Direct Active Lobbying has a 
Category Variable Operationalization Source
CPA Access Firm location: domestic (1) or 
foreign (0)
Mergent Intellect
Firm direct lobbying activity 
Firm direct lobbying dollars (log)
Firm direct lobbying reports
Firm indirect lobbying activity 
Firm indirect lobbying dollars (log)
Firm indirect lobbying reports
Self-Regulation Event
Categorical coding for the self-
regulation event quarter (1), the 
following quarter (1), and the 
preceding quarter (0)
Linkgraph
Issue saliency Licensed Merchandise Sales to 
Annual Sales Ratio
License Global
Takedown Agent Takedown agent firm id Google Transparency 
Movie popularity The Numbers
Music song popularity Media Traffic
TV show popularity Internet Movie Database
Size Annual Sales (log) Mergent Intellect
Industry Industry code Mergent Intellect
Control
Copyright popularity
DV Pressure to self-regulate Takedown URLs removed (log)
Google Transparency 
Report
IV
Direct CPA activity Center for Responsive 
Politics
Indirect CPA activity Center for Responsive 
Politics
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correlation value of 0.87 with Direct Lobbying Dollars and Direct Lobbying Dollars has a 
correlation value of 0.91 with Direct Lobbying Reports. These high correlation values are 
expected, as the three variables are all different measures for the direct lobbying activity 
construct. Similarly, Indirect Active Lobbying and Indirect Lobbying dollars have a 
correlation value of 0.69, and Indirect Lobbying Dollars and Indirect Lobbying Reports 
have a correlation value of 0.84. Again, these high correlation values are expected, as the 
three variables are all different measures for the indirect lobbying activity construct. 
Statistical Estimation Approach 
By combining these measures, a longitudinal database was created that allowed 
for testing the dissertation’s hypotheses. As is the case with longitudinal data, it is 
important to test for, and if needed control for, time-invariant changes, autocorrelation, 
and heteroskedasticity. Therefore, a Hausman test (Hausman, 1978) was conducted to test 
if a fixed-effects model is appropriate to use in order to control for time-invariant 
changes. The Hausman test resulted in p = 0.14 which rejects the null hypothesis and 
indicates a fixed effect model is appropriate.  
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Table 4 
Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Table for Variables in the Study 
  
M SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
1 Takedown URLs 
Removed (log)
3.16 4.77 1.00*
2 Foreign Firms 0.62 0.48 -0.19* 1.00*
3
Direct Active 
Lobbying 
0.04 0.20 0.32* -0.26* 1.00*
4
Direct Lobbying 
Dollars (log)
0.34 1.88 0.29* -0.23* 0.87* 1.00*
5
Direct Lobbying 
Reports (count)
0.04 0.21 0.29* -0.21* 0.51* 0.91* 1.00*
6 Indirect Active 
Lobbying
0.06 0.23 0.23* -0.27* -0.05* -0.04* -0.04* 1.00*
7 Indirect Lobbying 
Dollars (log)
0.79 2.75 0.36* -0.33* 0.51* 0.42* 0.40* 0.69* 1.00*
8 Indirect Lobbying 
Reports (count)
0.07 0.31 0.30* -0.24* 0.44* 0.43* 0.38* 0.53* 0.84* 1.00*
9 Merchandise to 
Sales Ratio
0.03 0.13 0.24* -0.21* 0.21* 0.14* 0.16* 0.43* 0.44* 0.23* 1.00*
10 Copyright 
Popularity
0.90 3.55 0.09* 0.08* 0.08* 0.04* 0.04* -0.01 0.04* 0.01 0.12* 1.00*
11 Annual Sales (log) 18.18 2.59 0.16* 0.11* 0.15* 0.19* 0.19* 0.22* 0.23* 0.21* 0.21* 0.14* 1.00*
Note: N  = 5,448, * p<0.05
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Additionally, a Wooldridge test (Wooldridge, 2002) was conducted to test if 
autocorrelation was present in the panel data. The Wooldridge test resulted in a p = 0.00, 
which supports the null hypothesis and indicates autocorrelation is present and robust 
standard errors should be used to control for autocorrelation. Finally, a Breusch-Pagan 
test (Breusch & Pagan, 1979) was conducted to test if heteroskedasticity was present in 
the panel data. The Breusch-Pagan test resulted in a p = 0.27, which rejects the null 
hypothesis and indicates heteroskedasticity is not present.  
Theses combination of results indicates a fixed-effects model, with year quarter 
fixed effects and with robust standard errors, clustered at the firm level, is appropriate for 
the primary model. In the section below, I describe the model specification for testing 
each hypothesis.  
Model Specifications  
Hypothesis 1 predicts that the more firms directly engage in CPA, the more 
pressure they will place on enabling firms to self-regulate. For all analyses related to 
hypothesis 1, the sample is restricted to firms that have access to CPA. Equation 1a is:  
Eq 1a: 
!  
where the dependent variable is the log number of URLs removed taken from the firm’s 
takedown requests, α is a fixed-effects control for time-invariant changes in copyright 
firms, !  is a binary variable based on if a firm directly 
engaged in lobbying for digital copyright issues during the study’s timeframe, !  
is quarterly time fixed effects, !  is fixed effects for the takedown agent used, 
log_url_removedit  =  αi +  β1Direct_ Act ive_ L obbyingit +  δQuar tert + δAgentit + Controlsit + εit
Direct_ Act ive_ L obbying
δQuar ter
δAgent
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Controls are copyright popularity, annual sales, and industry code, i denotes the copyright 
firm, and t denotes the year quarter. The robust standard errors are clustered at the 
copyright firm level.  
Additionally, to better understand the relationship between CPA and self-
regulation, two additional tests were run. Equation 1b replaces 
!  with !  a log value of direct 
lobbying dollars spent on digital copyright issues. Equation 1c replaces 
!  with !  a count value of direct 
lobbying reports filed on digital copyright issues.  
Eq 1b: 
!  
Eq 1c: 
!  
 Hypothesis 2 predicts that the more firms engage in CPA indirectly through their 
trade association, the more pressure they will place on enabling firms to self-regulate.  
For all analyses related to hypothesis 2, the sample is restricted to firms that have access 
to CPA. Equation 2 is:  
Eq 2: 
!  
Direct_ Act ive_ L obbying Direct_lobbying_dollars
Direct_ Act ive_ L obbying Direct_lobbying_repor ts
log_url_removedit =  αi +  β1Direct_lobbying_dollarsit +  δQuar tert + δAgentit + Controlsit + εit
log_url_removedit =  αi +  β1Direct_lobbying_repor tsit +  δQuar tert + δAgentit + Controlsit + εit
log_url_removedit =  αi +  β1Indirect_ Act ive_ L obbyingit +  δQuar tert + δAgentit + Controlsit +  Controlsit + εit
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where the dependent variable is the log number of URLs removed taken from the firm’s 
takedown requests, α is a fixed-effects control for time-invariant changes in trade 
associations, !  is a binary variable based on if a firm 
indirectly engaged in lobbying for digital copyright issues through trade associations 
during the study’s timeframe, !  is quarterly time fixed effects, !  is fixed 
effects for the takedown agent used, Controls are copyright popularity, annual sales, and 
industry code, i denotes the copyright firm, t denotes the year quarter. The robust standard 
errors are clustered at the copyright firm level.  
Eq 2b: 
!  
Eq 2c: 
!  
 Hypothesis 3 predicts that firms that engage in CPA directly will place greater 
pressure on enabling industries to self-regulate than firms who indirectly engage in CPA 
through trade associations.  For all analyses related to hypothesis 3, the sample is 
restricted to firms that have access to CPA. Equation 3 is:  
Eq 3a: 
!  
where the dependent variable is the log number of URLs removed taken from the firm’s 
takedown requests, α is a fixed-effects control for time-invariant changes in trade 
Indirect_ Act ive_ L obbying
δQuar ter δAgent
log_url_removedit =  αi +  β1Indirect_lobbying_dollarsit +  δQuar tert + δAgentit + Controlsit + εit
log_url_removedit =  αi +  β1Indirect_lobbying_repor tsit +  δQuar tert + δAgentit + Controlsit + εit
log_url_removedit =  αi +  β1Indirect_vs_ Direct_ L obbyingit +  δQuar tert + δAgentit +  Controlsit + εit
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associations, !  is a categorical variable coded for if a 
firm engages in indirect lobbying (1) through trade associations or direct lobbying (2) for 
digital copyright issues, !  is quarterly time fixed effects, !  is fixed 
effects for the takedown agent used, Controls are copyright popularity, annual sales, and 
industry code, i denotes the copyright firm, t denotes the year quarter. The robust standard 
errors are clustered at the copyright firm level. 
 Additionally, to further understand how direct and indirect lobbying activities 
differ, equation 3b adds domestic firms that do not engage in any lobbying as a reference 
category to the !  variable. The new categorical 
variable, !  codes domestic firms that do 
not engage in lobbying (1), firms that engage in indirect lobbying through trade 
associations (2), and firms that engage in direct lobbying (3). Equation 3b is: 
Eq 3b: 
!  
Additionally, to better understand how firm size may influence the relationship 
between both direct and indirect CPA engagement, and pressuring enabling firms to self-
regulate, two additional tests were run. Equation 3c investigates how firm size interacts 
with indirect CPA engagement by adding ! to the 
equation, which interacts indirect lobbying active firms with annual sales.  Equation 3d 
takes the same approach as equation 3c, yet looks at how being directly CPA active 
interacts with firm size.  
Indirect_vs_ Direct_ L obbying
δQuar ter δAgent
Indirect_vs_ Direct_ L obbying
Indirect_vs_ Direct_vs_ None_ L obbying,
log_url_removedit =  αi +  β1Indirect_vs_ Direct_vs_ None_ L obbyingit +  δQuar tert + δAgentit +  Controlsit + εit
CPA _ Act ive_Sales_ Interact ion
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Eq 3c: 
!  
Eq 3d: 
!  
Hypothesis 4 predicts that firms without CPA access will place greater pressure on 
enabling firms to self-regulate than firms with CPA access that do not engage in CPA, but 
less than firms that do engage in CPA.  For all analyses related to hypothesis 4, the full 
sample of firms is used. Equation 4a is: 
Eq 4a: 
!  
where the dependent variable is the log number of URLs removed taken from the firm’s 
takedown requests, α is a fixed-effects control for time-invariant changes in copyright 
firms, !  codes domestic firms that do not 
engage in lobbying (1), firms that engage in direct lobbying (2), and foreign firms (3), 
!  is quarterly time fixed effects, !  is fixed effects for the takedown agent 
used, Controls are copyright popularity, annual sales, and industry code, i denotes the 
copyright firm, t denotes the year quarter. The robust standard errors are clustered at the 
copyright firm level. Additionally, the copyright popularity control is not a significant 
predictor of the number of URLs removed when foreign firms are added to the sample. 
Therefore, equation 4a was rerun in equation 4b with the copyright popularity control 
removed.  
log_url_removedit =  αi +  β1Indirect_CPA _ Act iveit +  β2 CPA _ Act ive_Sales_ Interact ionit +  δQuar tert + δAgentit +  Controlsit + εit
log_url_removedit =  αi +  β1Direct_CPA _ Act iveit +  β2 CPA _ Act ive_Sales_ Interact ionit +  δQuar tert + δAgentit +  Controlsit + εit
log_url_removedit =  αi +  β1Foreign_vs_ Direct_vs_ None_ L obbyingit +  δQuar tert + δAgentit + Controlsit + εit
Foreign_vs_ Direct_vs_ None_ L obbying
δQuar ter δAgent
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Additionally, to better understand how foreign firms without CPA access differ in 
the pressure they place on enabling firms to self-regulate, firms that engage in indirect 
lobbying activity are added for a categorical comparison in equation 4c. Equation 4c is:  
Eq 4a: 
!  
where !  codes domestic firms 
that do not engage in lobbying (1), firms that engage in direct lobbying (2), foreign firms 
(3), and firms that engage in indirect lobbying as (4). The rest of the equation remains the 
same as equation 4a. Additionally, equation 4c was rerun without the copyright popularity 
control in equation 4d.  
 Hypothesis 5 predicts that after enabling firms implement self-regulation, external 
pressure to self-regulate from digital copyright firms will increase. For all analyses 
related to hypothesis 5, the full sample of firms is used.  Equation 5a is:  
Eq 5a: 
!  
where the dependent variable is the log number of URLs removed taken from the firm’s 
takedown requests, Self-Regulation_Event is a categorical event that codes the year 
quarter the self-regulation event takes place as a 1 and the two successive year quarters as 
a 2. The Self-Regulation_Event is run three ways in equation 5a. First, it is with both 
events combined, second is event 1 only, and third is event 2 only. Additionally,  
!  is quarterly time fixed effects, !  is fixed effects for the takedown agent 
log_url_removedit =  αi +  β1Foreign_vs_ Direct_vs_ Indirect_vs_ None_ L obbyingit +  δQuar tert + δAgentit + Controlsit + εit
Foreign_vs_ Direct_vs_ Indirect_ None_ L obbying
log_url_removedit =  αi +  β1Sel f_ Regulat ion_Eventit +  δQuar tert + δAgentit + Controlsit +  εit
δQuar ter δAgent
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used, Controls are copyright popularity, annual sales, and industry code, i denotes the 
copyright firm, t denotes the year quarter. The robust standard errors are clustered at the 
copyright firm level.  
 Hypothesis 6 predicts that after enabling firms implement self-regulation, CPA 
from digital copyright firms will increase. For all analyses related to hypothesis 6, the full 
sample of firms is used. Equation 6a is:  
Eq 6a: 
!  
where the dependent variable is lobbying dollars spent on digital copyright protection, 
Self-Regulation_Event is a categorical event that codes the year quarter the self-
regulation event takes place as a 1 and the two successive year quarters as a 2. The Self-
Regulation_Event is run three ways in equation 6a. First, it is with both events combined, 
second is event 1 only, and third is event 2 only.  Additionally, !  is quarterly 
time fixed effects, !  is fixed effects for the takedown agent used, Controls are 
annual sales, and industry code, i denotes the copyright firm, t denotes the year quarter. 
The robust standard errors are clustered at the copyright firm level. 
 Additionally, equation 6b switching the dependent variable to lobbying reports 
filed on digital copyright issues.  
Eq 6b: 
!  
log_lobbying_dollarsit =  αi +  β1Sel f_ Regulat ion_Eventit +  δQuar tert + δAgentit + Controlsit + εit 
δQuar ter
δAgent
lobbying_repor tsit =  αi +  β1Sel f_ Regulat ion_Eventit +  δQuar tert + δAgentit + Controlsit + εit
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Hypothesis 7 predicts the stronger the issue salience for firms, the greater the 
pressure to self-regulate they will place on enabling industries. To fully test this 
hypothesis, I run the analysis with two different data samples. The first analysis uses the 
fully matched dataset, which includes firms from all industries present in the dataset. This 
test gives a better understanding of what firms and industries are actively pressuring 
enabling industries to self-regulate. For all analyses related to hypothesis 7, the full 
sample of firms is used. Equation 7 is: 
Eq 7: 
!  
where the dependent variable is the log number of URLs removed taken from the firm’s 
takedown requests, !  is the ratio of annual sales dollars 
from licensed merchandise to annual sales, !  is quarterly time fixed effects, 
!  is fixed effects for the takedown agent used, Controls are copyright popularity, 
annual sales, and industry code, i denotes the copyright firm, t denotes the year quarter. 
The robust standard errors are clustered at the copyright firm level. 
log_url_removedit =  αi +  β1Merchandise_sales_rat ioit +  δQuar tert + δAgentit + Controlsit + εit
Merchandise_sales_rat io
δQuar ter
δAgent
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VI. RESULTS 
 The following chapter describes and interprets the results of the study’s empirical 
analysis. The use of panel data allowed for the comparison of between firm differences, 
as well as changes in firms over time. As a reminder, the panel data are set on a year 
quarter basis and time fixed effects were used. Additionally, the same set of control 
variables discussed in Chapter 5 are used for every model unless otherwise specified. 
Further, variance explained, the r-squared percentage was reported for all models.  
Finally, the dependent variable for all models is the log number of URLs removed taken 
from takedown requests. The sole exception is for model 6, which uses lobbying activity 
in terms of lobbying dollars and lobbying reports filed as the dependent variable.  
CPA Engagement Effects on Pressure to Self-Regulate 
Direct CPA Engagement 
 Table 5 reports the test results for Hypothesis 1. Hypothesis 1 predicts the more 
firms engage in direct CPA, the more pressure they will place on enabling firms to self-
regulate. For testing hypothesis 1, the sample was restricted to firms that have access to 
CPA, as they are located in the US. First, a controls-only model was run that results in an 
Annual Sales (log) coefficient of 0.25 significant at p = 0.00, with robust standard errors 
of 0.03, and a Copyright Popularity coefficient of 0.11 significant at p = 0.00, and with 
robust standard errors of 0.04. Industry, takedown agent, and quarterly fixed effects are 
applied to the control model. Industry categorical differences are not significant in the 
control model and use the movie industry as the reference category. Further, the controls- 
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only model applies to all models for hypothesis 1, 2, and 3, as each of these models use 
the same sample and dependent variable. 
Model 1a tested the categorical effect of a firm engaging in direct active lobbying 
anytime throughout the study, and is represented by the Direct Active Lobbying variable. 
The Direct Active Lobbying coefficient was 3.16 significant at p = 0.00 and with robust 
standard errors of 0.72. This test can be interpreted as firms that engage in direct lobbying 
request 316% more URLs through the takedown system than firms that do not engage in 
direct CPA. Additionally, none of the control variables are significant in this model.  
Model 1b provides a more granular test by examining the effect of changes in 
direct lobbying dollars (log).  This test shows the Direct Lobbying Dollars variable was 
0.24 significant at p = 0.00 and with robust standard errors of 0.08. This result can be 
interpreted as a 1% increase in direct lobbying spending on copyright issues is associated 
with a 24% increase in the number of URLs removed through the takedown system. 
Control variables for Model 1b are not significant.  
Model 1c tests the effect of changes in direct lobbying reports filed. This test 
shows the Direct Lobbying Report variable was 1.71 significant at p = 0.00 and with 
robust standard errors of 0.60. This result can be interpreted as a single count increase in 
lobbying reports filed on copyright issues is associated with a 171% increase in the 
number of URLs removed through the takedown system. Control variables for Model 1c 
are not significant. 
Models 1a, 1b, and 1c taken together provide strong support for hypothesis 1 in 
that the more firms engage directly in CPA, the more normative pressure they will place 
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on enabling firms. The strong differential effect of active direct CPA shown in model 1a 
demonstrates that firms that engage in direct CPA are more active in general than firms 
that do not engage in CPA. The additional findings from model 1b and 1c show that 
higher levels of direct CPA are related to increased normative pressure on enabling firms 
to self-regulate. Further, models 1a, 1b, and 1c were rerun with the full sample of firms, 
which includes foreign firms without CPA access as a robustness check. All findings were 
similar in direction, level, and significance.  
Indirect CPA Engagement 
Table 6 reports the test results for Hypothesis 2.  Hypothesis 2 predicts the more 
firms engage in CPA indirectly through their trade association, the more pressure they 
will place on enabling firms to self-regulate. For testing hypothesis 2, the sample was 
restricted to firms that have access to CPA by being located in the US. Model 2a tested 
the categorical effect of a firm engaging in indirect lobbying through their trade 
associations anytime throughout the study, represented by the Indirect Active Lobbying 
variable. The Indirect Active Lobbying coefficient was 2.39 significant at p = 0.00 and 
with robust standard errors of 0.73. This result can be interpreted as firms that engage in 
indirect CPA through their trade association request 239% more URLs through the 
takedown system. Additionally, the control variable Annual Sales coefficient was 0.17 
significant at p = 0.02 with robust standard errors of 0.07.  
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Table 5 
Fixed Effects Estimation of Direct CPA Engagement on Changes in URLs Removed 
through Takedown Notices 
Variable  
Controls 
Only  Model 1a  Model 1b  Model 1c
Direct Active Lobbying
 3.16 
[0.00]
(0.72)
Direct Lobbying Dollars 
(log)
 0.24 
[0.00]
(0.08)
Direct Lobbying Report 
(count)
 1.71 
[0.00]
(0.60)
Annual Sales (log)
 0.25 
[0.00]
 0.13 
[0.16]
 0.13 
[0.22]
 0.15 
[0.13]
(0.03) (0.09) (0.11) (0.10)
Copyright Popularity
 0.11 [0.00]  0.08 
[0.16]
 0.11 
[0.12]
 0.10 
[0.15]
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.07)
TV Industry (2)
-0.07 
[0.78]
-0.85 
[0.24]
-0.40 
[0.55]
-0.58 
[0.42]
(0.25) (0.72) (0.67) (0.72)
Music Industry (3)
 0.06 
[0.89]
 1.60 
[0.14]
 1.31 
[0.27]
 0.58 
[0.57]
!  cxx
Music Industry (3)
(0.39) (1.08) (1.19) (1.02)
Takedown Agent FE yes Yes yes yes
Year Quarter FE yes Yes yes yes
Observations 2,072 2,072 2,072 2,072
R-sq (%)  69.73  74.48  72.47  71.83
Note: Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses below the β coefficient. P values 
are listed in
brackets to the right of the β coefficient. Industry effects are in reference to the movie 
industry.
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Model 2b provides a more granular test by examining the effect of changes in 
indirect lobbying dollars (log).  This test shows the Indirect Lobbying Dollars variable 
coefficient was 0.23 significant at p = 0.00 and with robust standard errors of 0.07. This 
result can be interpreted as a 1% increase in lobbying spending on copyright issues is 
associated with a 23% increase in the number of URLs removed through the takedown 
system. Additionally, the control variable Annual Sales coefficient was 0.15 significant at 
p = 0.04 with robust standard errors of 0.11.  
Model 2c tests the effect of changes in lobbying reports filed. This test shows the 
Indirect Lobbying Report variable coefficient was 1.55 significant at p = 0.02 and with 
robust standard errors of 0.72.  This result can be interpreted as a single count increase in 
lobbying reports filed on copyright issues is associated with a 155% increase in the 
number of URLs removed through the takedown system. Additionally, the control 
variable Annual Sales coefficient was 0.17 significant at p = 0.04 with robust standard 
errors of 0.08. 
Models 2a, 2b, and 2c taken together provide strong support for hypothesis 2 in 
that the more firms engage indirectly in CPA through their trade associations, the more 
normative pressure they will place on enabling firms. The strong differential effect of 
active direct CPA shown in model 2a demonstrates that firms that engage in indirect CPA 
are more active in general than firms that do not engage in CPA. The additional findings 
from model 2b and 2c display that higher levels of indirect CPA are related to increased 
normative pressure on enabling firms to self-regulate. Further, models 2a, 2b, and 2c 
were rerun with the full sample of firms, which includes foreign firms without CPA 
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access as a robustness check. All findings were similar in direction, level, and 
significance. 
Direct vs Indirect CPA Engagement 
Tables 7 and 8 report the test results for hypothesis 3. Hypothesis 3 predicts firms 
that engage in CPA directly will place greater pressure on enabling industries to self-
regulate than firms who indirectly engage in CPA through trade associations. For testing 
hypothesis 3, the sample was restricted to firms that have access to CPA by being located 
in the US. Model 3a, shown in Table 7, tested the effect by creating a categorical code of 
indirect lobbying activity (0) and direct CPA activity (1) by the Indirect vs Direct 
Lobbying variable. This test shows the Indirect vs Direct Lobbying variable coefficient 
was 1.47 significant at p = 0.06 and with robust standard errors of 0.78.  This result can 
be interpreted as firms that engage in direct CPA request 147% more URLs through the 
takedown system than firms that engage in indirect CPA through trade associations.  
Additionally, there is a large effect for the music industry with a coefficient of 4.23 
significant at the 0.00 level and with robust standard errors of 1.31.  
Model 3b, shown in Table 7, aims to further understand the differences between 
direct and indirect CPA activity by comparing firms that engage in direct lobbying and 
firms that engage in indirect lobbying to domestic firms that do not engage in any 
lobbying. Making this comparison allows observing if the two groups have different size 
beta coefficients. This test shows that compared to domestic firms that do not engage in 
lobbying the Indirect Active Lobbying variable coefficient was 1.70 significant at p = 
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0.02 and with robust standard errors of 0.74, and the Direct Active Lobbying variable 
coefficient was 3.81 significant at p = 0.00 and with robust standard errors of 0.70. 
Table 6 
Fixed Effects Estimation of Indirect CPA Engagement on Changes in URLs 
Removed through Takedown Notices 
Variable  Model 2a  Model 2b  Model 2c
Indirect Active Lobbying
 2.39 [0.00]
(0.73)
Indirect Lobbying Dollars (log)
 0.23 [0.00]
(0.07)
Indirect Lobbying Report 
(count)
 1.55 [0.02]
(0.72)
Annual Sales (log)
 0.17 [0.02]  0.15 [0.04]  0.17 [0.04]
(0.07) (0.11) (0.08)
Copyright Popularity
 0.04 [0.63]  0.04 [0.62]  0.08 [0.31]
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
TV Industry (2)
-1.05 [0.19] -0.66 [0.38] -0.44 [0.51]
(0.79) (0.75) (0.68)
Music Industry (3)
-0.27 [0.71] -0.25 [0.73] -0.40 [0.64]
(0.72) (0.72) (0.87)
Takedown Agent FE yes yes yes
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Further, a Wald test comparing the indirect active lobbying category to the direct 
active lobbying category resulted in a p = 0.00, which suggests that including both 
variables results in a statistically significant better model fit.   
Model 3c and 3d, shown in Table 8, aim to further understand the differences 
between direct and indirect CPA activity by understanding the role firm size plays in both 
approaches to CPA. Therefore, both direct active lobbying and indirect active lobbying 
were separately interacted with annual sales to better understand the relationship between 
firm size and CPA engagement. To aid in interpretability, the interaction variable uses 
billions of dollars as the sales unit.  
Model 3c investigates this interaction effect on indirect lobbying activity. With the 
interaction included, the main effect of the Indirect Active Lobbying coefficient was 0.86 
with p = 0.09 and with robust standard errors of 0.50 and the Indirect Active Lobbying x 
Sales (B) coefficient was -0.13 with p = 0.65 and with robust standard errors of 0.28. 
Additionally, the control variable Annual Sales coefficient was 0.15 significant at p = 
0.04 with robust standard errors of 0.11. 
Year Quarter FE yes yes yes
Observations 2,072 2,072 2,072
R-sq (%)  74.04  73.71  72.32
Note: Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses below the β coefficient 
P values are listed in brackets to the right of the β coefficient
Industry effects are in reference to the movie industry
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Model 3d investigates the sales interaction effect on direct lobbying activity. With 
the interaction included, the main effect of the Direct Active Lobbying coefficient was 
3.55 with p = 0.00 and with robust standard errors of 0.78 and the Direct Active 
Lobbying x Sales (B) coefficient was -0.07 with p = 0.12 and with robust standard errors 
of 0.04. Additionally, the control variable Annual Sales coefficient was 0.17 significant at 
p = 0.04 with robust standard errors of 0.08. 
Models 3a and 3b provide strong support for hypothesis 3 in that firms that 
engage in CPA directly will place greater pressure on enabling industries to self-regulate 
than firms who indirectly engage in CPA through trade associations. The findings from 
model 3a and 3b are supported by the prior findings in models 1 and 2 that show a 
stronger effect for direct CPA than indirect CPA. Additionally, the strong music industry 
effect in model 3a suggests that firms in the music industry may be responsible for the 
difference in behavior observed between direct and indirect CPA firms. Therefore, as a 
robustness check, the firms in the music industry were dropped from the sample and the 
model was rerun; all findings were similar in direction, level, and significance. 
The additional findings from model 3c and 3d that investigate how firm size, 
represented by annual sales, interacts with CPA activity are inconclusive. Both the 
indirect lobbying and sales interaction and the direct lobbying and sales interaction show 
a negative but non-significant effect. Together, these results suggest that CPA does not 
have an economically significant interaction with firm size in terms of applying 
normative pressure on enabling firms to self-regulate.  
CPA Access 
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Table 9 reports the test results for Hypothesis 4.  Hypothesis 4 predicts Firms 
without CPA access will place greater pressure on enabling firms to self-regulate than 
firms with CPA access that do not engage in CPA, but less than firms that do engage in 
CPA.  For testing hypothesis 4, the sample included firms based in the US and abroad. 
First, a controls-only model was run that results in an Annual Sales (log) coefficient of 
0.15 significant at p = 0.10 and with robust standard errors of 0.09, and a Copyright 
Popularity coefficient of -0.01 with p = 0.73 and with robust standard errors of 0.03. As 
copyright popularity is not significant, it should not be included in the model. However, 
as copyright popularity is significant in the reduced sample of only US-based firms, 
which are included, it still may be beneficial to include copyright popularity in the model. 
Therefore, each model is run with and without the copyright popularity variable. 
Additionally, industry, takedown agent, and quarterly fixed effects are applied to 
the control model. Industry categorical differences are not significant in the control model 
and use the movie industry as the reference category. Further, the controls-only model 
applies to all models for hypothesis 4, 5, and 7, as each of these models use the same 
sample and dependent variable. 
Table 7 
Fixed Effects Estimation of Differences of Direct vs Indirect CPA Engagement on 
Changes in URLs Removed through Takedown Notices 
Variable  Model 3a  Model 3b
Indirect (1) vs Direct (2) Lobbying
 1.47 [0.06]
(0.78)
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Indirect Active Lobbying (2)
 1.70 [0.02]
(0.74)
Direct Active Lobbying (3)
 3.81 [0.00]
(0.70)
Annual Sales (log)
 0.04 [0.67]  0.09 [0.26]
(0.10) (0.08)
Copyright Popularity
 0.13 [0.28]  0.04 [0.55]
(0.12) (0.06)
TV Industry (2)
-1.39 [0.16] -1.09 [0.12]
(0.99) (0.70)
Music Industry (3)
 4.23 [0.00]  1.81 [0.07]
(1.31) (1.00)
Takedown Agent FE yes yes
Year Quarter FE yes yes
Observations 2,072 2,072
R-sq (%)  74.77  76.20
Note: Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses below the β coefficient 
P values are listed in brackets to the right of the β coefficient
Model 2b lobbying categories are compared to firms with no lobbying activity
Industry effects are in reference to the movie industry
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Table 8 
Fixed Effects Estimation of Differences of Direct and Indirect CPA Engagement 
Interaction with Sales on Changes in URLs Removed through Takedown Notices 
Variable  Model 3c  Model 3d
Indirect Active Lobbying
 0.86 [0.09]
(0.50)
Direct Active Lobbying
 3.55 [0.00]
(0.78)
Indirect Active Lobbying x Sales (B) 
-0.13 [0.65]
(0.28)
Direct Active Lobbying x Sales (B) 
-0.07 [0.12]
(0.04)
Annual Sales (log)
 0.15 [0.04]  0.17 [0.04]
(0.11) (0.08)
Copyright Popularity
 0.04 [0.62]  0.08 [0.31]
(0.08) (0.07)
TV Industry (2)
-0.66 [0.38] -0.44 [0.51]
(0.75) (0.68)
Music Industry (3)
-0.25 [0.73] -0.40 [0.64]
(0.72) (0.87)
Takedown Agent FE yes yes
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Model 4a tested the effect by creating a categorical variable with domestic firms 
with CPA access that do not engage in lobbying (1), firms engaged in direct lobbying (2), 
and foreign firms (3).  This test shows that, compared to domestic firms with CPA access 
that do not engage in lobbying, the Direct Active Lobbying variable coefficient was 3.27, 
significant at p = 0.00 and with robust standard errors of 0.75, and the Foreign Firms 
variable coefficient was 1.28 significant at p = 0.04, and with robust standard errors of 
0.63.  
Further, a Wald test comparing the direct active lobbying category to the foreign 
firm category resulted in a p = 0.00, which suggests that including both variables results 
in a statistically significant better model fit.  Therefore, these results can be interpreted as 
firms that do not have CPA access request 128% more URLs through the takedown 
system than firms that have CPA access and do not engage in lobbying, which is fewer 
URLs than firms that engage in direct CPA, which request 327% more URLs through the 
takedown system than firms that have CPA access and do not engage in lobbying. 
Additionally, none of the control variables are significant in this model. 
Year Quarter FE yes yes
Observations 2,072 2,072
R-sq (%)  70.08  74.64
Note: Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses below the β coefficient 
P values are listed in brackets to the right of the β coefficient
Industry effects are in reference to the movie industry
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Further, model 4b runs the same test as model 4a but removes the copyright 
popularity control variable. These results are similar to model 4a, with the Direct Active 
Lobbying variable coefficient was 3.52 significant at p = 0.00 and with robust standard 
errors of 0.83 and the Foreign Firms variable coefficient was 1.12 with p = 0.06 and with 
robust standard errors of 0.60. Additionally, there is an effect for the TV industry with a 
coefficient of -0.95 with p = 0.10 and with robust standard errors of 0.58. 
Model 4c aims to further understand the effect of CPA access on pressuring 
enabling firms to self-regulate by adding indirect active lobbying as a category (4) to the 
CPA access categorical variable used in Model 4a. This test shows that compared to 
domestic firms with CPA access that do not engage in lobbying the Direct Active 
Lobbying variable coefficient was 3.83 significant at p = 0.00 and with robust standard 
errors of 0.73, the Foreign Firms variable coefficient was 1.62 significant at p = 0.00 and 
with robust standard errors of 0.54, and the Indirect Active Lobbying variable coefficient 
was 1.86 significant at p = 0.01 with robust standard errors of 0.71.   
Further separate Wald tests comparing the direct active lobbying category to the 
foreign firm category, the indirect active lobbying category to the foreign firm category, 
and the direct active lobbying category to the indirect active lobbying category all 
resulted in a p = 0.00, which suggests that including all variables results in statistically 
significant better model fit.  Therefore, these results can be interpreted as firms that do 
not have CPA access request 162% more URLs through the takedown system than firms 
that have CPA access and do not engage in lobbying, which is fewer URLs than firms that 
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engage in direct CPA which request 402% more URLs through the takedown system than 
firms that have CPA access and do not engage in lobbying, and less than firms that 
engage in indirect CPA which request 181% more URLs through the takedown system 
than firms that have CPA access and do not engage in lobbying. Additionally, there is an 
effect for the TV industry with a coefficient of -0.95 with p = 0.10 and with robust 
standard errors of 0.58. 
Finally, model 4d runs the same test as model 4c but removes the copyright 
popularity control variable. This test shows that, compared to domestic firms with CPA 
access that do not engage in lobbying, the Direct Active Lobbying variable coefficient 
was 4.02 significant at p = 0.00 and with robust standard errors of 0.80, the Foreign 
Firms variable coefficient was 1.45 significant at p = 0.01 and with robust standard errors 
of 0.53, and the Indirect Active Lobbying variable coefficient was 1.81 significant at p = 
0.03 with robust standard errors of 0.84. Additionally, there is an effect for the TV 
industry with a coefficient of -1.03 with p = 0.07 and with robust standard errors of 0.57. 
Taken together, Model 4a, 4b, 4c, and 4f offer strong support for hypothesis 4. 
Firms without CPA access will place greater pressure on enabling firms to self-regulate 
than firms with CPA access that do not engage in CPA, but less than firms that do engage 
in CPA. Admittedly, there is not a true counterfactual for hypothesis 4. This is due to the 
CPA access construct, which is based on if the firm is located in the same country as the 
established regulative institution. Thus, another interpretation of this construct is 
comparing firms located in the US to firms outside the US. Therefore, a better 
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counterfactual would be foreign firms that have access to CPA. However, these firms do 
not exist due to CPA restrictions on foreign entities in the US.  
Yet, with these limitations recognized, there is still a case that firms without CPA 
access are placing more pressure on enabling firms to self-regulate than firms that have 
CPA access but do not engage in CPA. Supporting this is that the copyright popularity 
control variable is not significant when firms without CPA access are included and the 
annual sales control variable is only mildly significant at p = 0.10. This provides evidence 
that it is not only the largest firms without CPA access nor the firms with the most 
popular copyrights that are applying normative pressure on enabling firms to self-
regulate. Instead, it could be because these firms do not have access to regulatory 
institutional change mechanisms and therefore can only use normative institutional 
change mechanisms. Further discussion of  these findings and the recognized limitations 
can be found in Chapter 7.  
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Table 9 
Fixed Effects Estimation of No CPA Access on Changes in URLs Removed through 
Takedown Notices 
Variable  
Controls 
Only  
Model 
4a  
Model 
4b  
Model 
4c  
Model 
4d
Direct Active 
Lobbying (2)
 3.27 
[0.00]
 3.52 
[0.00]
 3.83 
[0.00]
 4.02 
[0.00]
(0.75) (0.83) (0.73) (0.80)
Foreign Firms (3)
 1.28 
[0.04]
 1.12 
[0.06]
 1.62 
[0.00]
 1.45 
[0.01]
 (0.63)  (0.60)  (0.54)  (0.53)
Indirect Active 
Lobbying (4)
 1.86 
[0.01]
 1.81 
[0.03]
 (0.71)  (0.84)
Annual Sales (log)
 0.15 
[0.10]
 0.06 
[0.45]
 0.06 
[0.50]
 0.03 
[0.67]
 0.02 
[0.76]
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08)
Copyright Popularity
-0.01 
[0.73]
-0.02 
[0.50]
-0.03 
[0.36]
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
TV Industry (2)
-0.35 
[0.57]
-0.82 
[0.15]
-0.95 
[0.10]
-0.93 
[0.10]
-1.03 
[0.07]
(0.62) (0.58) (0.58) (0.57) (0.57)
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Music Industry (3)
 0.82 
[0.34]
1.25 
[0.19]
0.28 
[0.77]
1.32 
[0.16]
0.31 
[0.74]
(0.86) (0.96) (0.97) (0.94) (0.94)
Takedown Agent FE yes Yes yes yes yes
Year Quarter FE yes Yes yes yes yes
Observations 5,448 5,448 5,448 5,448 5,448
R-sq (%)  60.44  64.47  62.48  65.7  63.91
Note: Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses below the β coefficient. P values 
are listed in brackets to the 
right of the β coefficient. Lobbying categories are compared to firms with 
no lobbying activity.
Industry effects are in reference to the movie 
industry.
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Responses to Self-Regulation Events 
Table 10 reports the test results for hypothesis 5. Hypothesis 5 predicts that after 
enabling firms implement self-regulation, external pressure to self-regulate from digital 
copyright firms will increase. For testing hypothesis 5, the full sample of domestic and 
foreign firms was used. Model 5a tests the increase from the pre-self-regulation event 
quarter to the two post-self-regulation event quarters, which is represented in the post-
self-regulation event variable. Model 5a tests both self-regulation events together.  The 
Post Self-Regulation Event coefficient was 3.35 significant at p = 0.00 and with a robust 
standard error of 0.89. This result can be interpreted as firms request 335% more URLs 
through the takedown system during the post-self-regulation event period than the pre-
self-regulation event period. Additionally, control variables for model 5a were not 
significant. 
Model 5b investigates the first self-regulation event by itself.  The Post Self-
Regulation Event coefficient was 1.74 significant at p = 0.00 and with a robust standard 
error of 0.61. This result can be interpreted as firms request 174% more URLs through 
the takedown system during the post-self-regulation event period than the pre-self-
regulation event period. Additionally, there was a strong effect with the TV industry 
coefficient was -4.10 significant at p = 0.01 and with robust standard errors of 1.52.  
Model 5c investigates the second self-regulation event by itself.  The Post Self-
Regulation Event coefficient was 0.23 but not significant with p = 0.27 and with a robust 
standard error of 0.20. Additionally, control variables for model 5c were not significant. 
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Models 5a, 5b, and 5c taken together provide support for hypothesis 5, that after 
enabling firms implement self-regulation, external pressure to self-regulate from digital 
copyright firms will increase. Interestingly, the positive but non-significant result in 
model 5c does suggest some limitations for this hypothesis. Model 5a, which tests both 
self-regulation events together, and model 5b that tests the first self-regulation event, are 
both positive, strong, and significant effects. However, model 5c, which tests the second 
self-regulation, is positive but not significant. An explanation for this diminished effect 
may reside in the nature of the self-regulation event.  
The first self-regulation event, the implementation of Google’s demotion signal 
policy, was a dramatic change that actually gave copyright owners an additional action to 
take to reduce digital piracy. The second self-regulation event was a smaller change that 
augmented the demotion signal policy to also remove any advertising revenue from the 
offending domains. As much of the ad revenue from offending domains was reduced 
from the original demotion signal, the further removal of all ad revenue was seen as a 
lesser event. Therefore, the smaller and non-significant effect in model 5c suggests that 
the severity of the self-regulation event may affect how institutional rival firms respond 
to the self-regulation.  
Tables 11 and 12 reports the test results for Hypothesis 6. Hypothesis 6 predicts 
that after enabling firms implement self-regulation, CPA from digital copyright firms will 
increase. For testing hypothesis 6, the full sample of domestic and foreign firms was 
used. First, a controls-only model was run that resulted in an Annual Sales (log) 
coefficient of 0.49 significant at p = 0.01, and with a robust standard error of 0.17 and a 
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Copyright Popularity coefficient of 0.02, with p = 0.81 and with a robust standard error of 
0.04. Therefore, the Copyright Popularity variable was not included. Industry, takedown 
agent, and quarterly fixed effects are applied to the control model. 
Table 10 
Fixed Effects Estimation of Response to Self-Regulation Events on Changes in URLs 
Removed through Takedown Notices 
  Model 5a  Model 5b  Model 5c
Variable  All Events  Event 1  Event 2
Post-Self-Regulation Event
 3.35[0.00]  1.74 [0.00]  0.23[0.27]
(0.89) (0.61) (0.20)
Annual Sales (log)
 0.17 [0.31]  0.59 [0.00] -0.15 [0.47]
(0.17) (0.14) (0.21)
Copyright Popularity
-0.08 [0.18] -0.29 [0.21] -0.01 [0.81]
(0.06) (0.16) (0.06)
TV Industry (2)
-1.63 [0.13] -4.10 [0.01] -0.23 [0.86]
(1.08) (1.52) (1.32)
Music Industry (3)
-1.17 [0.34] -2.28 [0.36] -1.50 [0.21]
(1.23) (2.49) (1.20)
Takedown Agent FE yes yes yes
Year Quarter FE yes yes yes
Observations 5,488 5,488 5,488
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Industry categorical differences use the movie industry as the reference category 
and show the Music Industry coefficient was -5.28 with p = 0.04 and with robust standard 
errors of 2.51.  
Models 6a, 6b, and 6c test the increase of lobbying dollars (log) from the pre-self-
regulation event quarter to the two post-self-regulation event quarters, which is 
represented in the Post Self-Regulation Event variable. The results for these models are 
shown in Table 11.  Model 6a tests both self-regulation events together. The Post Self-
Regulation Event coefficient was 1.11, but not significant at p = 0.21 and with a robust 
standard error of 0.88.  Additionally, the TV Industry coefficient was 3.85 with p = 0.05 
and with robust standard errors of 1.95, and the Music Industry coefficient was -7.14 with 
p = 0.00 and with robust standard errors of 2.44.  
Model 6b investigates the first self-regulation event by itself. The Post Self-
Regulation Event coefficient was 0.22, but not significant at p = 0.29 and with a robust 
standard error of 0.21.  Additionally, the TV Industry coefficient was 6.80 with p = 0.00 
and with robust standard errors of 2.0.  
Model 6c investigates the second self-regulation event by itself. The Post Self-
Regulation Event coefficient was -0.03, but not significant at p = 0.47 and with a robust 
standard error of 0.04.  Additionally, no control variables in model 6c were significant.   
R-sq (%)  63.98  70.07  64.28
Note: Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses below the β coefficient 
P values are listed in brackets to the right of the β coefficient
Industry effects are in reference to the movie industry
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Models 6d, 6e, and 6f test the increase of direct lobbying reports (count) from the 
pre-self-regulation event quarter to the two post-self-regulation event quarters, which is 
represented in the Post Self-Regulation Event variable. The results for these models are 
shown in Table 12.  Model 6d tests both self-regulation events together. The Post Self-
Regulation Event coefficient was 0.04, but not significant at p = 0.66 and with a robust 
standard error of 0.09.  Additionally, the control variable Annual Sales coefficient was 
0.05 with p = 0.07 and with robust standard errors of 0.03. Further, the TV Industry 
coefficient was 0.59 with p = 0.04 and with robust standard errors of 0.29, and the Music 
Industry coefficient was -0.58 with p = 0.01 and with robust standard errors of 0.21.  
Model 6e investigates the first self-regulation event by itself. The Post Self-
Regulation Event coefficient was -0.02, but not significant at p = 0.58 and with a robust 
standard error of 0.03.  Additionally, the TV Industry coefficient was 6.80 with p = 0.00 
and with robust standard errors of 2.0. Also, the control variable Annual Sales coefficient 
was 0.06 with p = 0.05 and with robust standard errors of 0.03. Further, the TV Industry 
coefficient was 0.93 with p = 0.00 and with robust standard errors of 0.29. 
Model 6f investigates the second self-regulation event by itself. The Post Self-
Regulation Event coefficient was -0.02, but not significant at p = 0.59 and with a robust 
standard error of 0.03.  Additionally, no control variables in model 6f were significant.   
All the model 6 tests taken together clearly due not support hypothesis 6 ,that 
after enabling firms implement self-regulation, CPA from digital copyright firms will 
increase. Additionally, several robustness checks were run that varied the length of lag of 
the post-self-regulation event period which also resulted in non-significant results. From 
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this analysis, it is safe to reject this hypothesis. However, organizational researchers’ 
understanding of CPA strategy is limited and this analysis highlights the need for more 
research in CPA strategy, as discussed further in Chapter 7.  
Issue Saliency and Copyright Strategy Effects on Pressure to Self-Regulate 
Table 13 reports the test results for Hypothesis 7. Hypothesis 7 predicts the 
stronger the issue salience for firms, the greater the pressure to self-regulate they will 
place on enabling industries.  For model 7a, the full sample of domestic and foreign firms 
was used. Model 7a tests the effect of how firms with lower issue saliency, due to their 
copyright strategy, pressure enabling firms to self-regulate by using the Merchandise to 
Sales Ratio variable. The Merchandise to Sales Ratio coefficient was 0.00 and significant 
at p = 0.04 and with a robust standard error of 0.04.  Additionally, the Annual Sales 
variable coefficient was 0.15 with p = 0.10 and with robust standard errors of 0.09.  
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Table 11 
Fixed Effects Estimation of Response to Self-Regulation Events on Changes in CPA 
Engagement 
  Model 6a  Model 6b  Model 6c
Variable
Controls 
Only All Events   Event 1   Event 2
Post-Self-Regulation 
Event
 1.11 [0.21]  0.22 
[0.29]
-0.03 [0.47]
(0.88) (0.21) (0.04)
Annual Sales (log)
 0.49 [0.01]  0.48 [0.05]  0.59 
[0.06]
 0.28 [0.31]
(0.17) (0.25) (0.31) (0.28)
Copyright Popularity
 0.02 [0.81]
(0.09)
TV Industry (2)
 1.41 [0.27]  3.85 [0.05]  6.80 
[0.00]
 4.21 [0.24]
(1.27) (1.98) (2.01) (3.55)
Music Industry (3)
-5.28 [0.04] -7.14 [0.00] -0.52 
[0.66]
-5.42 [0.20]
(2.51) (2.44) (1.18) (4.18)
Takedown Agent FE yes yes yes yes
Year Quarter FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,072 2,072 2,072 2,072
R-sq (%) 58.06 75.74  57.07  75.89
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Table 12 
Fixed Effects Estimation of Response to Self-Regulation Events on Changes in CPA 
Engagement 
Note: Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses below the β 
coefficient 
P values are listed in brackets to the right of the β 
coefficient
Industry effects are in reference to the movie industry
  Model 6d  Model 6e  Model 6f
Variable
Controls 
Only All Events   Event 1   Event 2
Post-Self-Regulation 
Event
 0.04 [0.66] -0.02 
[0.58]
-0.02 [0.59]
(0.09) (0.03) (0.03)
Annual Sales (log)
 0.06 [0.01]  0.05 [0.07]  0.06 
[0.05]
 0.04 [0.27]
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Copyright Popularity
 0.01 [0.41]
(0.01)
TV Industry (2)
 0.29 [0.11]  0.59 [0.04]  0.93 
[0.00]
 0.59 [0.13]
(0.19) (0.29) (0.29) (0.39)
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Music Industry (3)
-0.31 [0.06] -0.58 [0.01] -0.08 
[0.49]
-0.51 [0.28]
(0.16) (0.21) (0.12) (0.08)
Takedown Agent FE yes yes yes yes
Year Quarter FE yes yes yes yes
Observations 2,072 2,072 2,072 2,072
R-sq (%) 52.1 77.26  69.04  80.66
Note: Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses below the β 
coefficient 
P values are listed in brackets to the right of the β 
coefficient
Industry effects are in reference to the movie industry
!  cxlv
Further, the Music Industry coefficient was -0.58 with p = 0.01 and with robust 
standard errors of 0.21. While the Merchandise to Sales Ratio was a statistically 
significant predictor of URLs removed, it is not economically significant with 0.00 
coefficient. Due to the negative music industry effect found in model 7a, firms in the 
music industry were dropped in the sample for model 7b to see if they were driving the 
small result. In model 7b, the Merchandise to Sales Ratio coefficient was 0.00 and not 
significant at p = 0.92 and with a robust standard error of 0.04. Additionally, the control 
variables in model 7b were not significant.  
Finally, as most of the firms with licensed merchandise sales were in the movie 
industry, model 7c reduces the sample further to focus just on firms in the movie industry. 
In model 7c, the Merchandise to Sales Ratio coefficient was 0.02 and not significant at p 
= 0.81 and with a robust standard error of 0.07. Additionally, the control variables in 
model 7c were not significant.  
Models 7a, 7b, and 7c taken together do not support hypothesis 7: the stronger the 
issue salience for firms, the greater the pressure to self-regulate they will place on 
enabling industries. However, the lack of support for this hypothesis does not insinuate 
that issue saliency is not important for institutional change action. Instead, the fault may 
lie in the reasoning for hypothesis 7, specifically, the assumption leading to hypothesis 7, 
that firms that generate large revenue from copyrighted media through means other than 
distribution, such as licensed merchandise based on the copyrighted media, are less 
concerned with digital copyright infringement. In retrospect, these firms are likely still 
concerned about digital copyright infringement, as it is directly related to overall 
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copyright protection. Since the key strategy is to generate revenue from copyrighted 
media, through both distribution and licensed merchandise, protecting copyrights is 
generally important. 
Table 13 
Fixed Effects Estimation of Copyright Strategy driven Issue Saliency on Changes in 
URLs Removed through Takedown Notices 
 Model 7a  Model 7b  Model 7c
Variable All Industries   Movie & TV   Movie Only
Merchandise to Sales Ratio
 0.00 [0.04]  0.00 [0.92]  0.02 [0.81]
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07)
Annual Sales (log)
 0.15 [0.10]  0.09 [0.39]  0.13 [0.32]
(0.09) (0.10) (0.04)
Copyright Popularity
-0.01 [0.72] -0.00 [0.94] -0.02 [0.63]
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
TV Industry (2)
-0.35 [0.57] -0.28 [0.67]
(0.82) (0.65)
Music Industry (3)
-0.58 [0.01]
(0.21)
Takedown Agent FE yes yes yes
Year Quarter FE yes yes yes
Observations 5,488 3,836 2,156
R-sq (%) 77.26  65.56  74.51
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Summary 
 Chapter 6 provides a series of analyses to test the study’s seven hypotheses. Table 
14 provides a summary of which hypotheses were supported.  
Note: Robust standard errors are listed in parentheses below the β coefficient 
P values are listed in brackets to the right of the β coefficient
Industry effects are in reference to the movie industry
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Table 14 
Hypotheses Support Summary 
Hy
p. Statement
Support
ed
H1 The more firms directly engage in CPA, the more pressure they will 
place on enabling firms to self-regulate. 
yes
H2
The more firms engage in CPA indirectly through their trade 
association, the more pressure they will place on enabling firms to self-
regulate.
yes
H3
Firms that engage in CPA directly will place greater pressure on 
enabling industries to self-regulate than firms who indirectly engage in 
CPA through trade associations.
yes
H4
Firms without CPA access will place greater pressure on enabling firms 
to self-regulate than firms with CPA access that do not engage in CPA 
but less than firms that do engage in CPA.
yes
H5 After enabling firms implement self-regulation, external pressure to 
self-regulate from digital copyright firms will increase. 
yes
H6 After enabling firms implement self-regulation, CPA from digital 
copyright firms will increase.
no
H7 The stronger the issue salience for firms, the greater the pressure to 
self-regulate they will place on enabling industries
no
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VII. DISCUSSION 
 This dissertation has provided a focused look into how firms strengthen their 
institutional environment after the unplanned and radical weakening of a strong 
regulative institution, by studying and empirically analyzing their institutional response 
to digital piracy. By doing so, this dissertation provides new understanding to several 
areas of management theory including institutional change and nonmarket strategies. The 
following chapter discusses this dissertation’s contribution to management theory, as well 
as boundary conditions, implications for practitioners and policymakers, and areas for 
future studies. 
Theoretical Contributions 
Institutional Change Contributions 
To begin the discussion on this dissertation’s theoretical contribution, I start with 
the broadest contributions relating to institutional change and how firms target multiple 
institutional pillars, before moving to more focused contributions. As such, I will now 
describe four findings that provide new information to the institutional change literature. 
Then, I will describe how these four findings inform Suchman’s institutionalization 
model and relate these findings to the broader institutional change literature. Finally, I 
discuss how these findings generalize beyond Suchman’s model by discussing their 
relation to Scott’s institutionalization model.  
The first two findings deal with the relationship between institutional change 
mechanisms targeting regulative and normative institutional pillars. This dissertation’s 
first finding is that firms engage simultaneously in change actions that target the 
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regulative and normative pillars in order to change their institutional environment. The 
second finding expands on the first, by establishing that firms engaging in regulative 
institutional change actions increase their level of engagement in normative institutional 
change actions. These findings were empirically established by showing that the more 
digital copyright firms engaged in CPA for regulative institutional change, the more 
normative change pressure they placed on enabling firms to self-regulate. 
Additionally, these two findings provide evidence for the third finding, 
specifically that firms in one industry take institutional change action to change the 
institutional environment for firms in a different industry. Further, these industries are not 
traditional market rivals, but instead have overlapping institutional environments. This 
finding was empirically established by analysis that showed that digital copyright firms 
place pressure on enabling firms to self-regulate for normative institutional change. 
Finally, the fourth finding suggests that firms without access to regulative 
institutional change increase their levels of engagement in normative institutional change. 
This finding was empirically established by analysis showing that digital copyright firms 
that do not have CPA access placed more pressure on enabling firms to self-regulate for 
normative institutional change than firms that do have CPA access but did not engage in 
CPA.  
I now return to Suchman’s (1995a) Multistage Model of Institutionalization 
discussed in Chapter 2. To begin, I claimed that the multiple visible response area of 
Suchman’s model was under-researched. Through the subsequent literature review, I 
explained how most institutional change research focuses on actors targeting a single 
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institutional pillar. Further, research that does investigate actors targeting multiple 
institutional pillars has focused on social movement organizations and not firms as the 
focal actor.  
Therefore, findings one and two from this dissertation help inform Suchman’s 
model about how multiple visible responses can include firms targeting multiple 
institutional pillars with their change action. Specifically, this expands the response- 
comparison phase to include combining change action that targets multiple institutional 
pillars. Additionally, the response comparison phase should include that combining 
change action that targets multiple institutional pillars can increase the strength of the 
overall institutional change effort.  Also, finding four expands the response comparison to 
include how the inability to target a particular institutional pillar may result in increased 
engagement in other institutional pillars.  
Finally, finding three expands both the response comparison and the diffusion 
section of Suchman’s model. The response-comparison phase can be expanded to include 
firms targeting other industries when the two industries’ institutional environments 
overlap. This, in turn, informs the diffusion section of Suchman’s model by showing how 
firms need to plan for their institutional environments being changed by firms in different 
industries and take responsive action if needed. 
Each of these findings informs Suchman’s model in a way that provides new 
perspectives on how firms changing institutions are studied. First, these findings inform 
the broad firms engaging in institutional change literature (David, Sine, & Haveman, 
2013; Greenwood & Suddaby, 2006; Haveman, 1993a; Haveman et al., 2001; Peng, 
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2003). Institutional researchers need to be aware that firms may coordinate the 
simultaneous targeting of multiple institutional pillars. Even if it appears obvious that a 
firm is targeting a specific institutional pillar, scholars should still investigate if the firms 
are additionally targeting other institutional pillars. This is especially important, as this 
dissertation shows how targeting one institutional pillar increases the level of institutional 
change action targeting a different institutional pillar. Therefore, if scholars do not 
entertain that firms may be targeting multiple institutional pillars, they could be missing 
an important aspect of the institutional change strategy.  
While this dissertation shows that scholars should look for firms targeting 
multiple institutional pillars, they should also account for when a firm is not able to 
pursue a particular institutional pillar. This finding informs the growing research on firms 
engaging in institutional change in foreign countries where they likely have limited 
access to regulative institutions (K. G.-L. Huang et al., 2017; K. E. Meyer et al., 2009; 
Peng, 2003; Xin & Pearce, 1996). This dissertation shows how the inability to pursue one 
institutional pillar can result in increased institutional change engagement targeting a 
different pillar. Therefore, scholars need to account for not just the presence of targeting 
multiple institutional pillars, but of the absence of targeting singular institutional pillars 
as well.   
These findings, taken as a whole, suggest that institutional scholars should be 
cautious when studying institutional change action that appears to target only one 
institutional pillar. There is a possibility that firms could be simultaneously engaging in 
institutional change action that targets different institutional pillars. Additionally, if a firm 
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is only targeting one institutional pillar, the absence of other institutional pillars needs to 
be accounted for. As such, these recommendations for institutional researchers echo 
remarks from leaders in the field that call for more understanding of the scope of 
institutional change (Micelotta et al., 2017). 
Additionally, institutional researchers need to expand the idea of institutional 
opponents and proponents (Battilana et al., 2009; Suddaby & Greenwood, 2005) to 
include firms in different industries. As such, the concept of firms enacting institutional 
change in firms in different industries brings new opportunities for scholars to see how 
firms use institutional change to either engage in rent-seeking, or lower their transaction 
costs. By having this expanded view of how firms can enact institutional change on firms 
in different industries, there is potential to expand the institutional change literature to 
include a strategic perspective. While such calls to combine the strategy and institutional 
change perspectives are intermittently repeated (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011; Dorobantu et 
al., 2017; Peng et al., 2009), there is still relatively little research in this area compared to 
the rest of the institutional change literature.  
 While these general contributions do expand the institutional change literature, I 
recognize the boundary conditions to this study which are discussed in the next section. 
However, I do believe these findings add to the general institutional change literature. For 
example, while I chose to focus on Suchman’s model in the literature review, as it offers a 
more detailed description of choosing between multiple institutional change responses, 
these findings still relate to other institutionalization models such as Scott’s (1994) Top-
Down and Bottom-Up Process of Institutional Creation and Diffusion model.  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 Scott’s model describes a process of institutions diffusing sanctions to actors (i.e. 
top-down) and the actors engaged in negotiation and invention that influence the 
institutions (i.e. bottom-up). While Scott’s model is intentionally vague to fit many 
scenarios of institutionalization, this dissertation’s findings on the relationship between 
regulative and normative institutional change can help expand both the bottom-up and 
top-down processes in Scott’s model. From the bottom-up process, findings one and two 
provide more nuance in how targeting both regulative and normative institutional pillars 
simultaneously can increase the effectiveness of institutional change action.  
Additionally, finding four expands the bottom-up process by showing how the 
inability to target the regulative institutional pillar can lead to increases in targeting the 
normative institutional pillars. Further, finding three informs both the bottom-up and top-
down processes. The bottom-up process is expanded to include firms enacting 
institutional change in different industries. Therefore, the top-down process needs to 
include sanctions from new institutional arrangements that were constructed by firms in 
different industries.  
In summary, the findings from this dissertation encourage a different perspective 
on how firms engaging in institutional change are studied. However, despite the general 
claims of these findings, firms may not target multiple institutional pillars in response to 
every institutional problem. Additionally, if firms do target multiple institutional pillars, 
they may not do so in the same way as found in this dissertation. Therefore, the next 
section lays out the boundary conditions for this study before discussing the more 
focused findings from the dissertation.  
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Boundary Conditions of the Institutional Problem 
 To begin the discussion on this dissertation’s more specific theoretical 
contributions, I return to the novel problem that started this dissertation. As described at 
the beginning of Chapter 2, the nature of the problem that leads to institutional change is 
responsible for what types of institutional action and outcomes will occur. Therefore, any 
institutional change study should make clear the boundaries of the theoretical 
contribution. Only through a clear understanding of boundary conditions, can scholars 
better understand how institutional change works in varying conditions and determine 
what theory generalizes to broader contexts. As such, I will now briefly restate the 
institutional problem and then layout boundary conditions for the theoretical findings.  
 As stated in Chapter 2, the problem began with the unplanned and radical 
weakening of a strong regulatory institutional environment. Without the mandates on 
appropriate behaviors of the former strong regulatory institution, firms faced new risks 
from other actors deviating from the prior agreed-upon appropriate behavior. Therefore, 
the institutional change question was: how do firms strengthen their institutional 
environment after the unplanned and radical weakening of a strong regulatory institution?   
 This problem sets several boundary conditions that are dependent on the 
institutional context. First, regulatory institutional change needs to be a valid and obvious 
avenue for firms to pursue. Since the institutional environment was dominated by a 
regulatory institution, it is logical that firms will pursue regulatory institutional change 
post weakening. Therefore, institutional environments dominated by either cultural or 
normative institutions will inherently require a different institutional change response.  
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 The second boundary condition from the institutional context is that the regulative 
institutional weakening must be unplanned and severe. If the regulative weakening was 
planned, as in the case of deregulation, then further regulatory institutional change is 
unlikely. Firms are unlikely to engage in regulative institutional change to have 
regulations reinstated after deregulation due to the low likelihood of success. 
Additionally, even if the regulative institutional weakening was unplanned it needs to be 
severe enough to warrant an institutional change response as suggested by Suchman’s 
(1995a) Multistage Model of Institutionalization discussed in Chapter 2.  
 Further, some important boundaries stem from the study’s empirical context. The 
first boundary condition is the relationship between digital copyright firms and enabling 
firms. This relationship is unique in that each group’s institutional environment overlaps.  
This institutional environment overlap allows for the possibility of changing the other 
group’s institutional environment for improvements in their own institutional 
environment. Without this overlap, firms would have no incentive to change a separate 
group’s institutional environment.   
The second boundary condition from the empirical context, is that firms in both 
groups are resource-rich and powerful. The resource abundance and high power allow 
both groups to engage in institutional change actions with greater efficacy.  If one group 
of firms were resource-constrained and had low power, they would be unlikely to engage 
in institutional change action that would influence the other group.  
These boundary conditions are necessary to understand how this dissertation’s 
findings contribute to our theoretical understanding of institutional change. However, just 
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because these boundary conditions set limits to the study’s theoretical findings, it does 
not mean these findings are not generalizable to other institutional change contexts and 
other areas of management theory. Therefore, the broader implications of this study will 
be discussed after the specific theoretical contributions discussion. 
Regulative and Normative Institutional Change Implication 
The first set of hypotheses focuses on various aspects of how CPA engagement 
from firms affects the level of normative pressure they place on enabling firms to self-
regulate. One of the major theoretical contributions comes from the strong support of 
hypothesis 1 that demonstrates the more firms engage in direct CPA, the more normative 
pressure they place on enabling firms to self-regulate.  
From a general institutional change perspective, a theoretical contribution is made 
by providing evidence that firms engage strategically in regulative institutional change 
and normative institutional change simultaneously. More specifically, increased 
engagement in action for changing regulative institutions is related to increases in 
engaging in normative institutional change action. This relationship provides new 
understanding of how firms coordinate and combine change actions that target different 
institutional pillars to improve the overall institutional environment. For instance, digital 
copyright firms that engage in direct CPA for regulative institutional change, place the 
most pressure on enabling firms to self-regulate for normative institutional change. 
Theoretically, this opens a new lens to view how firms engage in institutional change, as 
most studies have focused on changing a single institutional pillar.  
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Additionally, this finding challenges the assumption that normative institutional 
change is less utilitarian and self-interest driven than regulative institutional change 
actions (Granovetter, 1985; North, 1990; Scott, 2010). The digital copyright firms in this 
study strategically use normative institutional change action for their own self-interest 
and improvement of their business environment. This finding gives credence to the call to 
study institutional change with a more strategy focused lens (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011; 
Dorobantu et al., 2017; Peng et al., 2009).  
Further, this finding provides a better understanding of the regulative institutional 
change process. While regulative institutional change has long been recognized, the 
understanding of how regulative institutional change has occurred remains relatively 
static. Previous studies focus on how firms directly engage with policymakers and 
regulators via CPA to change regulative institutions (Hillman et al., 2004). Yet, how firms 
use other actions to bolster their regulative change attempts are under-researched. This 
study’s finding - that normative institutional change bolsters regulative institutional 
change - provides a more nuanced understanding as to how firms engage in regulative 
institutional change. This finding opens the door to examine relationships between 
cultural institutional change and regulative change as well.  
This finding also provides a new theoretical understanding of the nonmarket 
strategy literature. First, pressure for industries to self-regulate has thus far only been 
viewed as originating from government regulators (A. A. King & Lenox, 2000). This 
study demonstrates that pressure to self-regulate can come from firms outside the focal 
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industry. This by itself opens up the industry self-regulation literature to a more strategic 
perspective on how institutional rivals may pressure other industries to self-regulate. 
Additionally, while both CPA and self-regulation have been mapped to regulative 
and normative institutional change respectively, there has been no study that evaluates 
their relationship.  By demonstrating that increased CPA activity is related to increased 
pressure to self-regulate, we begin to understand how nonmarket strategies are combined 
to create institutional change and improve the institutional environment. This finding is a 
foray into empirically understanding the relationship between different nonmarket 
strategies. As the nonmarket strategy literature has grown, researchers have recently 
called for studies evaluating the relationship between different nonmarket strategies 
(Dorobantu et al., 2017; Mellahi et al., 2016).   
Indirectly Engaging in Institutional Change 
 Hypotheses 2 and 3 investigate the effects of firms engaging in CPA indirectly 
through trade associations on the level of normative pressures placed on enabling firms to 
self-regulate. Taken together, these hypotheses show that firms engaging in CPA 
indirectly place higher levels of pressure on enabling firms to self-regulate than firms that 
do not engage in CPA, but less than firms that engage in CPA directly. These findings 
provide some interesting theoretical contributions to the role trade associations play in 
institutional change. 
 First, while trade associations have long been recognized as institutional change 
actors (Galvin, 2002; Lenway & Rehbein, 1991), little has been theorized and tested 
about their institutional change performance as compared to firms engaging directly in 
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institutional change. The results suggest that the firms acting indirectly through trade 
associations have lower legitimacy as institutional change actors than firms acting 
directly as an institutional change agent. Perhaps a limit to this finding is that the 
industries in this study contained many large firms that have the ability to engage directly 
in institutional change. This finding may not hold for industries comprised of smaller 
firms.  
 Additionally, the finding in hypothesis 3 - that firms that engage in more indirect 
CPA place less pressure on enabling firms to self-regulate than firms that engage in less 
indirect CPA - is theoretically interesting. This finding suggests that the more often firms 
have a trade association act on their behalf, the less direct institutional change action they 
will take themselves. This finding is reinforced by Barnett’s (2013) findings that large 
resource-rich firms dominate trade associations’ strategic direction.  
Foreign Firms Role in Domestic Institutional Change 
 Hypothesis 4 investigates the role of foreign firms that do not have access to CPA 
on the level of normative pressures placed on enabling firms to self-regulate. The 
findings were that foreign firms, that inherently do not have CPA access, place more 
pressure on enabling firms to self-regulate than domestic firms that do not engage in 
CPA. However, foreign firms also placed less pressure on enabling firms to self-regulate 
than domestic firms that engage in CPA.  
These findings provide additional understanding of the literature on how foreign 
actors engage in institutional change. Most of the institutional change literature that 
includes foreign actors focuses on foreign actors in emerging economies (Peng, 2003; 
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Peng & Heath, 1996).  However, little is known about foreign firms engaging in 
institutional change in developed economies. This finding suggests that foreign firms will 
pursue other institutional change actions when the regulative institutional change avenue 
is blocked. Additionally, their level of engagement will be greater than domestic firms 
that do not engage in regulative institutional change, but less than domestic firms that do 
engage in regulative institutional change.  
These findings are especially intriguing considering the current concerns in the 
US about foreign influence in social media to shape the US political landscape. Given 
this study found that foreign firms pursued normative change when regulative change 
was restricted, it is plausible that foreign firms would also pursue cognitive institutional 
change in different settings. Therefore, this finding opens up new avenues for 
institutional scholars to better understand how foreign firms influence domestic 
regulative institutions.  
Response to Self-Regulation 
Hypotheses 5 and 6 explored the responses of digital copyright firms to the 
enabling firm’s self-regulation events. The support of hypothesis 5 demonstrates that 
digital copyright firms respond to self-regulation events with increased normative 
pressure for more self-regulation. This finding gives new insight into the strategic use of 
normative pressure and self-regulation from both an offensive and defensive perspective. 
As such, it expands our knowledge about the relationship between institutional rivals 
pressuring firms in other industries to self-regulate, as was discussed previously. 
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From the offensive perspective, the self-regulation event is a sign of the 
successful use of normative pressure and as an indication to increase normative pressure 
for hopes of more self-regulation. From a defensive perspective, firms implementing self-
regulation should be prepared for an increase in normative pressure after implementing 
self-regulation.  
Additionally, the threat of more regulation still looms for defensive firms, and 
self-regulation is shown to be an effective defensive measure at preventing regulation. 
Therefore, defensive firms need to weigh the risks when deciding whether or not to 
implement self-regulation.  The risk of implementing self-regulation is an increase in 
normative pressure from your institutional rival, while decreasing the chances of 
additional government regulation. This option is desirable if the threat of government 
regulation is high or the normative pressure from the institutional rival firms is weak 
enough to ignore. The other option is to not implement self-regulation and increase the 
chance of additional government regulations, while keeping normative pressure from 
institutional rivals lower. This option is desirable if the threat of additional government 
regulations is weak or the defensive firm fears an increase in normative pressure from 
institutional rival firms.  
The strategic implications from the offensive and defensive perspective of self-
regulation give credence to the recent calls to understand nonmarket strategy from a 
strategic perspective (Dorobantu et al., 2017; Mellahi et al., 2016). Researchers have only 
recently been looking at nonmarket strategy in a competitive lens (Dorobantu et al., 2017; 
Rudy & Johnson, 2016) and as such, strategy scholars know little about how firms 
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respond to strategic events with nonmarket strategy. This gap is exemplified by the lack 
of findings for hypothesis 6 that investigated the CPA response to self-regulation events.  
Though hypothesis 6 is clearly not supported, it does raise the issue of 
organizational scholars’ lack of understanding about how firms strategically engage in 
CPA. While it is recognized why firms engage in CPA, the nuances of how firms engage 
in CPA are understudied. New research should investigate how firms vary CPA 
engagement based on industry and competitor events, as well as political events.   
Generalizing the Findings and Future Studies 
 As I chose to open the discussion chapter with boundary conditions for this study, 
I am intentional in my constraint to not overgeneralize the theoretical contributions. 
However, I do believe these findings are more than just a description of the fight for 
digital copyright protection. Hence, the following section discusses how these findings 
generalize to management research. In addition, I also discuss how future studies can 
expand the new theory generated in this study.  
 The first generalized area is this study demonstrates how firms can strengthen 
their institutional change efforts by coordinating actions that target multiple institutional 
pillars.  While this study shows how normative and regulative change actions are used in 
conjunction to change the institutional environment, other combinations including 
cultural institutions are possible.  Therefore, researchers should look to understand how 
combining change actions that target different institutional pillars could strengthen and 
weaken each other. For example, it is possible that cultural institutional change could turn 
actors against an existing regulative institution, which may encourage regulative 
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institutional change. While not every institutional context is ripe for coordinated change 
actions that target multiple institutional pillars, researchers should look for contexts to 
create institutional context typologies where coordinated or solo institutional pillar 
targeting strategies are better suited.  
 Additionally, this study investigates an empirical context - the unplanned and 
radical weakening of a strong regulative institutional environment - in which little 
attention has been given.  However, it is easy to imagine an increase in scenarios where 
strong regulative institutions are radically weakened. With the exponential increase in 
technological change and the inability for policymakers to respond effectively to 
technological change, this institutional context is likely to become more common. While 
the exact findings of this study are likely to not generalize to every similar institutional 
context, I predict some findings will. The coordination of targeting multiple institutional 
pillars is probable given the high likelihood of a sole regulative institutional change 
response being unsuccessful.  
More research is needed in empirical contexts where the unplanned and radical 
weakening of regulative institutions occurs to be able to create comparative studies of 
how institutional change happens in this institutional context scenario. A similar 
institutional environment context surrounds the fight between rideshare companies and 
taxi companies in how rideshare is regulated. In the US, taxi service is heavily regulated 
at the municipal level. These regulations include limits on the number of taxis, areas of 
operation, special licensing for drivers, and fare rates. However, rideshare companies 
such as Uber and Lyft were able to circumnavigate the regulations in many cities. The 
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ride shares companies were able to do this by claiming they were not taxi services and 
have no employees, as they only coordinate service for independent contractors. Over the 
last few years, municipalities have passed specific regulations for rideshare companies, 
but rideshare is still significantly less regulated than taxis (Cetin & Deakin, 2019).  
From an institutional perspective, the private car for hire industry was under a 
strong regulative environment. However, the meteoric rise of rideshare radically 
weakened the institutional environments for this industry. Again, researching this 
institutional context could provide a good comparison for this study. There are some 
differences with this context that could provide especially interesting contrasts. The first 
is that the taxi companies have many fewer financial resources compared to the digital 
copyright firms in this study, which may limit the strength of their institutional change 
actions. However, taxi companies may be powerful in other ways, such as having close 
ties to the local government. Additionally, the taxi context contains municipal level 
regulations instead of the federal level regulations of the digital copyright context and 
may therefore also show differences.     
Another similar institutional context surrounds the opioid crisis in the US and 
other countries. Every process in the opioid life cycle, from manufacturing, distribution, 
and prescription, to individual possession, is heavily regulated. Yet, despite these heavy 
regulations, many pharmaceutical companies, medical clinics, and pharmacies across the 
US were knowingly oversupplying regional populations with an incredibly high number 
of opioids. The oversupply, paired with the highly addictive opioids, caused an opioid 
epidemic in the US and other countries (DeWeerdt, 2019) 
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From an institutional perspective, pharmaceutical drug manufacturing and 
distribution operated in a once strong regulative institutional environment. However, the 
regulative institutional environment was weakened enough to allow pharmaceutical 
companies, medical clinics, and pharmacies oversupply opioids. Studying both how this 
regulatory institutional environment radically weakened and the institutional change 
response after the opioid epidemic, though it is still unfolding, may provide interesting 
parallels and differences to this study.  
 Another piece of new theory generated from this study that generalizes to other 
contexts is how foreign actors with restricted access to domestic regulative institutions 
will pursue institutional change by targeting other institutional pillars. Given how many 
issues have global implications, yet fall under regional regulative jurisdiction, it is likely 
there exist many issues where foreign actors will benefit from institutional change in 
other countries. Since direct regulative institutional change through CPA is unlikely, these 
foreign actors will engage in other types of institutional changes. Again, while this study 
focuses on normative change, cultural institutional change actions may also come into 
play. Therefore, future research can look at both offensive measures from foreign actors 
and defensive measures to stop or lessen foreign influence.  
 An interesting institutional context for focusing on foreign actors targeting 
multiple institutional pillars is US-based social media being influenced by foreign actors 
during the 2016 election. From an institutional perspective, foreign actors are prohibited 
from influencing other nations’ democratic elections, and hence a direct path to regulative 
institution change is limited. However, Russian-backed agents, creating fake news and 
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propagating misinformation on social media, were able to influence the regulative 
institutional change process. Additionally, there has been no new policy to regulate social 
media’s vulnerabilities to foreign actors influencing political information since the 2016 
election. Yet, multiple social media firms have enacted self-regulation in order to quell 
the influence of foreign actors (Kozlowska, 2019).  Again, a study on this institutional 
context could expand the findings from this study about foreign actors targeting different 
institutional pillars to indirectly influence regulative institutions.  
 Another theoretical contribution from this study that is likely to generalize is the 
now deeper understanding of industry self-regulation. This study demonstrates how 
pressure for industries to self-regulate does not have to only come from government 
regulators, but may also come from firms in peripheral industries that will benefit from 
the self-regulation. This contribution opens a new lens to view how firms benefit from 
pressuring firms in other industries to self-regulate and supports the institutional change 
as a strategy perspective (Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011; Peng et al., 2009). This strategy 
may be useful for firms in established industries to slow the progress of firms in fast-
growing nascent industries or in established industries that are branching into a new 
space.  
Further, historically nonmarket strategies have been studied separately. However, 
there is a growing call for action for research to integrate different types of nonmarket 
strategies (Doh, Lawton, & Rajwani, 2012; Dorobantu et al., 2017; Mellahi et al., 2016). 
This dissertation aids this integration by providing empirical evidence and a theoretical 
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explanation that CPA and industry self-regulation are linked as offensive and defensive 
actions for institutional change.  
Finally, this dissertation contributes to the IP institutional environment literature. 
Research in this area has recently expanded with the inclusion of IP appropriation in 
weak and transitioning economies (K. G.-L. Huang et al., 2017; Zhao, 2006). However, 
IP institutional environment research has largely ignored contexts where strong IP 
institutional environments are weakening (Greenstein, Lerner, & Stern, 2013).  The 
findings from this study show a strong institutional response to restore IP rights. While I 
do expect industries in similar IP institutional environments to have a similar institutional 
response, this may not be the case for all industries.  
Other industries may choose to forego an institutional change response and 
instead choose different product-based options. For example, some software companies 
have chosen to pursue software as a service that provides and hosts the software which 
makes it copyright infringement more difficult (Atkinson & Draheim, 2013). Other 
software firms have chosen to move to a subscription model where they offer frequent 
updates to the software. This model diminishes the effects of digital copyright 
infringement, as older software versions are no longer supported and missing critical 
updates (Hill, 2007). These alternative approaches suggest that there are differences in 
how industries will respond to weakening regulative institutions that are based on the 
ability to protect IP with market-based solutions. Therefore, comparative studies of 
different industries response to the general regulative institutional weakening of IP rights 
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may yield new understanding about when firms choose institutional change or a different 
path.   
Limitations 
 As with any study, this dissertation contains some limitations. First, this study 
develops and tests hypotheses based on a specific institutional context. As discussed at 
length in the boundary conditions section of this chapter, focusing on one institutional 
context limits the generalizability of the findings. As such, more research is needed in 
different institutional contexts to better understand how the findings on both how firms 
target multiple institutional pillars to enact institutional change and how firms strengthen 
their institutional environment after the unplanned and radical weakening of the strong 
regulative institutions generalize to other settings. As such, several additional institutional 
contexts that are suitable for future studies were discussed throughout this chapter.  
 The second limitation is that the measure for CPA in this study only includes 
lobbying activity. Lobbying activity was used as the CPA measure, as it can be directly 
linked from the firm to the digital copyright issue, whereas other forms of CPA cannot, 
such as political action committees (PAC) donations for candidate elections. However, 
several digital copyright firms in the sample likely donated to PACs explicitly to 
influence the digital copyright issue. Unfortunately for researchers, the laws around PAC 
donations do not require the focal issue to be disclosed, as is the case with lobbying. 
Additionally, PACs can easily hide the identity of donors through the common practice of 
creating an NGO to handle the candidate election donations, as NGOs are not required to 
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disclose their donors (Barker & Wang, 2011). This is commonly known as “dark money” 
and presents a challenge for researchers measuring firms CPA.  
 Another limitation is concerned with hypothesis 4, which makes predictions about 
firms without CPA access. The without CPA access variable is operationalized where all 
foreign firms are categorized as not having CPA access. This operationalization then 
groups all foreign firms together, which likely includes several other differences 
compared to domestic firms besides just not having CPA access.  Therefore, the 
operationalization can also be interpreted as firms located in the US or outside the US. 
Ideally, an operationalization would exist where some foreign firms have CPA access and 
some do not. However, this is not possible given the geographic constraint to CPA access 
in the US. 
Management Implications 
 The primary managerial implication comes from the use of nonmarket strategies 
for improvements to a firm’s business environment. In general, managers faced with a 
changing institutional context that significantly harms their performance should view 
nonmarket strategies as a way to improve their business environment, even if the results 
may not be immediate. More specifically, firms engaging in CPA should investigate if 
other nonmarket strategies, such as pressuring further industries to self-regulate, may 
bolster their institutional change actions.  
 From a defensive perspective, firms who are facing the potential of regulative 
institutional change from the actions of firms in other industries should investigate self-
regulation as a means to prevent or weaken these attempts. However, defensive firms 
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should weigh this option with the likelihood that normative pressure from institutional 
rival firms will likely increase. Thus, determining which is the bigger threat, the chance 
of new regulations or increased normative pressure,  may decide their self-regulation 
strategy.  
 Slightly more general, established firms should be sure to include an institutional 
impact component when assessing the emergence and rise of new technologies and 
industries. This is especially so for firms that model their behavior on regulative 
institutions. By identifying an institutional threat before it is fully realized, firms can take 
preemptive actions, both with policymakers and with firms enabling the technological 
change that may lessen the institutional impact of the new technology.  
Policy Implications 
 This study’s first policy implication is rather straightforward and nothing new for 
policymakers.  When firms are faced with an unplanned and radical regulatory 
weakening, they will attempt to influence policymakers to create new regulations that 
restore the regulative strength. If these efforts are unsuccessful, firms will take improving 
their business environment into their own hands and pursue other institutional change 
actions. Therefore, the issue for policymakers is: will firms or the government create new 
institutions that affect society.  
Further, this study highlights how technological change can weaken long-standing 
institutions and highlights how complex technological change can be.  From a policy 
perspective, it can be quite daunting to create regulations that mitigate the negative 
effects of technological change. However, policymakers need to make strong efforts to 
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understand the technological change and its impact on industry and broader society. 
Again, given the rapid pace of technological change, I expect policymakers will continue 
to struggle in this area.  
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VIII. Conclusion 
 This dissertation provided a deep exploration of a novel institutional question: 
how do firms restore strength to their institutional environment after the unplanned and 
radical weakening of a strong regulatory institution. Through analyzing this institutional 
problem, new theory was created and tested that led to two primary contributions and two 
secondary contributions to the institutional change literature. These contributions, which 
are discussed in detail in Chapter 7, are briefly reviewed presently.  
The first primary contribution was the new theory created on the positive 
relationship between regulative and normative change actions. This theory was supported 
by empirically showing the more digital copyright firms engage in CPA, the more 
normative pressure they place on enabling firms to self-regulate. By demonstrating 
theoretically and empirically how firms use target multiple institutional pillars in this 
institutional context, a new avenue is opened for institutional change researchers.  Future 
research can compare how firms target multiple institutional pillars, including cultural 
institutions, in different institutional contexts to further elaborate on this theory.  
The second primary contribution was the new theory that shows how firms in one 
industry attempt to improve their business environment by engaging in institutional 
change action against firms in a different industry. This theory was demonstrated by the 
collection of supported hypotheses related to offensive actions from digital copyright 
firms directed at enabling firms. This theoretical contribution opens up institutional 
change research to include a more strategy-based focus in which firms may improve their 
business environment by enacting institutional change on firms in different industries.  
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The first secondary theoretical contribution was the new theory on how the 
inability to directly enact regulative institutional change is related to foreign firms 
increasing their normative institutional change actions, compared to domestic firms that 
do not engage in CPA. This theory was supported by empirically showing that foreign 
digital copyright firms without CPA access place more normative pressure on enabling 
firms than domestic firms with CPA access but do not engage in CPA. The implication of 
this theory encourages researchers to reexamine foreign firms in institutional change. 
Further, researchers should not assume that foreign firms are unable to change regulative 
institutions just because they do not have the direct ability to do so.  
The second, new secondary theoretical contribution theory explains the 
relationship between two nonmarket strategies CPA and industry self-regulation, and how 
they can be combined to form institutional change strategies for firms to improve their 
business environment. This theory was supported by empirically showing the more 
digital copyright firms engage in CPA, the more normative pressure they place on 
enabling firms to self-regulate. Additionally, new theory was created and supported 
regarding the dynamics of industry self-regulation that shows how the pressure to self-
regulate can come from firms in different industries. Both of these contributions provide 
evidence that nonmarket strategies can and should be studied as strategic actions to 
improve firm performance by changing the business environment. 
These four theoretical contributions taken together demonstrate that firms can 
engage in dynamic and orchestrated institutional change strategies to improve their 
business environment. Further, institutional change strategy can include changing firms 
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in different industries institutional environment, which may lead to a decline in the other 
industry’s business environment. Collectively, these contributions lead to strong support 
for studying institutional change as a dynamic and orchestrated strategy used by firms.  
My plan is for this dissertation to spur a research stream for myself, and hopefully 
others, that studies institutional change from a more strategy-based perspective. While 
some efforts have been made to study institutional change from a strategy perspective 
(Ahuja & Yayavaram, 2011; Peng et al., 2009), this area has seen relatively little attention 
in the management field. Given the increasing power of firms in society, and the potential 
for institutional change to affect the broader society, this research perspective will only 
continue to grow in importance. I look forward to the theoretical and empirical 
contributions I can make in this area.  
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